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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Windsor, 
that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional.1  
DOMA defined marriage as solely between one man and one woman for 
every purpose under federal law.2  Consequently, it required that same-sex 
couples who are legally married under state law be denied both federal 
recognition of their marriages and a host of federal benefits (and burdens) 
that apply to heterosexual married couples.  DOMA had been challenged in 
federal courts across the country as a violation of the U.S. Constitution.  
Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that it violated the Spending Clause, Equal 
Protection under the Fifth Amendment, and federalism under the Tenth 
Amendment.3  The First and Second U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal, had 
previously concluded that DOMA violates Equal Protection, affirming 
district court grants of summary judgment.4  Windsor was decided as this 
                                                          
 1. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013); Jeremy W. Peters, 
Cold, Wet Wait for Tickets to Supreme Court’s Same-sex Marriage Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Late Edition, Mar. 26, 2013, at 14; see also The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining marriage for purposes of federal law); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006) (providing that no state is required to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in another state). 
 3. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376-77 (D. Mass. 
2010) (contending an Equal Protection challenge against DOMA, as embodied in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Mass. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235-36 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(challenging DOMA under the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment), aff’d, 682 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)  (asserting DOMA violates Equal Protection), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir. 2012), aff’d, 12-307, 2013 WL 3196928 (June 26, 2013). 
 4. See Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, No. 12-97 (June 27, 2013); Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188. 
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article went to press.  In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court 
determined that in passing DOMA and banning same-sex couples married 
under state law from receiving any federal marriage benefits, Congress had 
interfered with the rights of states to define marriage and thereby, had 
violated the rights of Windsor and other couples to Equal Protection.  At 
press time, the Court still had not yet formally determined the fate of 
several other certiorari petitions seeking review of DOMA-related issues, 
although some might argue that Windsor is practically determinative.5  And 
on the same day that it decided Windsor, the Supreme Court also decided a 
case challenging a state’s right to limit the term “marriage” to heterosexual 
couples.6 
This article focuses on the issues raised by DOMA and the federal 
recognition of state-approved same-sex marriages.  While the Supreme 
Court invalidated DOMA, its decision in Windsor reserved judgment on 
some key questions that DOMA raised.  For example, the Court stated that 
"by history and tradition" the states controlled marriage, but it did not 
define that control itself as a constitutional restriction.  The Court also 
expressly acknowledged that the federal government can sometimes 
deviate from the states on marriage when federal policy is as at issue.  
While indicating the instances were limited, the Court did not identify the 
                                                          
 5. See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013).  The Windsor 
plaintiff argued that the denial of a federal marital estate tax deduction (allowing one to 
give an unlimited amount to a spouse free from estate and gift taxes) on the ground that 
she was married to a person of the same-sex, violated her Equal Protection rights under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 175-76; see also 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Mass., No. 12-
15 (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter HHS v. Mass. Cert. Pet.], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0015.pet.aa.pdf (filing for 
certiorari with Gill); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. 
of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill, No. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012), 
[hereinafter BLAG v. Gill Cert. Pet.] available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/06-29-
2012-gill-v-opm-blag-certiorari-petition.pdf (challenging the finding of an Equal 
Protection violation in Gill); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, 
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinsky, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012) [hereinafter OPM v. 
Golinsky Cert. Pet.] available at 
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0016.pet.aa.pdf (seeking to 
bypass the Court of Appeals); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, 
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 12-231 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter 
Pedersen v. OPM Cert. Pet.], available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/pedersen-v-opm/pedersen-plaintiffs-cert-
petition-08-21-12.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, Office of 
Pers. Mgmt. v. Pedersen, No. 12-302 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012) [hereinafter OPM v. 
Pedersen Cert. Pet.], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0302.pet.aa.pdf. 
 6. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 12-144 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (holding that given the 
state official’s refusal to defend the statute before the Supreme Court, the Court has no 
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the California revision of the state constitution to ban 
same-sex marriage, and the lower federal court decision invalidating the revision 
stands). 
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line between state and federal power.  In support of its claim that DOMA 
made same-sex couples second-class citizens in violation of Equal 
Protection, the majority did list several benefits that same-sex couples were 
denied.  But it did no serious examination of the purposes of these 
underlying statutes to find what the federal policy vindicated by those 
statutes was, nor did counsel for either side.  The Court also did not settle 
the debate over the purpose of marriage in the United States—whether it is 
primarily to support procreation as DOMA defenders argued or whether 
government support of marriage is to facilitate the formation of consensual 
family relationships irrespective of procreation as the DOMA challengers 
claimed.  Indeed, the word "procreation" did not even appear in the 
majority opinion, probably because it relied solely upon DOMA's scope to 
invalidate the statute.  And finally, and relatedly, the Court expressly 
declined to say whether the federal government was required to grant 
uniform benefits to same-sex couples and heterosexual couples as a 
matter of Equal Protection if states recognizing such marriages did not 
distinguish the two groups of couples.  Thus, we are left to ask whether 
procreation is a legitimate basis for the distribution of some federal 
benefits?  Is biological difference a legitimate basis for distinguishing 
funding among the married?  If so, can heterosexuality alone be a marker 
for procreation or biological difference? Would a regime for same-sex 
couples that does not use the term "marriage," but provides federal benefits 
satisfy Equal Protection?  Do the benefits provided have to be exactly 
equal?  Do same-sex couples have a constitutional right to have their 
marriages called "marriage" at the federal level if their respective state uses 
that term?  And if some differentiation in the treatment of marriage is 
allowed either on the basis of procreational status or otherwise, what 
standard of review applies to denials of marriage-related benefits to same-
sex couples?7     
While all litigation is partisan, the political battle over same-sex 
marriage has made the legal cases quite so.  While the Department of 
Justice once defended DOMA, President Barack Obama has now ordered 
them to cease doing so, asserting that he believes that DOMA is 
                                                          
     7. See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 slip op. at 14-15 (U.S. June 26, 
2013) (stating that states control marriage under history and tradition but that the 
federal government can effect federal policy through marriage rules); id. at 22-25 
(mentioning benefits denied to same-sex couples as evidence of second-class status 
marital status under DOMA); id. at 16 (referring again to "history and tradition"); id. at 
17 (declaring that it is unnecessary to decide whether federal benefits must be uniform 
as state benefits are for same-sex couples and heterosexual couples); id. at 20 (noting 
that DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York state seeks to protect); see id. at 
17-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for conveniently ignoring the 
question of the standard of scrutiny or any discussion of substantive due process); id. at 
8-10 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court should not decide whether or not 
procreation or consent is the basis of marriage).  
CARTER 5/17/2013 8/10/2013  2:38:40 PM 
710 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:4 
unconstitutional.8  Before that, the Obama Administration abandoned one 
of the key reasons that Congress put forth for passing DOMA: that it is 
related to a federal interest in responsible procreation.9  Although Congress 
passed DOMA by a wide margin, members are now backpedaling wildly 
from the legislation.10  Commentators on all sides have imposed pressure to 
achieve their desired outcomes.11  Law professors, historians, and advocacy 
groups, have all chimed in with amicus briefs for their favored sides.12  
There is a pressing need for a sound historical record on past federal 
inroads into marriage and for proposals that recognize both the long history 
of discrimination against gay and lesbian Americans and Congress’ right to 
                                                          
 8. However, the Administration has said it will still enforce DOMA.  See Letter 
from Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.  The Republican 
members of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives 
(“BLAG”) then intervened.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 12-14, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
786 (2012) [hereinafter “BLAG Windsor Merits Brief”]. 
 9. In 2010, in a reply brief in Smelt v. County of Orange, the Department of 
Justice ("DOJ") first indicated the retreat.  It stated, “[T]he government does not 
contend that there are legitimate government interests in creating a legal structure that 
promotes the raising of children by both of their biological parents or that the 
government’s interest in 'responsible procreation' justifies Congress’s decision to define 
marriage as a union between one man and one woman.”  It said further,a “[T]he United 
States does not believe that DOMA is rationally related to any legitimate government 
interests in procreation and child-rearing and is therefore not relying upon any such 
interests to defend DOMA’s constitutionality.”  Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant United States of America Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, Smelt v. Cnty of 
Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 959 (2006).  The 
brief was filed on August 17, 2009.  This abandonment of the procreation support 
position was continued in subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 
(discussing the government’s abandonment of Congress’s justifications for DOMA), 
aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
Notably, Justice Kagan was Solicitor General at the time that the government filed its 
brief in Smelt.  Compare Obama Said to Pick Solicitor General for the Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2010, at 1, with Lyle Denniston, Kagan, DOMA and Recusal, 
SCOTUSblog, (Nov. 2, 2012, 4:59 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/kagan-doma-
and-recusal/ (suggesting that the Solicitor General must have been involved in the 
decision to abandon argument that procreation is not key to marriage policy). 
 10. See Mass. v. HHS, 682 F.3d at 6 (noting the “strong majorities” in both houses 
when DOMA was passed and that President Clinton signed it); Brief of 172 Members 
of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the Merits, Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. at 786; Peter Baker, Now in Defense of Gay Marriage, Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2013, at 1. 
 11. The Obama Administration’s initial defense of DOMA upset same-sex 
marriage advocates; the abandonment of the procreation argument angered 
conservatives.  Compare Frank Rich, 40 Years Later, Still Second-Class Americans, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at 8, with Ed Whelan, The Massachusetts DOMA Rulings—
Some Commentary on Gill v. OPM, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 9, 2010, 12:10 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/230892/massachusetts-doma-rulings-
some-commentary-i-gill-v-opm-i/ed-whelan. 
 12. For a listing of briefs filed in the key cases see website of the Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) at http://www.glad.org/doma/documents/. 
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set priorities in public funding decisions, including those related to 
marriage. 
This article seeks to contribute to those ends.  Part II considers the 
historical origins of American notions that some matters are “local” issues, 
including marriage. It argues that the notions arise out of (1) the American 
colonial experience, (2) the notion that "the people" (not merely states) rule 
in a democracy, and (3) conflict of laws theory.  I point out that conflict of 
laws theory has historically differentiated between the law governing the 
validity of a marriage and that governing the incidents that flowed from 
that marriage. 
Part III offers five cases in which the federal government has deviated 
from state or local laws on the validity of a marriage: (1) the recognition of 
marriages according to slave custom for purposes of providing military 
pensions to the families of black soldiers during the Civil War; (2) the 
federal government’s authorization and oversight of marriages among ex-
slaves during and after the Civil War; (3) the treatment of polygamy in 
Utah Territory; (4) the treatment of polygamy and fraudulent marriages in 
immigration; and (5) the treatment of American Indian marriages.  Items 1 
and 2—the federal recognition of slave marriages and federal oversight of 
the marrying of ex-slaves—have either been not mentioned or 
mischaracterized in DOMA litigation.  They are extremely important to 
understanding the extent and limits of federal power.  The government’s 
efforts to end polygamy in Utah are often couched as tale of moral 
judgment or religious intolerance.  I will demonstrate that the Supremacy 
Clause played a significant role in the government's actions, although other 
factors also contributed.  Part III then discusses cases in which Congress 
recognized the validity of the marriage, but applied different incidents than 
state or local law would have advised.  I offer but two of many examples: 
(1) the decision to give married women a legal share of land in Oregon 
Territory, separate from their husbands under the Oregon Donation Law of 
1850 and (2) Congress’ decision to abandon deference to state marital 
property rules in the income tax controversy over community property 
states versus separate property states in the 1930s and 1940s.  To this 
writer’s knowledge, the Oregon Donation law has not been discussed in 
DOMA cases and the income tax history that I discuss has been referenced 
peripherally and for other points. 
Part IV summarizes the findings with respect to what history says about 
the federal law of marriage.  I argue that federal conflict of law rules are 
likely a key source of the history and tradition of deference to local (not 
merely state) law on marriage that the Supreme Court identified in 
Windsor.  These rules join with limited federal constitutional powers to 
produce the pattern of deference. Traditionally, under those conflict of law 
rules, the validity of a marriage has been governed by local law (not merely 
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state law), subject to serious public policy concerns.  However, the 
incidents that a government chooses to attach to a marriage have not been 
consistently subject to such a rule of deference.    Federal deviations from 
state and local determinations of validity or with respect to what incidents 
should flow from a marriage have historically fallen into three categories.  
Congress has deviated (1) to vindicate Constitutional interests; (2) to 
vindicate statutory, rule, or treaty interests; and (3) to vindicate non-
constitutional, non-statutory interests.  In these decisions, Congress has 
also considered the role of the majority of the states and the common law’s 
traditional approach.  The central question for courts is, then, what is the 
purpose of Congress' deviation. 
Part V recognizes that there are really three DOMAs. One DOMA 
bundled all of marriages’ benefits making them impervious to same-sex 
couples married under state law. That DOMA is now dead.  Another 
DOMA collapsed into the underlying statutes that it defined.  That DOMA 
may very well still live, at least in part.  And the third DOMA was merely 
an exercise of the right of the federal government to define its own terms.  
This DOMA as a restrictive definition applicable to all marriage benefits is 
effectively dead, but it may survive in effect in individual instances in 
which the second DOMA also survives.  Then, focusing on the second 
"unbundled" DOMA, Part V argues that if there is legitimate authority for 
the approach of DOMA as a substantive statute, that authority must be 
found in the underlying statutes; there too one must look for evidence of 
purpose.  Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts did this analysis 
in DOMA litigation nor did the parties signal in any serious way that such 
an analysis was necessary.  The section makes its point by examples, 
discussing four groups of statutes and their relationship to procreation:  the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), the Social Security 
statutes, income tax treatment of marital income, and the estate and gift tax 
marital deduction at issue in Windsor.  This section provides evidence that 
some federal statutes seek to respond to the unique biological imbalance in 
the heterosexual couple and a unique history of discrimination through 
marriage policy.  It concludes that the first three of these sets of statutes do 
indeed evidence a defensible federal interest in procreation support.  The 
marital deduction at issue in Windsor, however, cannot be justified on any 
ground reasonably related to procreation.  
Part VI then proposes a framework for analyzing DOMA.  I suggest that 
the Supreme Court should borrow from the division in conflict of law rules 
between the validity of a marriage and its incidents.  Under the proposal, 
federal benefits that directly affect the right to be a marital family (e.g., 
"family rights") should be assessed by looking to state law designations of 
who is married.  Denials of this class of federal benefits should be subject 
to intermediate scrutiny for purposes of federal Equal Protection review.  
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On the other hand, I propose that benefits that do not directly affect the 
family relationship that is marriage, should be guided by spending priorities 
set in federal law.  These benefits are akin to the "incidents" of a marriage 
in conflict of laws theory.  I also call these rights “branch” rights.  Denials 
of these rights should be subject to a rational basis test, not merely because 
they are incidents, but also because, as I will show, although they have 
suffered rank family discrimination by way of the denial of marriage, 
same-sex couples have not historically suffered by way of the denial of 
marriage rank economic discrimination of the type that has traditionally 
been covered by Equal Protection.  Of course, in cases of plenary power, 
federal law must control even when family rights are affected and a rational 
basis test should apply.  
I argue that the federal government is not required to use the term 
"marriage" for same-sex couples or any couples simply because a state 
does.  Indeed, employing the broader principle of looking to state law for 
designations of "family," the federal government could reasonably base the 
extension of federal benefits beyond same-sex marriages to other forms of 
state and local recognition of committed same-sex families such as civil 
unions, domestic partnerships and possibly in some cases, unique contracts 
designed to replicate the legal relationships that follow from marriage. 
In Part VII, I return to the three DOMAs.  The first DOMA, the one that 
bundled all federal statutes together would, under the proposal, be 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny and should be seen as violating Equal 
Protection because it prevented same-sex couples from having family rights 
that their state intended to confer through marriage.  The second 
"unbundled DOMA," the one that collapses into the statutes that it defines, 
may violate Equal Protection in some cases but not in others.  The 
applicable level of scrutiny for Equal Protection purposes should depend 
upon the nature of the rights affected in the statute at issue, that is whether 
the denial of the right burdens the state-conferred right to be a marital 
family.  The third "definitional DOMA" mimics the other two.  If 
applicable to all marital rights, it is too broad but it might be defended in 
individual cases of benefits.   
In Part VIII, I apply these notions to the Windsor case.  I conclude that 
the Court correctly held that she should receive the marital deduction and a 
tax refund.  However, I argue that if state embrace of the marriage is the 
basis of the federal recognition, it is reasonable for the federal government 
to require that a state clearly signal its intention to grant a comparable tax 
refund in all such cases when the case involves, as Windsor's does, 
retroactive recognition of a marriage that was entered into at a time when 
the state had not embraced it.13  
                                                          
13 For a discussion of the “standing” concern, see infra note 351. 
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And finally in Part IX, I conclude that Congress has the right to create 
"lanes of interest" with respect to federal marriage policy, given that 
families and groups of families and individuals have varying interests and 
compete for a limited purse of federal benefits.  Such an approach allows 
Congress appropriate freedom to differentiate a wide range of interests and 
allows it to specifically consider these interests in deciding how federal 
dollars will support families. Because the heterosexual couple is unique 
both in its biological imbalance and in the long history of gender 
discrimination against women through heterosexual marriage, Congress 
should be free to decide, independent of the states, whether natural 
procreation should guide federal spending to support families or should 
otherwise be treated uniquely. Indeed, a procreation-based policy can likely 
only survive if such lanes exist. I do not say whether such a procreation-
based policy is wise or unwise, but rather that it is permissible. The 
question for the courts is whether the distinction Congress draws is based 
upon procreation, a permissible aim, or whether it is really merely a means 
of sexual orientation discrimination.  If Congress can exclude unmarried 
couples based on procreational status then it seems permissible but not 
necessary that "heterosexual marriage" be a lane. Congress could also 
adopt other designations and sub designations for different types of 
families. I believe that Congress also has the right to differentiate among 
different types of procreation in its spending. The job of the Court is to 
recognize and require remedies for the long history of family 
discrimination against same-sex couples, but also to recognize that it is 
Congress that has the constitutional right to set the priorities for 
expenditures from the public purse. 
II. AMERICAN NOTIONS OF “LOCAL” MATTERS 
This Part investigates how notions that some matters are to be locally 
determined may have emerged.  I explain that local deference was afforded 
not only to states, but also to U.S. Territories, a fact that indicates that 
conflict of laws played a major role. 
A. Origins 
Three ideas likely shaped the early nation’s notions of what matters 
should be “local.”  First is the experience of the states as English colonies. 
Second is the notion that the people should have some input on the laws 
that most directly affected them.  Third is the body of conflict of law rules 
that determined when the law of a foreign jurisdiction would apply in a 
forum state. 
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1. The Colonial Experience 
When the Framers were drafting the Constitution, they had in mind their 
experiences as English subjects and later as English and British colonists.14 
They would have known that, though a monarchy, England certainly 
recognized the need for some local governance.15  In the feudal age, 
English kings had a system of feudal councils.  These councils ultimately 
evolved into the English and later British Parliament.16  The Magna Carta 
reflected notions that the people should have some rights to decide issues 
affecting them.17  In his discussion of English approaches, Blackstone also 
spoke of subordinate magistrates who act in “an inferior secondary sphere” 
regarding matters affecting only defined issues and groups of persons.18  He 
referenced local issues as “depending entirely upon the domestic 
Constitution of their respective franchises.”19 
With the American colonies, the Crown gave the colonists authority to 
establish rules relating to education, criminal and civil laws, marriage, 
probate and inheritance, local courts, and other matters.20  Such freedom 
                                                          
 14. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the 
difference between British crown and Presidency), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 
(James Madison) (referencing the feudal system). 
 15. See generally ROBERT C. RITCHIE, THE DUKE’S PROVINCE: A STUDY OF NEW 
YORK POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1664-1691, 34-36 (1977) (discussing the basic structure 
of the local government). 
 16. See J.R. MADICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327, 
158-59 (2010); see also Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1432, 1436 (1987) (noting that colonists understood English/British law to reveal 
sovereignty rights in “people” that superseded the King). 
 17. See J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 23-24 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the power 
struggle between the English Monarchy and the people that developed their rights); 
A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 4 (rev. ed. 1998) 
(explaining that the Magna Carta was a source of inspiration for American colonists).  
 18. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *327-28.  On Subordinate 
Magistrates, he refers to “mayors and aldermen, or other magistrates of particular 
corporations” as having mere private jurisdiction affecting “strictly municipal rights, 
depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises” and 
also speaking of a view that “the people should choose their own magistrates,” 
although all rules had to be consistent with the crown’s dictates.  Id. 
 19. Cf. id. at *337. 
 20. For example, the 1629 Charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company expressly 
provided for a council of Governor and other local officials to be chosen from among 
free men on the plantation.  This “assembly” had the authority to establish local laws.  
The Charter of Massachusetts Bay: 1629, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mass03.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  
Minutes of the Massachusetts Bay Company reflect such rules related to matters we 
now deem typically local: criminal and civil law, local courts, probate and intestate 
succession, and rules for marriage.  See id. (granting authority to govern).  The Charter 
of Carolina (Charles II) granted “full and absolute power . . . for the good and happy 
government of the said province . . . according to their best discretion, of and with the 
advice, assent and approbation of the freemen of the said province . . . .”  It allowed for 
the creation of “penalties, imprisonment or any other punishment;” the establishment of 
“subordinate officers and judges, justices, magistrates;” the power to amend laws or 
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may have been a practical necessity both because of distance and because 
of the need to give incentive to adventurism in a faraway land.  Still, the 
royal charters had one key proviso.  Any laws adopted had to be consistent 
with the laws and interests of the Crown.21 
As the colonies began to pass local laws, they also began to develop 
unique personas and a sense of their own sovereignty.  Their rules 
expanded to regulate admiralty and trade.22  When their leaders gathered to 
write the Articles of Confederation in 1777 and to ratify it in 1781, they 
styled themselves the “United States of America,” a clear hint to the notion 
that those joined together were independent “states,” not mere subjects of a 
king.23 
2. The Notion That the People Rule 
Notions that all governmental power derived from the people likely also 
would have affected American views of what issues were “local.”  Again, 
for colonists the Magna Carta would have stood as a prime early example 
of the notion.24  The writings of many early political thinkers, including 
John Locke and Rousseau, propounded notions that people should have 
some say over matters directly affecting their lives.25  And the notion that 
                                                          
pardon offenses, and also to determine the “actions, suits and causes” obtaining in such 
courts, civil, criminal or otherwise.  Charter of Carolina – March 24, 1663, AVALON 
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc01.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  
The 1606 Charter of Virginia provided for a local council of thirteen in Virginia but 
also a “Council of Virginia” in England.  The English council was to “have the superior 
Managing and Direction, only of and for all Matters that shall or may concern the 
Government, as well of the said several Colonies.”  The First Charter of Virginia; 
April 10, 1606, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  The Charter gave colonists the power to mine precious 
metals and keep the profits and to coin money.  The second Charter in 1609 created a 
local council and the power to “have full and absolute Power and Authority to correct, 
punish, pardon, govern, and rule” English subjects who arrived there, to establish 
“Orders, Ordinances, Constitutions, Directions, and Instructions,” affecting civil, 
criminal, “marine” and other matters.  The Second Charter of Virginia; May 23, 1609, 
AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va02.asp (last visited Mar. 
5, 2013). 
 21. E.g., Charter of Carolina, supra note 20; The Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 
supra note 20; The First Charter of Virginia, supra, note 20. 
 22. See Amar, supra note 16, at 1447-48 (noting states negotiated with foreign 
nations long before the Constitution); see generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 
(Alexander Hamilton) (urging common Navy and admiralty jurisdiction for the new 
nation). 
 23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. I, para. 1. 
 24. See HOWARD, supra note 17.  
 25. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (1690), available at 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/complete.html (explaining that political 
rights emerged from the natural law that gives men the right to “order their actions”); 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 21-22 (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1913) 
(1762), available at http://mongolianmind.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/Rousseau_contrat-social-1221.pdf (declaring that nature gives 
man absolute power over himself).  See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Karl 
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the people, not a monarch, control was central to the very core of the 
American enterprise.26  These principles ultimately made their way into the 
American Constitution.  Article IV, Section 4 ensured each state a 
republican form of government.27  The Tenth Amendment expressly 
reserves powers not granted to the federal government to the states “or to 
the people.”28  Indeed, the Constitution’s Preamble began, “We the 
People.”29 
The Framers also left hints of the types of matters that might usually be 
considered “local.”  These too reflect the notion of the people having 
control of that which immediately affects them.  In addressing the concern 
that the people under the new government might owe more allegiance to 
the federal government than to the states, Hamilton made specific reference 
to “the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” as a state role.  
Hamilton also dismissed fears of a transfer of primary allegiance from state 
to federal arguing that the state would regulate “those personal interests and 
familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more 
immediately awake.”30  James Madison described the constitutional design 
as allocating “the great and aggregate interests . . . to the national, the local 
and particular to the State legislatures.”31  Hamilton also stated that “the 
variety of more minute interests, which [would] necessarily fall under the 
superintendence of the local administrations . . . cannot be particularized, 
without [delving into tedium not worth the time of instruction].”32  This 
dichotomy of “particular and limited” versus “general and broad” is also 
reflected in the fact that the early founders commonly referred to the 
federal government as the “general government.”33 
                                                          
Schuhmann et al. ed., Bristol 2003) (1651). 
 26. Accord BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 9 (1998). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added). 
 29. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17  (Alexander Hamilton). 
 33. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 14, 41, 43, 45 (James Madison).  Madison used the term 
“general government” in the debates of the Constitutional Convention.  See, e.g., 
Madison Debates – August 18, 1787, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) 
(discussing enumerated powers of the general government).  Hamilton used it as well.  
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 17, 27, 28  (Alexander Hamilton); Variant Texts of the Plan 
Presented by Alexander Hamilton to the Federal Convention – Text. B, AVALON 
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextb.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 
2013).  The Supreme Court has also used the term.  See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886); McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435 
(1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Chisolm v. Georgia, 
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2512 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the term as reference to federal government). 
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3. Conflict of Laws Theory 
The theory of conflict of laws also must have informed early American 
notions of what matters were “local.”  Rules of “comity”—or voluntary 
recognition of a foreign jurisdiction’s laws as a sign of respect for that 
jurisdiction’s sovereignty—have long been a part of the law of nations.  In 
his famous article, The Comity Doctrine, Hessel Ytema traced the doctrine 
back to Dutch jurists in the latter part of the Seventeenth Century and 
specifically, theorist Ulrik Huber.34  According to Professor Kurt 
Nadelman, the English courts formally embraced of the notion of conflict 
of laws in Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Robinson v. Bland.35  
The early American bar would certainly have known of Mansfield’s 
opinion and of the doctrine.36  Nadelman notes that at least by 1788, the 
domestic doctrine of international comity was referenced by a Pennsylvania 
state court considering whether to enforce a debt.37  He adds that in 1797 
the preface to the United States Supreme Court opinion in Emory v. 
Grenough quoted Huber extensively, although the court dismissed the case 
for failure of plaintiff to plead diversity of jurisdiction.38  The doctrine was 
solidified in American Jurisprudence by Justice Joseph Story’s famous 
1834 treatise on Conflict of Laws.39 
Rules of comity were subject to one major exception.  Such rules were 
suspended when following the foreign rule would violate a sovereign’s 
public policy.40 
Under the common law, marriage was considered a contract, but it had 
                                                          
 34. Hessel Ytema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH L. REV. 9-32 (1966).  See also 
Kurt H. Nadelman, The Comity Doctrine: An Introduction, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1961) 
(noting at the introduction to Michigan Law Review the memorial reprinting of 
Ytema’s article and discussing the importance of Ytema’s work). 
 35. See Nadelman, supra note 34, at 2; Robinson v. Bland, 6 Eng. Rep. 129 (King’s 
Bench 1760).  In Robinson, a plaintiff sued an intestate’s estate on alleged contracts 
entered into in England to repay funds advanced for gambling in France.  The Court 
found that the agreements were governed by English, not French law and were 
unenforceable.   
 36. Accord  Nadelman, supra note 34, at 2. 
 37. Camp v. Lockwood, 1 Dall. 393, 401 (Phila. Co. 1788) (distinguishing case 
from the law of nations, and declining to enforce a Connecticut debt that Connecticut 
deemed plaintiff had forfeited as an enemy of the United States, citing the states' 
unique relationship and their common interest in the War); see also Nadelman, supra 
note 34, at 2. 
 38. Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 368, 369 n.(a) (1797); Nadelman, supra 
note 34, at 2.  Nadelman also notes that Samuel Livermore launched an attack on the 
general American acceptance of the doctrine in 1829.  See id. at 3-4. 
 39. JOSEPH STORY & MELVIN MADISON BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES (1834).  See e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story’s Contributions to 
American Conflicts Law, A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230, 230-32 (1961). 
 40. See STORY, supra note 39, at 8 (showing that nations apply foreign laws 
pursuant to own public policy); see also id. at 207. 
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special rules.41  While the place where the marriage was celebrated 
generally controlled the validity of the marriage, rules applying “the 
incidents of marriage” were subject to more variations.  Often the domicile 
–or the jurisdiction with the closest contact—controlled these “incidents.”42 
The distinction between “validity” and “incidents” of marriage was 
significant enough that Joseph Story devoted separate chapters to “validity” 
on the one hand and “incidents” on the other.43  Story did not live in a time 
of broad governmental programs providing economic support to marriage.  
Instead, in his day, government supported marriages by placing its power 
on the side of the husband as against the wife and children and on the side 
of preferred races and classes. Thus, he described the “incidents" of 
marriage as the (1) rights and disabilities of a wife and (2) the obligations 
of a husband.44  Under the common law the domicile of a wife was 
considered that of her husband irrespective of her travels or the law of the 
place of celebration.45  Sometimes states used public policy grounds to balk 
at recognizing foreign law on issues such as capacity to be married (in 
particular, age limits) and divorce.46 
On the other hand, there is little evidence that the subject matter of 
marriage was understood at the time to be so uniquely local that federal 
                                                          
 41. E.g., Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, Consistory Court of London (1811) reprinted in 
Beale at 41-43 (referring to marriage as a contract); JOSEPH STORY & MELVIN MADISON 
BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN 
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (Bigelow, ed. 1884).  The Bigelow 
edition is a reprint of the Third Edition of Story’s work.  Id. at iii. 
 42. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, n. 10 (1933) (applying Georgia 
law to refuse to require a father to provide maintenance to child and noting, “Without 
denying the validity of marriage in another state, the privileges flowing from the 
marriage may be subject to the local law”); Headen v. Pope, 252 F.2d 739, 742-43 (3d 
Cir. 1958).  Despite fact that marriage occurred in Maryland, Pennsylvania was the 
domicile and the state primarily concerned with the legal incidents of this union, 
including the support of wife after husband died.  See also discussion of Lutwak v. 
United States, infra at p. 146.  Compare Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 
1813) (upholding Vermont divorce as entitled to full faith and credit and determining 
that in considering the relationship of the parties to each other and their conduct 
including divorce, one looks to the law of the domicile which was Vermont, not the law 
where the marriage was originally contracted which was Massachusetts). 
 43. See STORY, supra note 39, at 184-226 (discussing marriage); see also id. at 
227-274 (discussing incidents to marriage, e.g., property rights etc.).  
 44. See id. at 233 (dividing chapter on incidents into (1) disabilities and powers of 
wife and (2) rights of husband). 
 45. See id. 
 46. E.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 1961) (finding 
that New Jersey did not have to recognize common law marriage because it was against 
the state’s public policy); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1957) (stating that recognizing underage marriage in another state would be 
against New Jersey public policy); see 15 Johns. 121, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (noting 
that even if Vermont would recognize a divorce procured by fraud and without notice 
to all parties, New York would not); STORY, supra note 39, at 275-314 (discussing 
recognition of foreign divorces).  
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power could not touch it to the same degree as it could other local issues.47 
The federal government’s approach to slavery, often shuttered away in a 
closet during historical discussions of domestic relations law, offers quite 
important insights into the federal approach to local domestic relations.  At 
the time of the Constitution’s signing, slavery in America was considered 
local in several senses.  First, slaves were treated as under the jurisdiction 
of households; indeed, each time they were sold, their last names were 
changed to that of the new masters as a brand of ownership.48  Second, state 
laws determined slave holder/slave rights.  Third, unlike other servants, 
slaves were not only persons but also legally property.  Fourth, as property 
under the law, slaves could be made the subject of contract, intestate 
succession, wills, trusts or dower.  At the same time, because of objections 
on public policy grounds, nations and American states that did not endorse 
slavery often did not afford comity on that subject to jurisdictions that 
did.49 
According to Story, early Courts saw the full faith and credit clause as a 
compliment to conflict of laws doctrine.  It did not alter general conflict of 
law rules.50 
B. The Local Powers of U.S. Territories 
In dealing with U.S. Territories, the Americans appear to have adopted 
the English approach of allowing local sovereignty so long as federal 
interests were not jeopardized.  The approach was also consistent with 
conflict of law rules. 
Usually, Congress would pass an “organic statute” that organized the 
territory along republican (representative majority rule) lines.  Each 
                                                          
 47. See generally Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of 
Federal Family Law and the Invention of State’s Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 
(2005) (reviewing prior federal interventions into allegedly traditional state areas and 
arguing that state's rights is a recent invention); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the 
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (rejecting "localism" theories 
that argue family law always as the province of states); Judith Resnik, Categorical 
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) 
(demonstrating that areas  traditionally seen as local have long been subject to federal 
rulemaking). 
 48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 527 (1857) (Campbell, J., 
concurring) (insisting that a slave is part of a master’s “family” both “in name and in 
fact”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 49. See STORY, supra note 39, at 153-54. 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); STORY, supra note 39, at 802-03 
(explaining that the clause is thought not to alter the general principle that in procedural 
matters lex loci was to govern); id. at 831-32 (stating that the clause does not alter 
jurisdictional rules).  
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territory was allowed to establish its own laws with respect to marriage and 
other traditionally local issues, consistent with the laws of the United 
States.51  This restriction seems to parallel England’s requirement of the 
colonies.52  The statutes also prohibited the territory from distributing its 
own land.53 
Today, we think it indisputable that Congress has plenary power in the 
territories.  In fact, however, the notion of whether plenary power extended 
to the right to decide traditionally local concerns in the territories was hotly 
debated in earlier times, despite modern expressions that downplay the 
debate.54 
III. INSTANCES OF FEDERAL DEVIATION FROM LOCAL MARRIAGE LAW 
There are only a few instances in which the federal government (1) 
deviated from state marriage law to recognize a marriage that the state in 
which the marriage took place rejected; or (2) refused to recognize a 
marriage that a state or territory accepted. This section considers those 
early cases. 
A. Deviation to Recognize Marriages That a State or Local Government 
Rejected as Invalid 
Apart from American Indian cases, there are only two instances in which 
the federal government ignored the states and recognized marriages that the 
states refused to recognize.  Both involved the nation’s battle over slavery.  
                                                          
 51. E.g., An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of 
Colorado, ch. 59, § 6, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (1861); An Act to Establish a Territorial 
Government for Utah, ch. 51, § 6, 9 Stat. 453, 454 (1850).  Cf. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 
682, 684 (1891) (remarking that polygamy aside, Utah territorial legislature has (had) 
plenary power as would a state over local issues of inheritance). 
 52. See discussion supra p. 116. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, for example, the discussion of efforts to affect marriage in Utah territory.  
Infra at p. 741, 743 (Congress arguing about whether marriage is a local, territorial, or 
federal issue).  In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court, held that the 
constitutional provision giving Congress’s plenary power over federal territories was 
limited to lands ceded by the Crown and did not include such power over territory later 
obtained through expansion and conquest.  The Court also narrowly read the scope of 
congressional powers over territories to apply only to the most needful legislation that 
had to be executed in acquiring and holding territories for the benefit of the states.  60 
U.S. (19 How.) at 393.  Excluded from that power were domestic relations matters, like 
slavery.  Later, cases began to reject the notion that plenary power over the territories is 
limited.  See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (“The power of Congress over the Territories of the 
United States is general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire 
the Territory itself.”); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 267-68 (1901).  
Downes asserted that Dred Scott’s logic was contrary even to the prevailing 
understanding of congressional power at the time.  Downes, 182 U.S. at 250.  However, 
the evidence suggests that there was indeed vigorous debate on the subject. 
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First, the federal government recognized “slavery custom” marriages for 
the purpose of dispensing black Civil War military pension claims.   
Second, the federal government authorized military officers and others to 
perform marriages among ex-slaves during the Civil War and afterward, 
when rebel states refused to perform them. 
1. The Slave Marriage Statutes: Context 
Some background is necessary to understand the authority for and 
purpose of these actions.  When news of the Civil War spread, slaves 
escaped and headed toward Union lines, often offering themselves as 
scouts and information brokers.  In May of 1861, General Benjamin Butler 
refused to return a group of slaves to their owners, adopting the position 
that slaves of rebels were “contraband” and could be applied to work for 
the Union Army.55  On August 6, 1861, Congress passed the first of several 
Confiscation Acts.  The Act allowed the army to confiscate rebel 
“property,” expressly including, slaves.56 
The Confiscation Act was strategically important because slavery was 
the economic backbone of the Southern economy.  Southern states, facing 
pressure to give it up before the War, had demanded compensation.57  
Those whites who owned few or no slaves benefitted from the social status 
that it bestowed.58  Indeed, by purchasing a slave or two and using free or 
cheap land grants to build a plantation a poor white person could rise.  
Manufacturing northern states benefitted too, relying upon products 
produced from slave labor.59 
By the time of Dred Scott in 1857, slaves were the most valuable form of 
                                                          
 55. The term was apparently coined and status first designated by Gen. Benjamin 
Butler.  Slaves Contraband of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1861, at 4.  By June 12, 1861, 
Prof. Theophilus Parsons at Harvard Law School had opined that Butler’s claim had 
merit in a state of war.  Slaves as Contraband of War: Professor Parsons’ Opinions—
Four Ways of Dealing with the Subject, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1861, at 2. 
 56. An Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, § 1, 
12 Stat. 319, 319 (1861). 
 57. E.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGR. 338 (1789) (statement of Mr. Jackson) (asking who 
will compensate Virginia if slavery ended); 2 ANNALS OF CONGR. 1204 (1790) 
(statement of Sen. Gerry (Mass.)) (saying he has calculated slavery as worth ten million 
dollars); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 38 (1859) (statement of Rep. Moore 
(AL)) (noting that ending African slavery would result in an economic loss of property 
to the South exceeding in value two billion dollars). 
 58. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. App. 94 (1856) (statement of Sen. A.G. 
Brown (MS)) (opining that non-slaveholding southern whites “may have no pecuniary 
interest in slavery but they have a social interest at stake that is worth more to them 
than all the wealth that is in the Indies"). 
 59. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 483-84 (1856) (statement of Sen. 
Henry Clay (KY)) (discussing how the North is dependent upon slavery too and upon 
the Southern agricultural production). 
CARTER 5/17/2013 8/10/2013  2:38:40 PM 
2013] THE FEDERAL LAW OF MARRIAGE 723 
personal property in some southern states.60  Land, which often was given 
for free under bounty statutes, was useless in the agricultural south without 
labor to work it.61  Owners exploited slaves not only for themselves but 
also rented their slaves to others.62  A second Confiscation Act followed on 
July 17, 1862, establishing the penalty for treason against the United States 
as jail time and the freeing of the guilty party’s slaves.63 
The number of slaves escaping to Union lines swelled as the War 
continued.64  Often, they arrived in families and groups of loved ones.65  
Slaves were not allowed to marry legally, and since they did not constitute 
a separate political entity under law, their customs during slavery were 
disregarded.  Legal marriage would have given a slave father and husband 
power over his wife and children, and that would have been contrary to the 
slaveholder’s rights.  As abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison noted, by 
usurping the black male’s right of patrimony in the prevailing paternalistic 
                                                          
 60. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 524 (speaking of value in Louisiana); see 
also, Gimon v. Baldwin, 38 Ala. 60, 60 (1861) (valuing a male slave at $1500); Drake 
v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382, 383-84 (1857) (estimating $2800 for two Negro men). 
 61. For more on bounty statutes see, for example, note 237. 
 62. The value lay not only in the slave itself but in the rental value.  Bryan v. 
Walton, 33 Ga. Supp. 11, 11 (1864) (valuing Negro female slave Patience, about 28 
years old, and her six children, ages fourteen to six at the aggregate value of $9000, and 
with a “hire” value of $3000); Evans v. Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 71, 76 (1860) (listing prices 
of slaves of various genders and ages).  
 63. An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treasons and Rebellion, to Seize 
and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, § 2, 12 Stat. 
589, 590 (1862). 
 64. Contraband Statistics, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1861, at 3 (noting that more than 
100 slaves a day escaped Missouri for Kansas, and contrary to the desires of federal 
army generals, they were not returned).  Letter from Maj. Gen. John Peck to Maj. Gen. 
John Dix, Dec. 7, 1862 in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE 
OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 474 
(1887), available at http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (“To-day an 
old contraband came in from a plantation just this side of Franklin to get his liberty.”); 
Letter from Brig. Gen. George Crook to Brig. Gen. James Garfield, May 27, 1863, in 
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION 
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XXIII, pt. II, 366 (1890), available at 
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (noting large numbers of 
contraband women).  This Four series multivolume set includes, among other records, 
officer reports on the numbers of escaped slaves flowing into union camps.  See also, 
Negro Slaves as Contraband of War, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1861, at 2. 
 65. See, e.g., Letter from Maj. Gen. John Dix to E.M. Stanton, Sec. of War, Sept. 
12, 1862, in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY 
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 391 (1887), available at 
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (noting some 2000 men, 
women, and children were held at Old Point Comfort in Virginia); Letter from Maj. 
Gen. John Dix to E.M. Stanton, Sec. of War, Dec. 13, 1862, in THE WAR OF THE 
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION AND 
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 480-81 (1887), available at 
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (suggesting soldier abuse and 
noting the need to remove “contraband” women and children from camps for their 
safety). 
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society, slave holders asserted ownership to all slave children and could 
thereby control slave families and communities into multiple generations.66  
When a husband died, his wife could inherit his slaves and, if she remained 
single, could also assert this privilege.  With the consent of owners, some 
slaves could enter into a form of marriage with other slaves, sometimes 
referenced by legal authorities as contubernium.67  But contubernium 
marriage did not give the rights of legal marriage.68  Because slaves were 
property, an owner could break up a slave family for sale when economic 
interests or punishment needs so dictated.  He or she could insist that a 
slave, his wife, daughter, or son perform sexual services.69  The evidence 
                                                          
 66. In 1835 Garrison noted in his newspaper, The Liberator: 
The . . . disuse of legal marriage is necessary to sustain the slave holder’s right 
of property in the children.  The laws give to the owner of a woman a property 
in her children, whether the father be bond or free, black or white.  The father 
may be a slave to the same planter, or to another; he may be a colored or a 
white free man of the neighborhood; he may be the owner of the mother 
himself or his hopeful son.  The law is the same in every case; the children of a 
colored female follow the condition of their mother.  This claim on children as 
property must be legally maintained or slavery could not be perpetuated or 
“entailed” on successive generations . . . . 
  No the code of laws must not contradict itself.  It must not take away by one 
enactment what it secures by another.  But a legal marriage constitutes the 
father of the children, the slave holder of these children during their minority.  
He has the legal right to command them, to keep them with him, to educate 
them, to require their service, and toil for his benefit and their own.  No other 
man can possess any right or authority over them . . . .  If a man slave were the 
legal father and slave holder of his own children, he could reject the claims of 
the white man who is the owner of their mother.  He could prevent his working 
them, punishing them, or selling them.  He could pronounce his own children 
free from all control but his own and that of his mother.  She too would have 
with her husband a joint legal authority over her children; and in the event of 
his decease, the law would still sustain his prerogatives and secure guardians to 
her offspring. 
William Lloyd Garrison, The Liberator, Oct. 31 1835, at 1. 
 67. The term appears to have been borrowed from Roman slave marriage laws.  
E.g., WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO 
MODERN LAW 232 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2004) (1938) (discussing Roman 
contubernium). 
 68. E.g., Malinda v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719, 723-24 (1854) (indicating that slave 
marriage called “contubernium” afforded no inheritance rights for children). 
 69. E.g., discussion infra p. 744 (in polygamy discussion, Congressman claiming 
hypocrisy and noting “unlimited concubinage” practices of slaveholders).  EUGENE 
GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL, 414 (1974) (suggesting that three quarters of blacks in 
the U.S. have some white ancestry; the percentage of mulattos in the South was twice 
as high as that in the North and that in 1850 an estimated thirty-seven percent of the 
Negro population in the South was half white).  See also Rachel L. Swarns, Meet Your 
Cousin, the First Lady: A Family Story, Long Hidden, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/us/dna-gives-new-insights-into-michelle-obamas-
roots.html (noting the recent discovery of Michelle Obama’s multiracial DNA, the 
prevalence of rape and sexual coercion in slavery); Richard Steckel, Slavery, Marriage 
and the Family, 11 J. FAM. HIST. 251_(1980) (using multiple regression analysis to 
estimate instances of mulatto children during slavery and patterns); DAVID BERRY 
GASPAR & DARLENE CLARK HINE, MORE THAN CHATTLE: BLACK WOMEN AND 
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on plantations was clear from the number of “mulattos” being born on 
slave plantations.  Slaves had no legal rights of their own under the law, 
and slave fathers and husbands had no legal right to defend their families 
against harm.  Indeed, some posit that so-called contubernium marriages 
were supported by some slave holders in part because such relationships 
provided a means of controlling of slaves through threats of family 
separation or physical harm to a loved one.70  The denial of marriage rights 
during slavery, coupled with the economic disadvantages of broad scale 
race discrimination and segregation after it, barred black male ex-slaves 
from a host of other rights the prevailing patriarchal culture required in 
order to protect oneself and one’s family.  And such denials rendered black 
female slaves breeders for a system that deprived them and the children to 
whom they gave birth of the legal and physical protections that marriage 
provided to white women and children.71  It is no surprise that the federal 
government concluded that marriage rights and promises of family stability 
would be a key means of recruitment for the U.S. military. 
In September 1862, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation 
Proclamation in preliminary form.  By its terms, it became effective one 
hundred days later, on January 1, 1863.  Notably, the final version of the 
Proclamation stated that the action was compelled by military necessity and 
expressly authorized the enlistment of black soldiers.  These key items 
were not in the Proclamation’s preliminary version.72  The Proclamation 
only purported to free those slaves in the states that were still in rebellion.73  
                                                          
SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS (1996).  There were certainly interracial couples who 
wanted to be married, but allowing legal marriage between whites and blacks, much 
less between slave and free, would have threatened a racially based slave system. 
 70. Accord JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF 
NEGRO AMERICANS 154 (4th ed. 1974); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE ENDURING VISION: A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 356 (2008).  
 71. One finds in the reports of the abuse of black women and girls during slavery 
the same biases against recognizing female injury as one finds in the stories of other 
women victimized when rape, sexual abuse, and separation from children were 
employed as physical and psychological weapons of terror.  Slave narratives offer a 
more personal account, but even those sometimes arrive through multiple hearsay 
levels.  See JEAN FAGAN YELLIN, HARRIET JACOBS, A LIFE (2005) (explaining the story 
of a female slave’s life).  Adult black men and children were also subjected to sexual 
slavery.  WILMA KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA, 
24, 61, 64-65, 108-110, 199, n.165 (1997); Thomas A. Foster, The Sexual Abuse of 
Black Men Under American Slavery, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 445-464 (2011) (discussing 
abuse of black men and the forcing of black men to sexually abuse black women). 
 72. Compare Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Sept. 22, 1862, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/transcript_preliminar
y_emancipation.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013), with The Emancipation 
Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/tran
script.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 73. The Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, is available online at Library of 
Congress website at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/almgall.html.  In the 
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It left slavery in place in the states that stayed loyal or had already 
submitted to Union control.74  Those enlistments would be compelled 
later.75 
Some have attempted to distinguish such Civil War statutes relating to 
marriage with the suggestion that these actions occurred when or because 
there was no state government in place.76  But by no stretch of the 
imagination were the Union Army and Freedmen’s Bureau just filling in to 
help out the exhausted rebelling states while they took a “little breather” 
from governance.  Indeed, the legislative bodies of the Confederate states 
met and strategized during the War, they coined their own money and 
passed laws on various subjects.77  Southern leaders were continuing to 
command soldiers.  Whites continued to marry and the local laws 
recognized their marriages.78  And the reason these marriages took place in 
                                                          
intervening time, states in rebellion could indicate surrender by having their 
representatives show up in Congress on January 1. 
 74. Id.  Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri, though slaveholding, did not 
secede. 
 75. See discussion infra p. 729. 
 76. Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Historians, American Historical 
Association, Peter W. Bardaglio et al. in Support of Respondents Affirmance of the 
Judgment Below at 35-36, Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 [hereinafter 
"Windsor Historians' Amici Brief"] available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/2011-
11-03-gill-v-opm-amici-historians.pdf (describing these slave marriages as occurring 
when Confederate governments “collapsed,” arguing there were “no state governments 
in the occupied South” and stating that when the state governments were reconstituted 
the federal government “ceded its authority” back to them and they “resumed their 
jurisdiction over marriage law” subject to the 14th Amendment).  See Golinsky v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (federal 
government has only legislated in domestic relations when there has been a failure or 
absence of state government); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 
(S.D.N.Y.) (citing Golinsky for both points), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 12-
307, 2013 WL 3196928 (June 26, 2013). 
 77. See, e.g., STATUTES OF GEORGIA PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1864, 
available on Hein Online, 1864 5 1864; ACTS OF THE CALLED SESSION AND OF THE 
FOURTH ANNUAL REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF ALABAMA, 
available on Hein Online, 1864 4; SC STATUTES AT LARGE (1861), available on Hein 
Online, 1864; 1861 1 1861.  Slaveholding states refused to recognize the Emancipation 
Proclamation as immediate law.  E.g., Hall v. Keese (The Emancipation Cases), 31 
Tex. 504, 514 (1868) (calling the Emancipation a war measure, although slavery, in 
fact, continued undisturbed until Union General Granger entered Texas and ordered 
Negros free); Weaver v. Lapsley 42 Ala. 601, 614 (1868) (describing Emancipation as 
merely a “war-measure” that was not law until enforced by force of arms).  One might 
distinguish these cases on the theory that the states had withdrawn from the union and 
no longer existed; however, that theory is a stretch as well because the alleged point of 
the War from Lincoln’s perspective was to save the union, and so the right to secede 
was never conceded by the Northern states.  It must be then that War Powers—not the 
absence of state government—was the situation that gave rise to the action.  It would be 
odd indeed to allow the federal government to define state authority as “absent” merely 
because it disagreed with the position an acting state government had taken. 
 78. See J. David Hacker et al., The Effect of the Civil War on Southern Marriage 
Patterns, 76 J. S. HIST. 39, 44 (2010).  The biggest obstacle to wartime marriages for 
whites was finding eligible mates given the large numbers of Southern white males 
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federal space is because the federal government had commandeered it in 
War, not because the states were hospitable.  The federal government was 
in direct conflict with state governments when it recognized these 
marriages and decided what incidents would flow from them. 
2. Recognition of Existing Marriages According to Slave Custom for Black 
Civil War Military Pension Purposes When States Would Not Recognize 
Them79 
One example of Congress’ stepping out to touch domestic relations 
matters was its decision to accept slave marriages as valid for military 
pension purposes.  The approach was adopted to encourage black men to 
join the military and to ease the burden of the War on Union soldiers and 
their families. 
Congress had long recognized military pensions as a recruitment tool.  
Three days before the second Confiscation Act, on July 14, 1862, but 
before the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was signed in 
September of that year, Congress passed an act regarding pensions for 
disabled union soldiers and the dependents of soldiers dying in battle for 
the Union.80  The act expressly denied a pension to any dependent who had 
aided in the rebellion or in any way manifested sympathy with its cause.81 
To secure the enlistment of blacks, Congress adopted several 
approaches.  On July 17, 1862 (before the Emancipation Proclamation), 
Congress provided that if male slaves from rebelling states escaped and 
joined the Union Army, they could gain freedom for their mothers, wives, 
and children but only if the slave and those family members to be freed 
were slaves of rebels.82  Of course, slaves were not allowed to marry but 
the law was silent on recognizing marriages performed according to slave 
custom. They were allowed monthly pay and rations but at a lesser rate 
                                                          
killed in the Civil War.  Id. 
 79. Counsel for BLAG specifically referenced the slave military pension statute in 
oral argument.  Windsor Sup. Ct. Trans. at 73 (regarding authority for DOMA, stating 
that there was a reason Congress specifically wanted to provide benefits for spouses of 
freed slaves who fought for the Union) available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307.  See also supra note 12 (noting that earlier drafts were shared with parties and 
amici).  The Law Professors brief lists the July 4, 1864 and March 3,1865 Acts with 
other statutes as examples that Congress can affect marriage, but it does not discuss 
their context.  Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent 
Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (referencing two acts regarding slaves or ex 
slaves as evidence that Congress can touch upon marriage). 
 80. An Act to Grant Pensions, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567 (1862) (providing 
pension to surviving spouses, but if there was no spouse, then to the child until the 
child reached age sixteen).  
 81. Id. § 4, 12 Stat. at 568. 
 82. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 13, 12 Stat. 597, 599.  The Act did not affect 
slaves held in so-called “loyal” states.  Id. 
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than non-blacks.83  The Act also expressly authorized the President to enlist 
blacks in the military specifically in low-level service positions.84 
The Emancipation Proclamation allowed ex-slaves to enlist without such 
slaveholder consent, provided they could reach Union Army lines.  On 
October 26, 1863, the War Department expressly declared that the 
“exigencies of war” required that “colored” troops in the slaveholding 
states—Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee—that did not secede, as well 
as blacks of any status in any rebelling states, be enlisted into the army.  
Under the new law, slaves in the three loyal states could be forcibly 
enlisted by their slaveholders.  To compensate for property loss, in 1864, 
Congress authorized up to $300 to be paid to slave holders in each state 
that had a representative in Congress (i.e., not the rebel states) for the 
delivery of each age-eligible slave to the Union army.  State commissions 
were to decide the value of the slave.  Although Congress referred to these 
black men as “volunteers,” in fact, the slaves in loyal states had no choice 
and were only free upon enlistment.85  The families of these drafted slaves 
from loyal states were not set free.86  Congress also specifically provided 
that black soldiers would be segregated as “Colored Troops.”87 
In July of 1864, Congress decided to recognize marriages that slaves had 
entered into according to slave custom, if states refused to recognize them 
or refused to allow black marriages.  It did this solely for the purpose of 
making black soldiers’ families eligible for military pensions.88  While 
abolitionists cheered these Acts, the coalition that made them possible 
included those war wearied who wanted the government to use more blacks 
to fight in the Army.89 
                                                          
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 24, 13 Stat. 6, 11.  See CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 626-631 (1864).  But see id. at 629 (comments of Sen. Cole) (voting 
“no” because he could not justify giving compensation to the slave holder but not to the 
slave who served).  The $300 was a heavily discounted value for a military eligible 
black male slave, justifiable, no doubt in light of the uncertainty of what war would 
bring.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 86. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. at 629 (comments of Sen. Grinnell) 
(reluctantly voting yes, but stating that his support had been contingent upon the entire 
family being given freedom, which was not reflected in the final bill). 
 87. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 24, 13 Stat. 6, 11. 
 88. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved 
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” ch, 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389 
(1864) (supplementing the 1862 pension act). 
 89. In 1862, Horace Greeley, Editor of the New York Tribune and a noted 
abolitionist, recognized the nation's war weariness and encouraged Lincoln to recruit 
blacks for the War.  He said “We must have scouts, guides, spies, cooks, teamsters, 
diggers and choppers from the Blacks of the South, whether we allow them to fight for 
us or not, or we shall be baffled and repelled.”  Letter from Horace Greeley to the 
President, Aug. 19, 1862.  In his famous response to Greeley, Lincoln made it clear that 
his goal was to save the Union and that if he could have saved it by continuing slavery 
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The first pension law allowed only the free wives of “colored soldiers” 
(or their descendants) or children who were also free to apply for pensions 
based on living as married couples during slavery.90  In other words, once 
again, Congress did not end the enslavement of families in the so-called 
“loyal” states.  On March 3, 1865, Congress finally addressed slave 
families.  It declared that “to encourage enlistments” and military 
“efficiency,” the “wife and children, if any he have" of any person 
mustered on military rolls would be “forever free, any law, usage, custom, 
or whatever, to the contrary notwithstanding."91  The accepted evidence of 
the marriage and of children was that couple had cohabitated together as 
husband and wife or that they participated in some sort of ceremony 
indicating marriage “whether such marriage was or was not recognized or 
authorized by law.”92 
On June 6, 1866, after the War ended, Congress extended the slave 
marriage recognition to black sailors, in addition to soldiers, and extended 
the application rights to include “pensions, bounty and back pay” just as 
white soldiers already had, but not in equal amounts.  Evidence of the 
marriage required was that satisfactory to the Commissioner of Pensions 
that the parties had habitually lived together as husband and wife.  A 
                                                          
he would have done so.  A Letter from President Lincoln; Reply to Horace Greeley. 
Slavery and the Union The Restoration of the Union the Paramount Object, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 1862), http://www.nytimes.com/1862/08/24/news/letter-president-
lincoln-reply-horace-greeley-slavery-union-restoration-union.html.  Accord Robert 
Fabrikant, Lincoln Legal Acolytes, A Comment On Professor Akhil Reed Amar’s The 
American Constitution: A Biography (2005), and Judge Frank J. Williams’ “Doing 
Less” and “Doing More”: The President and the Proclamation—Legally, Militarily, 
and Politically, in the Emancipation Proclamation, Three Views (2006), 49 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 169, 178 (2007) (explaining Lincoln’s goal to strip the South of key 
military assets). 
 90. The language of the original Military Pension Act provided that the widow and 
children of a soldier who died in the line of duty: 
shall be entitled to receive the pensions now provided by law, without other 
proof of marriage than that the parties had habitually recognized each other as 
man and wife, and lived together as such for a definite period next preceding 
the soldier’s enlistment, not less than two years, to be shown by the affidavits 
of credible witnesses: Provided, however, That such widow and children are 
free persons: Provided, further, That if such parties resided in any State in 
which their marriage may have been legally solemnized, the usual evidence 
shall be required. 
An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions,” Approved July 
Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two, ch. 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389 (1864) 
(emphasis modified).  See also In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, in 4 DECISIONS 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 358, 
362-63 (George Baber ed. 1891).  The Crain decision offers an elaborate discussion of 
the history of Congress’s Acts with respect to black and slave marriages not recognized 
in the Southern states. 
 91. A Resolution to Encourage Enlistments and to Provide for the Efficiency of the 
Military Forces of the United States, 13 Stat. 571 (1865). 
 92. Id. 
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child’s recognition depended upon a husband asserting that they were his 
own.93 
On June 15, 1866, it further extended the rights of black soldiers to 
bounty and provided additional security to their heirs. It provided that the 
soldiers would be presumed free despite the absence of any notation on 
muster rolls and once again set forth how their marriages would be 
proven.94  It recognized a ceremony “deemed by them to be obligatory” and 
their living together as husband and wife, and it extended protections to 
children “born of any such marriage.”95  The next day Congress approved 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution for 
submission to the states for ratification.96 
Legislation on June 6, 1866 and March 3, 1873 used different language 
regarding proof of marriage as a basis of benefits.  The proof had to be 
proof of cohabitation and a ceremony “satisfactory to the Commissioner of 
Pensions.”97  The latter act allowed a black soldier’s wife or heirs to file 
claims for “arrears” of pensions, bounties and allowances, and declared that 
the children of the slave marriages were lawful children and heirs for 
purposes of federal law.  American Indian soldiers were also included.98 
The pension statutes reveal that all support for procreation flowed from 
the male’s status and from heterosexual marriage. The earliest slave 
marriage pension statute simply used the term "children" in referencing a 
soldier's dependents.99  In the 1865 statute giving freedom to dependents, 
the language provided that children "born of that marriage" would be 
presumed to be those of the soldier whether or not the parents were still 
                                                          
 93. An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Relating to Pensions, ch. 106, § 15, 
14 Stat. 56, 58 (1866).  Given the realities of slave life it is likely that many men 
stepped into fatherhood for children who were not biologically theirs and that many 
children rebuked for being the children of owners had no fathers through whom they 
could claim support.  See supra note 70. 
 94. A Resolution Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions, 
Bounties and Allowances to Their Heirs, 14 Stat. 357 (1866). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Compare Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, 14 Stat 358-59 (1866) (passed June 16, 1866), with A Resolution 
Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions, Bounties and Allowances to 
Their Heirs (passed June 15, 1866). 
 97. An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Relating to Pensions, ch. 106, § 14, 
14 Stat. 56, 58 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 98. In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, supra note 90.  See also An Act to 
Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Laws Relating to Pensions, ch. 234, § 11, 17 Stat. 
566, 570 (1873) (providing benefits and referencing “Colored or Indian soldiers”). 
    99.  An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved 
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” 13 Stat. at 389 (requiring, in 
section 14, marriage, but not specifying when or how children must be born to qualify 
as a soldier's children for pension purposes). 
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married at the time of enlistment.100  By 1866, the pension statutes 
protected only children “born of the marriage.”  This tightening of the 
language reinforced the government's view that marriage should be the 
primary source of dependent benefits and adult female support.   
At the same time, Congress knew full well that black slave women did 
not possess the basic legal right to control of their own bodies and that in 
many cases the biological fathers of their children would be white men. 
Those men would not or, if they wanted to, could not, legally marry the 
mothers or openly claim the children.101  Women's future and that of their 
children was, therefore tied to black men whose earning power was, in turn, 
crippled by racial injustice.  A widow's pension ended if she remarried (and 
presumably gained a new source of support).102  Similarly, when in 1873 
the laws provided for an additional two dollars per month for a widow with 
children, they also provided that additional amount ended when the 
children became sixteen.103 These approaches to spousal support are 
reflected in the structure of Social Security spousal benefits today.104   
Certainly, the slave marriage pension statutes did not recognize slave 
marriages for all purposes, not even for all federal purposes.  Congress 
followed state law in doling out other federal benefits.  It did not grant 
pensions in the case of interracial marriages if the relevant states or 
localities banned them.105  But the reason may not have been mere 
deference to individual state law.  The action would not have been popular 
with the public since the majority of states in the union banned interracial 
marriage, and given the likely disruption that would follow upon such a 
policy, Congress could not justify it on military necessity grounds.106  
Moreover, race discrimination was not inconsistent with federal policy as it 
was made by the very same people who made up the states.  The U.S. 
continued to racially segregate blacks in the military for another hundred 
years.107  In so doing, it greatly restricted advancement opportunities for 
                                                          
   100. A Resolution to Encourage Enlistments and to Provide for the Efficiency of the 
Military Forces of the United States, 13 Stat. at 571. 
 101. E.g., A Resolution Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions, 
Bounties and Allowances to Their Heirs, 14 Stat. at 358 (using "born of the marriage"). 
 102. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved 
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” ch, 247, § 7, 13 Stat. at 388. 
 103. An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Laws Relating to Pensions, ch. 
234, § 9, 17 Stat. at 570. 
 104. See discussion infra at p. 773. 
 105. E.g., In re Ann Cahal, in 9 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN 
CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 127, 127-28 (John W. Bixler ed. 1898) (rejecting 
the widow’s claim because her husband was white, although he was claimed to be 
black, and expressing that interracial marriage was contrary to Mississippi law). 
 106. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (declaring state restraints on interracial 
marriage unconstitutional).    
 107. E.g., John W. Finney, Segregated Units Ended By The Services, WASH. POST, 
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black men because they could never command companies that had white 
troops, and that race discrimination, in turn, made them less able to support 
families financially through marriage. 
In one sense, the federal Civil War pension statutes and their supporting 
legislation were broad in that they recognized marriages that states did not.  
Indeed, it was very clear that if a state allowed blacks to marry, the couple 
could not use the standards for marriage set forth in these statutes.108  But 
the statutes were also narrow in that they deviated for particular federal 
purposes, when following state law did not serve federal interests. 
In fact, many years later, the Department of Interior stressed that the 
federal statutes were understood to be contrary to state law.  The 
justification was that they were required to meet “the peculiar conditions of 
those who, having been held to “involuntary servitude” were thereby 
denied marital rights under State law.”109  But in fact, they were clearly 
closely tied to military recruitment. 
The Department of Interior also rejected any characterization of the slave 
pension statutes as statutes establishing new marriage laws. 
It is obvious from the language of the section that Congress did not 
intend to enact a law of marriage for persons of color—neither to supply 
the lack of any State or local statute on the subject, nor to make a 
general law affecting marital rights, beyond claims for pension.  An 
intention to regulate marital rights in general, if entertained by Congress, 
might well be held as an encroachment upon the authority of the State 
which, having marital laws of its own might properly assert exclusive 
jurisdiction over the subject.  While not interfering with local 
enactments, Congress intended, by section 4805, to establish grounds for 
title to pension in behalf of certain persons—the widows and children of 
colored and Indian soldiers and sailors for whom no provision had 
theretofore been made in the pension system.110 
The source of the power to recognize slave marriages as qualifying 
marriages for federal pension purposes (and to recognize the children of 
former slaves as legitimate dependents) had to lie in Congress’ War Powers 
under the Constitution, both directly and under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.111  The Thirteenth Amendment freeing the slaves and the 
                                                          
Oct. 31, 1954, at M6. 
 108. E.g., In re Fanny Curtis, in 2 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 159, 161 (George Baber ed. 1889) (finding that 
the Act was not intended to validate cohabitation of free black couples who had not 
been slaves and could be married where they resided). 
 109. In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, supra note 90, at 361. 
 110. Id. at 362. 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress inter alia, the power “[t]o declare 
War,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o 
make Rules for the Government of Regulation of the land and naval Forces”). 
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Fourteenth Amendment declaring them citizens of the United States later 
added additional authorization for the federal government to assume the 
work of transitioning blacks out of the law of servitude against the will of 
rebel governments. 
3. Secretary of War Marriage Directives During the Civil War and 
Reconstruction 
The Civil War pension statutes recognized the existing customary slave 
marriages.  There is yet another example of federal forays into marriage 
from the Civil War period.  The U.S. Secretary of War authorized military 
officers, local clergymen, and others to perform marriages for black 
soldiers and so called “contraband.”  Of course, military officers were 
already performing marriages for white military men.112  The newly 
authorized marriages occurred in areas of military occupation, but often 
within the boundaries of rebel states.  Unlike U.S. bases today, Civil War 
military encampments were not preexisting federal properties, but were 
often established on commandeered lands. 
The earliest official record of “contraband” marriages appears to be from 
October 11, 1861, in a report of marriages performed by Rev. Lewis C. 
Lockwood at Camp Hamilton, Virginia.  Lockwood married 32 couples.113  
On March 28, 1864, John Eaton, then Superintendent of contrabands for 
Department of Tennessee and Arkansas, issued Special Order 15 ordering 
Union Army clergy to “‘solemnize the rite of marriage among 
Freedmen.’”114  And again the report notes that “Special Order 176, issued 
by the Department of the Gulf (July 4, 1864), ordered clergy in that 
Department ‘to unite in marriage, free of charge, such colored soldiers as 
may be recommended to them . . . with the women whom such soldiers 
may select to be their wives.’”115 
By the Act of March 3, 1865, weeks before the South’s surrender, 
Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands (the “Freedmen’s Bureau”).116  At the time, both houses of Congress 
                                                          
 112. War obligations, it seemed, led military men to want to marry.  Military 
Matrimony, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1861, at 4. 
 113. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., MARRIAGE RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF 
THE COMMISSIONER, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS OF THE BUREAU OF REFUGEES, 
FREEDMEN AND ABANDONED LANDS, 1861-1869, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY], available at 
http://www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/m1875.pdf. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 
90, § 1, 13 Stat. 507, 507 (1865) (committing the supervision and management of all 
abandoned lands, refugees, and freedman to the newly formed bureau); see also The 
Surrender: Full Details of the Great Event From an Eyewitness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
1865, at 1. 
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had adopted the Thirteenth Amendment (with rebel states not represented), 
but it had not been ratified.117  The Freedmen’s Bureau was another federal 
foray into traditionally local activity, one compelled by the expansiveness 
of the effort to organize the slaves into communities.118  The original 
authorization provided for blacks to have access to forty acres of land for 
farming at a small rent and later, if available, for the Bureau to make the 
land available for purchase.119  As blacks had been excluded from many of 
the free land grants previously offered to whites,120 this provision was a 
comparably modest way to provide a way for them to start their own 
farms.121  The promise faltered under protest when the claimed original 
owners returned and challenged the Act.122  Nevertheless, the Bureau 
helped blacks and whites to establish schools and financial institutions for 
ex-slaves.123  It had been a felony to teach a slave to read and write in many 
slaveholding states.124  The Bureau tried to track vigilante groups' terrorism 
                                                          
 117. The Amendment was passed by the Senate on April 8, 1864, by the House on 
January 31, 1865, and adopted on December 6, 1865.  See 13th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution: Abolition of Slavery (1865), 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=40 (last visited Mar. 26, 
2013). 
 118. Letter of the Freedmen’s Aid Societies to President Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1863) 
(“[T]he question is too large for anything short of government authority.”). 
 119. An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, § 1, 13 
Stat. at 508.  In General Order No. 110, President Andrew Johnson ordered lands 
abandoned in War to be turned over to the Bureau.  The Freedmen’s Bureau: Important 
Official Order by the President, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1865, at 1; see also William H. 
Burkes, The Freedmen’s Bureau, Politics, and Stability Operations During 
Reconstruction in the South 42 (Dec. 6, 2009) (unpublished Slave holder of Military 
Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA501927 (noting that access to land 
for farming was also granted to loyal white refugees); W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The 
Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1901, at 354, 357,  available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm (stating former male 
slaves had the opportunity to lease and eventually own abandoned property). 
 120. See discussion infra p. 753; see also infra pp. 751-52 (discussing restrictions to 
“white men only” or American Indians with white male fathers in Utah and Oregon 
land grant laws). 
 121. See infra p 147-48 (discussing restrictions in the Oregon Land Donation Law). 
 122. Freedmen’s Affairs, First Official Report of General Howard, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 1865 at 3 (stating some distribution had occurred but most had been 
suspended after persons claimed a right to those lands).  President Johnson, he began to 
back away from the promises and vetoed reauthorization of the bill.  His veto was 
immediately overridden.  Washington News: The President’s Message Vetoing the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1866, at 1. 
 123. See Martin Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Negro Schooling in South 
Carolina, 57 S.C. HIST. MAG. 56, 67 (1956) (stating the Bureau performed many vital 
tasks including providing resources to schools and funding building repairs); see also 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY, supra note 113, at 1 (stating 
that the Bureau established hospitals, supervised tenements for the homeless, and 
operated employment offices). 
 124. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other 
Slaves in this Province, 1740, reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 397, 413 (David J. McCord ed., 1840), available at 
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of blacks after the War, including lynchings.125 
Bureau officers issued marriage licenses and certificates and registered 
the marriages.126  “On June 24, 1865, John W. Sprague, Assistant 
Commissioner for Arkansas, whose jurisdiction covered both the States of 
Arkansas and Missouri (June 1865 until January 1866), issued Circular 
Number 3 instructing his subordinates ‘to keep and preserve a record of 
marriages of freed people, and by whom the ceremony was performed.’”127  
Sprague sent regular reports to Washington of the marriages performed.128  
In August of 1865, General Edict No. 8 set up a system for marriages 
affecting Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia.129  The edict addressed who 
was eligible to be married, how marriages were to be performed, the rights 
and obligations of husbands and wives, and the rights of children and 
divorce.  It addressed the difficult topic of those who had been separated by 
forced sale during slavery, had married a second person, but now wanted to 
be reunited with the first.  It even provided forms for marriage 
certificates.130 
 The Freedmen’s Bureau was reauthorized and its authority expanded by 
subsequent Acts.  However, criticisms that the job was too costly, 
complaints that the now freed blacks should be required to stand on their 
own and continuing racism combined to end its work.131  The Bureau 
finally succumbed to politics three years after the end of the War in 
                                                          
http://archive.org/details/statutesatlargeo07edit (imposing a money penalty for teaching 
a slave how to write). 
 125. See generally Freedmen’s Bureau Records Relating to Murders and Outrages, 
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ONLINE, http://freedmensbureau.com/outrages.htm (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2013) (reflecting murders, lynchings, and questionable rape accusations against 
black men and young boys). 
 126. NATIONAL ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY, supra note 113, at 5. 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Marriage Rules: General Order No. 8, August 11, 1865, HIST. ST. 
AUGUSTINE, http://www.drbronsontours.com/bronsongeneralrufussaxtongeneralordersn 
o8august111865.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (acknowledging the Bureau’s 
commitment to protect the “sacred institution of marriage”). 
 130. Id.; see also Rules for Marriage in the State of South Carolina, FREEDMEN’S 
BUREAU ONLINE, http://freedmensbureau.com/southcarolina/marriagerules.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2013) (stating that each couple shall be issued a marriage certificate by 
the minister who marries them). 
 131. See Du Bois, supra note 119, at 364 (postulating that a permanent Freedmen’s 
Bureau might well have solved persistent and perplexing “negro” problems); see also 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1307 (1865) (statement of Mr. Powell) (objecting 
to the original bill stating, “this bill will involve an expense of millions upon millions 
of dollars”); The Situation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1866, at 4 (stating that an institution 
charged with “educat[ing] the negro into fitness for freedom” would inevitably grow 
into permanence—a result which should be carefully guarded against); A Word for the 
Freedmen and the Freedmen’s Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1866, at 4 (objecting to 
those pleading for Bureau’s work to continue, arguing that the scope of its task is too 
monumental). 
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1868.132  The ex-slaves, largely illiterate and poverty stricken, surrounded 
by racial tensions, and with their families scattered were left to find their 
own way with the help of what private philanthropists would and could 
give and little protection from state authorities.  In this void, the Southern 
states' leadership engrained racial oppression in the notorious “black 
codes,” laws applicable only to blacks that attempted to recreate the 
economically and socially valuable structure that slavery had once secured 
for whites.133 
It is very clear that when Congress provided for the federal licensing of 
marriages for the ex-slaves, it intended for their marital rights to be 
recognized in all of the states.  Moreover, its actions did not facilitate state 
action, but rather operated directly contrary to the will of those in the 
Confederacy and others who rejected the notion of affording blacks the 
right to marry.134   This extraordinary step flowed from its War Powers and, 
again, from the Constitutional Amendments relating to the newly freed 
slaves. 
B. Deviating to Reject a Class of Marriages Deemed Valid Under State or 
Local Law 
1. Prohibiting Polygamous Marriages in the Territory of Utah 
DOMA defenders have often cited the U.S. treatment of polygamy in 
Utah as an example of federal inroads into marriage and an example that 
the federal government’s use of marriage rules to express moral 
viewpoints.  Those critical of the comparison have sought to distinguish the 
Utah case in a variety of ways: that the case involved a territory and 
plenary power, that polygamy affects families differently than same-sex 
marriage, etc.135  Prior writers on both sides have failed to grasp the 
                                                          
 132. See The End of the Freedmen’s Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1868, at 4 
(claiming that the exigency which gave rise to the Bureau ceased to exist and thus the 
Bureau became a drain on national resources). 
 133. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860 - 1880, at 325 
(The Free Press 1998) (1935) (noting that the South was willing to use “black codes” to 
restore the capital it lost with the abolition of slavery); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, 
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 47 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that enacting “black 
codes” was the greatest concern of Southern legislatures in the year following the Civil 
War); see also Black Codes, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/black-codes 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (listing, for example, a “black code” which required blacks 
to sign yearly labor contracts or risk being arrested and forced into labor). 
 134. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3341-50 (1864) (objecting to Freedmen’s 
Bureau Bill on grounds that Jefferson Davis claimed that blacks are inferior and bill 
overlooks white man’s rights). 
 135. E.g., Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993-97 (2010) (arguing that 
binary same-sex marriage is more consistent with modern trends of equality in family 
law than polygamy and that the latter runs contrary to that trend with frequently 
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significant role that the Supremacy Clause played in federal decisions 
relating to polygamy in Utah.  The battle over supremacy laid the predicate 
for federal action in Utah, and makes Utah a case of not simply mere moral 
reproach (although some actors held this view), but also a case of a 
vindication of a federal interest in establishing federal power as the 
supreme power in accordance with both the U.S. Constitution and the 
organic statute that created the territory. 
Utah came into the territory of the U.S. through the 1848 Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico.136  At the time, members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the "Mormons") were already living 
there.  Facing resistance, they had moved from place to place to find 
territory where they could peaceably practice their religious tenets, 
including, but not limited to, polygamy.137 
In 1850, Congress adopted the organic act that established a territorial 
legislature, affording Utah all local governance powers consistent with the 
federal Constitution, with a few exceptions.  One was that locals had no 
power to dispose of the land.138  President James Buchanan appointed 
Brigham Young as the territory’s first governor.  Buchanan had to know 
that Young was the head of the Mormon Church and a polygamist but 
apparently did not attach significance to the fact.139  According to one 
source, at the time of that appointment Young had fourteen wives. 140 
The tensions between Mormon local officials and non-Mormon federal 
officials began almost immediately.  By December 1851, the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the Territory, one of the two Associate Justices, 
and the Secretary for the Territory had resigned and left the territory.141  
                                                          
changing family structures that heighten vulnerability of family members); see also 
Windsor Historians' Amici Brief at 37-39 (Congress' campaign to end polygamy was so 
intense because Congress knew it could not affect polygamy once Utah became a 
state). 
 136. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 137. See 1 HISPANIC AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CULTURES 375 (Miguel de la Torre ed. 
2009); see also Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban 
on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 298 (2010) (discussing the intense 
evangelism, and other religious doctrines that prompted the Mormons to seek their own 
territory within the United States). 
 138. An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, ch. 51, § 1, 9 Stat. 453, 
453 (1850). 
 139. James Buchanan, State of the Union Address, Dec. 8, 1857, in STATE OF THE 
UNION ADDRESSES BY JAMES BUCHANAN 3, 25-26 (2003), 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/uspressu/SUaddressJBuchanan.pdf 
(discussing the difficulty of Young’s dual roles). 
 140. Accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 1804 (1873) (noting difficulty that 
Young had fourteen wives when appointed Governor, and Congress later allowed 
polygamy to stand for some ten to twelve years before doing something about it). 
 141. CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 91 (1852). 
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Upon hearing of the uproar in Utah, the House of Representatives asked the 
Executive Branch to deliver a report.  In 1852, President Millard Fillmore 
relayed to Congress a report from Secretary of State Daniel Webster.  That 
report was delivered a full ten years before Congress banned polygamy.  
The documents that it contained reveal extensive information of, at least, 
the U.S. government’s view of what was happening in Utah. 
Essentially, in a lengthy letter, the judges claimed that Utah had become 
a theocracy and the Mormon Church had usurped the federal government’s 
role.  They accused the Church of controlling the opinions, actions, 
property, and lives of its members; “usurping and exercising the functions 
of legislation and judicial business in the Territory” (including conducting 
its own trials without a jury); “organizing and commanding the military; 
disposing of the public lands, upon its own terms; coining money, stamped, 
‘Holiness to the Lord,’ and forcing its circulation at a standard fifteen or 
twenty percent above its real value; openly sanctioning and defending 
polygamy . . .  extracting the tenth part of everything from members, under 
the name of tithing, and enormous taxes, from citizens, not members.”142  
Of Brigham Young they said that he exacted absolute obedience and “[h]is 
opinions and wishes were [the people’s] opinions and wishes.”143 
They further accused Young of insisting that only Mormons be 
appointed to public office in Utah, of insulting the government of the 
United States and government officials in his speeches, and of riling up 
citizens to threaten federal officials both generally and in particular, with 
physical harm.144  They accused him of using federal funds for purposes 
other than those Congress had authorized, of producing a fraudulent 
census, and of conducting elections in which aliens were allowed to vote.145  
They claimed that Young refused to meet with them and claimed that 
Young told them that federal judges would never try a single case in Utah 
territory.146  The judges also pointed out that while bigamy was a crime 
under common law, it would, in their view, be impossible to find anyone 
who would convict, for all of the local judges and jurypersons would also 
be Mormon.147  They ended by stating that the Mormons were “living upon 
                                                          
 142. Id. at 86. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 86-87; see also id. at 87 (articulating that the officials felt endangered,  
but also that they felt insulted; one letter relates Young stating in a public speech that 
President Zachery Taylor, then dead, was “in hell,” and that “I prophesy in the name of 
Jesus Christ, by the power of the Priesthood that’s upon me, that any President of the 
United States who lifts his finger against this people shall die an untimely death and go 
to hell”). 
 145. Id. at 87, 88. 
 146. Id. at 86-87. 
 147. CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 89 (1852). 
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the soil of the United States and drawing their sustenance from it free of 
charge,” and that their officers, including Governor Young, were paid for 
with monies provided by the federal government.148  And yet they added, 
“[i]t is impossible for any [federal] officer to perform his duty or execute 
any law, not in sympathy with their views as the Territory is at present 
organized.”149 
The federally appointed Secretary of the territory, who had also resigned, 
submitted a report as well.  It indicated controversy over the handling of 
spending and elections.  The Secretary accused Young of disregarding 
Utah’s Organic Act.  He included copies of correspondence that appeared 
to indicate that Young had attempted to order the Secretary as to how to 
handle federal monies in the territory rather than conceding Utah’s 
obligation to follow federal law.150 
Utah’s sole Congressional delegate, John Milton Bernhisel, wrote a letter 
too.  He reported that his community denied that they mistreated federal 
officers or insulted the government.  Acknowledging that he left the 
territory on travel before the events allegedly occurred, he asked for a 
committee investigation.151 
The sole remaining judge wrote an oddly short letter.  He stated that he 
had decided to remain and that the others could explain for themselves their 
reasons for departure.  But he also cryptically pointed out that delegate 
Bernhisel (whose letter denied that Utah residents had been discourteous) 
was not present in the territory when the events in question occurred. 
The report also included a short letter from Governor Brigham Young to 
President Fillmore.  It simply informed the President that with the 
resignations, Young had appointed a new Secretary pro temp and that the 
territorial legislature had redistricted the territory into one district and 
assigned the cases to the sole remaining judge, all this to fill a void until the 
President could act.152  It said nothing about the reasons for the judges’ 
resignations or Young’s reactions. 
The leading Utah Newspaper, The Deseret News, was largely a religious 
vehicle, dominated by sermons, speeches, and testimonies.  It did not then 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 90. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 85, 91. 
 152. See CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 86 (1852) (describing Young’s 
decision to appoint a new Secretary; it is not clear whether, in doing so, he was filling a 
void or taking advantage of an opportunity to arrange affairs more suitable to his 
preferences); see also An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, ch. 51, §§ 
1-2, 9 Stat. 453, 453 (1850) (appearing to have given Young the authority to redistrict, 
though not to appoint federal officials).  For other expressed concerns about Young see 
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. 31 (1873) (claiming Young had driven from 
competition every Gentile company that attempted to build a railroad in Utah). 
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address the conflicts, perhaps an indication that the Mormons did not want 
to provide fuel for a federal fire.153 
Despite resignations that indicated clear signs of trouble in Utah, 
Congress did not focus in on banning polygamy in this period.  Four years 
later, in 1854, the matter of Utah came up again.  Congress was considering 
a bill relating to the appointment of a Surveyor General for Utah and the 
distribution of territorial lands.154  Under the proposed bill, “white” married 
men were to receive twice the lot of “white” single men (a total of 640 
acres versus 320).155  At the last minute, an Ohio Congressman inserted a 
provision that excluded polygamists from allotments.156  Utah’s delegate, 
Bernhisel, moved to strike the limitation.  That motion set off a furious 
debate over polygamy and more directly the power of Congress to affect 
religion, marriage, and domestic issues in the territories.  Some 
Congressmen expressed surprise at learning of the extent of polygamy in 
Utah.  But while Utah statutes did not mention it, polygamy prevailed in 
Utah and had been an open secret.157 
Some of the arguments presented are similar to the arguments in same-
sex marriage cases.  Defenders of Utah's rights to practice polygamy 
argued that religion and marriage were local matters outside of Congress’ 
enumerated powers and consequently, despite Congress' power over 
territorial lands, any marriage-based federal condition on the receipt of the 
land was void.158  They asked why, if polygamists were to be excluded, 
adulterers in other territories were not excluded as well and why any 
                                                          
 153. The Deseret News is available digitally online through the University of Utah at 
http://digitalnewspapers.org/newspaper/?paper=Deseret+News. 
 154. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1091-92 (1854) (proposing that the 
authority to grant the final disposition of the land rested with the U.S. government). 
Compare An Act to Regulate Surveyors and Surveying, 1851-52 Utah Territory Acts 
1st Sess. 94, 94-96 (1852)  (noting the ability of officials in Utah to appoint surveyors), 
with An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah §§ 15-17, 9 Stat. at 457-58 
(discussing the boundary of Utah’s territory and emphasizing that the laws of the 
Constitution extend over it). 
 155. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1091-92 (1854) (“[T]he benefits of 
this act shall not extend to any person who shall now, or at any time hereafter, be the 
husband of more than one wife.”).  The statute left ambiguity as to whether Mormon 
authorities desired a husband to claim land for each marriage; however, it still appeared 
to allow only one lot per male applicant.  See also id. at 1092 (noting that when asked 
about the damage the restriction would bring, Rep. Bernhisel stated that the more wives 
a man has the more land he needs). 
 156. Id. at 1091-92. 
 157. See id. at 1091, 1095 (noting that the territorial statutes had no mention of 
polygamy or the Mormon Church); see also discussion infra at p. 742 and note 164; 
supra note 140 (Congressman arguing that President and Congress had knowledge of 
polygamy at time of Utah founding). 
 158. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1093 (1854) (citing Congressman 
Phillips when he states that “Congress has nothing whatever to do with this 
transaction” as it is “not necessary or proper” to impose the condition); see also id. at 
1092 (noting the comments of Mr. Bernhisel when striking to amend the proposal). 
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number of bad acts did not block eligibility for land grants.159  They argued 
that the terms for Utah should be the same as the terms for other 
territories.160 They argued that Congress had no power to touch moral 
issues such as religion and that if “discrimination” against the Mormons 
was allowed, other religions would be next.161  They also made a public 
safety argument that the Mormons had suffered significant discrimination 
in their history, that they would take great offense to this condition, and 
that upsetting them would come at a price.162  They argued that the 
Mormons were conscientious and hard workers and truly believed that their 
faith authorized and encouraged polygamy.163  They argued that Congress 
knew about the practice of polygamy when Utah became a territory but did 
nothing to prevent it.164  They argued that polygamy was not yet a crime 
because it was legal under Utah law, Congress had not outlawed it, and 
Congress had no basis for infringing local rights.165  They argued that it 
was unfair to exclude Mormons when land grants were given to “‘outcasts 
from Europe” and “fugitives from justice.”166 
Supporters of the restriction on polygamy had their own arguments: that 
Congress had sweeping power to issue any laws deemed necessary with 
respect to the territories;167 that marriage between one man and one woman 
was ordained by God;168 that states where polygamy was practiced were  
“heathen and have not flourished;”169 that allowing polygamists to have 
bounty lands would attract to Utah licentious individuals and advance the 
degradation of women as married men legally pursued multiple 
                                                          
 159. See id. at 1093 (noting where Congressman Phillips asks why adultery or 
murder was not excluded). 
 160. See id. at 1094 (noting the comments of Congressman Stephens of Georgia, 
who argued that Congress cannot treat religions differently in these territories). 
 161. See id. at 1094 (highlighting the comments of Congressman Stephens of 
Georgia, who argued that such unequal treatment was unconstitutional). 
 162. See id. at 1097 (emphasizing the comments of Mr. Walsh noting that “good 
precepts, and persuasion, will do more to remove polygamy . . . than all the laws you 
can pass here”). 
 163. Id. at 1092. 
 164. Id. at 1097; accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 1804 (1873) 
(documenting Mr. Carpenter’s comments noting knowledge of polygamy when 
Brigham Young appointed and that Congress allowed polygamy to stand for some ten 
to twelve years before doing something about it). 
 165. See id. at 1097 (referencing the comments of Mr. Kerr who argued that the way 
to deal with the “crime” was to directly outlaw it, not address it indirectly). 
 166. See id. (highlighting the comments of Mr. Kerr,); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
338 (1789)  (referencing import of prison labor or “white slaves” from Europe). 
 167. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1101 (1854) (noting the comments of 
Mr. Lyon on this issue when he cites the Constitutional authority for Congress’ power). 
 168. See id. at 1094 (noting the comments of Mr. Smith of Tennessee that this 
reference is singular and not plural). 
 169. Id. at 1101. 
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paramours;170 that affording land to polygamists would constitute the 
federal government’s approval of the practice and by reward lead to its 
increase in the territories;171 that the role of the federal government was to 
fit territories to become republican states and that polygamy was 
inconsistent with this task;172 that every state in the union banned 
polygamy;173 that denying benefits would encourage Mormons to give up 
the practice;174 that polygamy broke up the family circle;175 that the matter 
was not local at all; that not excluding polygamists would give them a 
“bonus” in bounty lands not available to those who adhered to the 
dominant common law approach to marriage; that Congress was giving a 
federal gift and that it had every right to impose the terms of that gift 
consistent with the rules recognized by the states in common.176 
At the time of the 1854 debates, at least one person insisted that the 
federal government would have no power to hinder polygamy in this way if 
Utah territory were in fact a state.177  Of course, were Utah a state, 
disposition of federal land or federal supremacy would not have been an 
issue—and all the states had outlawed polygamy.   
Representatives from slaveholding states were split on the question of 
polygamy.  One proposed that polygamists should even be required to 
forfeit lands that they already held.178 But others saw Congressional 
intervention to ban polygamy as a breach of a local jurisdiction’s right to 
determine its own domestic relations—a breach that might broaden to lead 
the federal government up to the slaveholder’s doorstep.  Said Mr. Keitt 
from South Carolina: 
Now, if Congress has a right to say that no man in the Territories shall 
                                                          
 170. See id. at 1100 (noting that such an allowance would disrupt the “virtuous quiet 
in the unbroken wilderness of the West”). 
 171. Id. at 1096; see also id. at 1095 (noting the comments of Mr. Simmons on his 
concern about western expansion and the potential for the spread of polygamy when 
settlers interact with Mormons). 
 172. Id. at 1095 (referencing the statement Congressman Simmons made when he 
articulated that Congress in the past had determined that “religion and morality” were 
“the basis of free republication institutions” in schooling). 
 173. See id. at 1093 (noting the comments of Congressman Campbell when he stated 
that in every state polygamy was “a high offense”). 
 174. See id. at 1098 (referencing the comments of Mr. Goodrich when he stated that 
if it was not possible to reach Mormon’s on this issue through “moral considerations,” 
it would become necessary to affect their interests in other ways). 
 175. See id. at 1095 (noting that Mr. Simmons also stated that it “spoils the domestic 
relations”). 
 176. See id. at 1098 (noting Mr. Campbell and Mr. Taylor’s comments that those 
practicing polygamy would receive increased benefits); see also id. at 1101 (identifying  
the comments of Mr. Cobb on the power of Congress to condition the grant of federal 
lands). 
 177. Id. at 1092. 
 178. Id. at 1099. 
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have more than one wife, may it not say that no man shall have a wife at 
all?  If it can prescribe the number of wives, may it not altogether 
abrogate the marital relation?179 
Mr. Davis of Rhode Island, referring to the limitation of the land to white 
men, responded by posing his own question: “I would ask the gentleman 
where Congress gets the power to insert the word ‘white’ in this bill?”180  
His question emphasized that federal racial restrictions on land grants did 
not actually have an obvious constitutional basis, especially since 
citizenship was not even a requirement.  He also cried hypocrisy against 
slaveholders challenging polygamy, saying that at least Mormons 
acknowledge their wives and children unlike slaveholders who practice 
“unlimited concubinage” and “sell their children.”181 
It appears the matter was set aside and for a year, Utah continued 
without a federal Surveyor General.  Settlers (many of whom were 
polygamists) effectively squatted on land.182  In February 1855, over the 
objections of a vocal minority, Congress finally passed a statute appointing 
the Surveyor General, without any restrictions on polygamists.183  But a 
year later, the appointed Surveyor General of Utah abandoned his post.  He 
alleged hostilities from the Mormons.184  Still, Congress did not act to ban 
polygamy. 
The tense environment was made incendiary by frequent, often bloody, 
skirmishes between Mormon and non-Mormon settlers moving through 
Utah territory.  A notable one occurred in September 1857, when a band of 
armed men murdered more than one hundred Arkansans traveling through 
Utah.  The incident became known as the “Mountain Meadows 
Massacre.”185  Later that same year, a party of travelers was attacked and 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 1099. 
 180. See id. at 1100 (referencing Mr. Davis’s responsive question about Congress’ 
authority).  Davis did not ask about the exclusion of women.  Although married women 
could access land through their husbands, or children through their fathers, marriage 
remained the key to women’s access.  See also id. at 1092 (mentioning Congressman 
Giddings’ of Ohio statement that Southerners have denounced all attempts to interfere 
with slavery in the territories as a domestic institution but are now in favor of 
interfering with the “domestic institution of marriage in Utah, among the Mormons”); 
id. at 1093 (recognizing that Congressman Campbell came to a similar conclusion 
regarding the Southerners’ discussions about centralization in this context but not 
within the context of slavery). 
 181. Id. at 1092.  Of course, employing the word “concubinage” presents the female 
slave experience only from the male point of view. 
 182. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 14 (1857). 
 183. An Act to Establish the Office of Surveyor-General of Utah, and to Grant Land 
for School and University Purposes, ch. 117, § 1, 10 Stat. 611, 611 (1855). 
 184. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 14 (1857). 
 185. See RONALD W. WALKER, ET AL., MASSACRE AT MOUNTAIN MEADOWS, at IX, 
191 (2008) (stating the emigrants were en route to California). 
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killed in the “Aiken Massacre.”186  Prosecutors could not secure 
convictions of Mormons alleged to be involved.  It was claimed that 
Mormons would not vote to convict a fellow Mormon.  The first Mountain 
Meadows trial resulted in a hung jury.187  The second finally resulted in a 
conviction twenty years after the massacre, and after Congress allowed 
challenges to strike jurors who were polygamists.188 
For his part, President James Buchanan replaced Governor Brigham 
Young and sent new federal agents there.  In his December 1857 State of 
the Union address, he explained his actions, essentially alleging that Utah 
was a theocracy that did not respect federal rule and stating that the troops 
were necessary for protection of federal officers, as so many had resigned 
in fear of their personal safety.189  Ironically, Senator Jefferson Davis—
who would later lead the states of the Confederacy that seceded from the 
Union—commented that it was “palpably absurd” that the President could 
not call upon the predominantly Mormon Utah militia to defend U.S. 
interests in Utah.190  The U.S. military remained in Utah until 1858.191  
Mormon newspapers began to strike back in their own defense.192 
                                                          
 186. See The Judiciary vs. the Administration—Mormon Complicity in Recent 
Massacres, DAILY EVENING BULL., Sept. 17, 1859 (reporting  attempts to collect 
evidence regarding Massacres for trials and request for military aid). 
 187. See The Second Trial of John D. Lee, the Mormon Elder, for the Massacre of 
Emigrants, Known as the “Mountain Meadow Massacre,” Has Just Begun at Beaver, 
Utah, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN, Sept. 18 1876, at col. A (stating the three or four 
Mormons on the jury refused to return a guilty verdict). 
 188. See John D. Lee, the Mormon Who Was Found Guilty of Complicity in the 
Mountain Meadows Massacre, and Condemned to Be Shot Last Month, Is Still Alive, 
with Some Prospect of Escaping Punishment Altogether, Through Technicalities, 
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1877, at 4; Execution of John D. Lee, the Mormon 
Leader in the Mountain Meadows Massacre, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED 
NEWSPAPER, Apr. 7, 1877, at 79.  For trial transcripts and other papers related to the 
Massacre see the website at the University of Missouri, Kansas City available at 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/leetrial.html. 
 189. Buchanan, supra note 139, at 25-26 (noting Brigham Young was head both of 
Church and state and in a conflict, the people of Utah would side with Young and the 
Church; stating Young desires the conflict; noting all the federal officers except for two 
Indian agents found it necessary to withdraw from the territory to protect their personal 
safety; the only government in Utah was the despotism of Brigham Young).  See also 
Report of the Secretary of War, CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1857) 
(reporting to the Joint Session that the people of Utah had established a theocracy and 
rejected the laws of United States; discussing alleged incitement of Brigham Young, 
blaming Mormons for nearby American Indian unrest against United States; expressing 
attempts to negotiate with the Mormons discussing provisions for expedition). 
 190. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (1858) (Sen. Jefferson Davis (MI)) 
(calling the notion that the state militia of Utah could not be called upon to enforce 
United States law against the Mormons a “palpably absurd” situation). 
 191. End of the Mormon Rebellion, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, May 24, 1858 
(reporting the end of the “rebellion” without bloodshed). 
 192. Mormon reactions in newspapers tended to be encased in larger sermons.  See, 
e.g., Discourse By Pres. Brigham Young, Oct. 7, 1857, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857, 
at 340 (stating “hell cannot overthrow us, even with the United States to help them,” 
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In 1858, President Buchanan also used the Utah turmoil and Mormon 
resistance to federal power to call for more funding for a larger Army.193  
Congressional debates focused primarily on whether a larger army was 
needed and the question of respect for federal power in Utah, not on 
polygamy.194  Some accused the President of levying war upon the 
Mormons or using their situation as an excuse to get money for an Army.195  
The debates indicate just how strongly some Congressmen of that era felt 
about federal respect for local powers, even in the territories. 
By the mid-1800s, an invigorated Women’s Movement had provided a 
new argument against polygamy: that it was harmful to women and 
families.196  The debates over slavery also provided fuel for those opposing 
                                                          
and telling U.S. Captain Stewart Van Vliet that Young does not care how many troops 
the government has because “before they get through they will want to let the job to 
sub-contractors”); Expedition Against Utah, id. at 244-45 (speaking of past religious 
discrimination over decades and stating Mormons respect federal government but will 
resist attempts to supplant territorial local control or end  polygamy); Discourse of 
Elder O. Hyde, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857 at 342-43 (accusing others of inciting 
violence against Mormons, accusing the U.S. government and Buchanan of anti-
Mormon behavior and inciting conflicts); Discourse By Elder Geo. A. Smith, Nov. 29, 
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857, at 343 (arguing that the United States never extended 
protection to Mormons); id. at 341 (referring to the “vile and illegal” crusade of 
Buchanan and the U.S. against Utah).  Some argue that the Mormons failed to 
acknowledge any responsibility for tensions or for the Mountain Meadow murders.  
Accord Kristine W. Fredrickson, Scholars Discuss Massacre at Mountain Meadows, 
DESERET NEWS (June 9, 2010, 3:00 PM), www.deseretnews.com/article 
/705384706/Scholars-discuss-Massacre-At-Mountain-Meadows.html (discussing 
scholars who note that Mormons at that time refused to take responsibility and 
considered it an individual problem).  In 2007, the Mormon Church acknowledged that 
some of its former leaders played a role in recruiting Paiute Indians for the massacre 
and it publicly apologized.  Jessica Ravitz, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept, 11, 2007, at 
1. 
 193. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess.  406-07 (1858) (discussing the request). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 407 (Statement of Mr. Toombs (GA)) (articulating that the President has 
no power to make war and some Congressmen “may believe it unnecessary to carry 
vast bodies of troops over the Rocky Mountains, in order to murder those people who 
are called Mormons”); id. at 407-08 (Statement of Jefferson Davis) (denying the sole 
reason for troop request was Mormon War, agreeing no War exists, and saying 
President was not levying War upon the Mormons); id. at 412-13 (Statement of Mr. 
Seward) (asserting that Congress is not taking threat in Utah seriously enough; “Utah 
stands out entirely distinct from the whole line of our past experience;” Mormons 
unlike others who have settled territories who are “men trained up under our own 
Constitution . . . accustomed to the principles and habits of the American republican 
society . . . educated to govern themselves, and maintain their rights and liberties; and 
men also accustomed by habit to submit with loyalty to the Federal Government in 
exercise of its proper jurisdiction over them . . . .”). 
 196. Hamilton Ward (NY) argued the alleged plight of women and noted that 
Women’s Rights Activist, Anna Dickenson, visited Utah’s Mormon women.  CONG. 
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2144-45 (1870).  Ironically, the Mormons gave women the 
vote before the United States did,  but Congressmen argued that the action was merely 
an attempt to increase Mormon voting power and that the women were controlled by 
their men and the Church.  CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. 31 (1873).  Not 
surprisingly, women’s groups argued that the vote should be kept secure for Utah’s 
women.  2 CONG. REC. 522 (1874) (Memorial from New York Woman Suffrage 
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polygamy.  Even before Utah was formed, abolitionists had tied together 
toleration of slavery and polygamy in foreign affiliated churches.197  
Hearkening to this link, the Republican Party, in 1856, branded polygamy 
and slavery, the “twin relics of barbarism.”198 
Those whose primary concern was the supremacy of federal law began 
to lose patience with Utah.  They allowed morality objections and anti-
Mormon animus to grow to full bloom.  On February 23, 1857, Republican 
J.S. Morrill made an extended speech in the House of Representatives 
attacking the Mormon Church and polygamy as morally repugnant.199  It 
did not help that after leaving the Mormon Church, one of Brigham 
Young’s ex-wives wrote a book attacking Young and polygamy.200 
The debates over “The Morrill Act” began in 1860.  The Act was passed 
in 1862.201  Although the Act applied to all U.S. territories, the target was 
known widely to be Utah.  The Act dismantled the Territorial legislature of 
the state of Utah and revoked a certificate of incorporation that the 
territorial legislature had issued to the Mormon Church.  Congress seized 
those lands.202  The Act stated that it was not intended to prevent anyone 
from worshipping God according to conscience, but rather only to “annul 
all acts and laws which establish, maintain, protect or countenance the 
practice of polygamy, evasively called spiritual marriage, however 
                                                          
Society) (asking Congress not to take away Utah women’s vote). 
 197. See Polygamy, EMANCIPATOR, July 29, 1846, at col. D (discussing arguments to 
justify polygamy similar to those to justify slavery and attacking American Board of 
Foreign Missionaries for tolerating polygamy, slavery, and caste systems in churches 
abroad); The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions—Polygamy, 
LIBERATOR, Nov. 13, 1846, at col. E (criticizing the Board’s tolerant stance on 
polygamy and slavery). 
 198. See Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Note, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon 
Polygamy in the Congressional Imagination, 1862-1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 438 
(2009). 
 199. J.S. Morrill, Address to the House of Representatives: Utah Territory and Its 
Laws—Polygamy and Its License (Feb. 23, 1857), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 34th 
Cong., 3d Sess. App. 284, 284-90 (1857). 
 200. ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE NO. 19, at 574 (1876), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=0ngFAAAAQAAJ.  Young also testified before 
Congress.  See also Martha M. Ertman, The Story of Reynolds v. United States: 
Federal “Hell Hounds” Punishing Mormon Treason, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 51, 51 
(Carol Sanger ed., 2008). 
 201. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501; see also 
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 
U.S. 1, 9 (1890).  For another history on the federal government’s approach to 
polygamy see Hasday, supra note 47, at 1357-65; Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peays 
Horses: The Federal Response to Polygamy, 1854-1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29 
(2001). 
 202. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, § 1, 12 Stat. at 501 (“An act to punish 
and prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the United States and other 
Places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Territory of Utah”). 
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disguised . . . .”203  The Act made polygamy a felony in all U.S. territories 
and other places over which the U.S. has exclusive jurisdiction.  Polygamy 
was already prohibited in every other state and territory.  The Act also 
provided that bigamists convicted as felons could not vote.204 
In 1872, Congressman Blair of Missouri unsuccessfully argued for a bill 
to legalize all polygamous marriages in Utah and to cease all polygamy 
prosecutions.  He argued that such legalization was consistent with 
“principles of republican government.”205 
In 1873, Utah sought admission to the Union.206  Once again, polygamy 
became a subject of discussion.  Despite the 1862 Act banning it, and even 
subsequent Acts, the Mormons, including Utah’s Congressional delegates, 
had continued to practice it.207  Challengers to Utah’s admission charged 
the Mormons with placing tolls on public roads, charging exorbitant fees to 
travelers, and impeding travel.208  They claimed that Governor Young had 
driven out of competition all “Gentile” railroad companies hoping to build 
there.209 
Utah’s delegate, W.H. Hooper, denied that Utah had impeded others’ 
rights and said any actions taken were consistent with local rights exercised 
by other states and the freedoms exercised by other religions.210  He argued 
that Mormons were the victims of bias and misrepresentations.211 
In 1874, Congress passed the Poland Act.212  The Act drew back the 
expansive jurisdiction that the Mormons had given to their Probate 
Courts.213  It also provided rules for women seeking to divorce on the 
                                                          
 203. Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 501. 
 204. Id. 
 205. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1096-1100 (1872). 
 206. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 944 (1873). 
 207. See, e.g., 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 491-500 (1907) (discussing various 
challenges over several years to seating Utah House delegates on the grounds, inter 
alia, that they practiced polygamy in violation of U.S. laws).  These challenges were 
usually not successful unless other actions contrary to U.S. interests were also proven. 
 208. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 947 (1873). 
 209. Id. at  948. 
 210. Id. at 945-46; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 29-31 
(1873) (rebutting various allegations). 
 211. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 945 (1873) (noting bias in 
newspapers and comparing Mormon approaches to others that invoke no concern); 
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 31 (1873) (calling attacks on Mormons 
“slander” and noting that they evoke applause on the floor); id. at 29 (alleging that 
those seeking to attack Mormons were forced to go back six to sixteen years and 
“grope in the twilight of fable for causes of complaint”). 
 212. The Poland Act of 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat 253. 
 213. Id. § 3, 18 Stat. at 254 (defining probate court jurisdiction as not including civil 
chancery or criminal jurisdiction); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 946  (1873) 
(noting expensive chancery and common law jurisdiction was given to probate courts). 
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ground that they were in plural marriages.  It appointed the U.S. Marshall 
of the territory to attend all court sessions in the territory, the U.S. Attorney 
to prosecute all actions, and afforded three juror challenges in criminal 
trials: adultery, bigamy, and polygamy.214  The passage of the Poland Act 
and its predecessors laid the groundwork for the successful conviction in 
the Mountain Meadows case. 
The early statutes banning polygamy prevented a married person from 
marrying a subsequent time without divorce.  But technically the language 
of the statute still allowed multiple marriages if they occurred all at one 
time.  In 1882, Congress passed the Edmunds Act, amending the earlier 
statute to close that loophole.215  It also reached back to legitimize the then 
living children of polygamous marriages that with their mothers had been 
rudely tossed out of inheritance and support lines.  The local laws of the 
Utah territorial legislature had protected the children of polygamous 
marriages, but that body was now disassembled. 
In 1887, the Edmunds-Tucker Act allowed a willing wife to waive the 
marital testimonial privilege in bigamy cases to testify against her husband, 
except as to marital confidences.216  This privilege alteration was contrary 
to the common law, which allowed a spouse to prevent even a willing 
spouse from testifying against him.217  It also defined adultery as applicable 
to both married women and married men, banned sexual relationships with 
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity, punished fornication, 
and required marriage licenses. 218 
Court challenges to restrictions on the Mormons would fall on deaf ears.  
In rejecting the claims, federal courts not only relied upon Supremacy, but 
also adopted the moralistic view of Mormonism and the “twin relics of 
barbarism” mantra.219 
Utah was ultimately admitted to the union as a state in 1896.  As a 
condition, it was required to ban the recognition of polygamy “forever” in 
its state constitution.  Even today, the prohibition can only be changed by 
the consent of the United States.220  After Congress suppressed the 
                                                          
 214. Id. §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. at 253. 
 215. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30. 
 216. The Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 2, 24 Stat. 635, 635. 
 217. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). Trammel subsequently 
reversed the common law rule in federal courts allowing a willing spouse to testify 
except as to communications covered by the marital communications privilege.  By that 
time, many other states had already abandoned the common law rule.  Id. at 48. 
 218. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882 § 2, 22 Stat. at 30; The Edmunds-
Tucker Act of 1887 § 4, 24 Stat. at 636. 
 219. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (equating polygamy 
with barbarism); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890) (to the same effect). 
 220. UTAH CONST. art. III. 
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Mormons, outlawed polygamy, and disbanded the territorial legislature, the 
federal government resumed the approach of looking to the local law of the 
Utah Territory, to the extent not inconsistent with U.S. law.221 
In banning polygamy, Congress rejected a category of marriages 
recognized under local law, a category that it had in fact previously 
expressly embraced when it accepted that polygamous marriages could be 
the basis of land claims and implicitly embraced when it did not act to 
eliminate polygamy for more than a decade. 
Utah polygamy cases involved federal territory and plenary power.  But 
plenary power was not the reason the federal government invaded 
traditional provinces of local law there.  Instead, the reasons were 
perceived federal interests that made some believe that polygamy was 
incompatible with the American system. 
2. Immigration Based Rejections 
Congress has plenary power to prescribe the rules for immigration.222  
Numerous marital benefits are attached to immigration.223  While the 
rejection of immigration benefits might be seen as the denial of an incident 
of marriage, because the rejection essentially means that the individual 
cannot remain in the country, the rejection of marriages benefits based on 
immigration rules is essentially a rejection of the marriage’s validity 
overall. 
i. Declining to Recognize Polygamous Marriages in Immigration 
Congress refused to allow immigration benefits to flow from 
polygamous marriages though such marriages were sanctioned in other 
countries where the marriages took place.224  The immigration ban differs 
from the Utah situation because it lacks the context of an immediate threat 
to federal authority or anti-Mormon animus.  But there was a different kind 
of animus present.  Polygamy was often cited as one reason to bar the 
Chinese as a class from immigrating to the U.S., whether or not they 
individually practiced it.225 
                                                          
 221. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1891) (finding that the Utah territorial 
law allowing child of polygamous marriage to inherit should be followed).  In 1890, 
the Court held that despite a polygamous marriage, the marital privilege banned a wife 
from testifying against her husband in a state polygamy prosecution. 
 222. Congress has the power to adopt uniform laws on naturalization.  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  See also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) 
(noting federal government’s broad power over immigration). 
 223. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in 
U.S. Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 382-83 (2009); see, e.g., Kerry 
Abrams, Immigration and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007). 
 224. Smearman, supra note 223, at 382-83.  
 225. An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, 22 U.S. Stat 
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Still, the ban on polygamy was not a new ban.  Bigamy had long been 
banned under the common law and repudiated in the states.226  In 
recognizing the marriages of ex slaves, Congress and the states insisted that 
if they had multiple spouses either due to separation by sales or otherwise, 
they had to choose which spouse they desired.227  Arguably, in the 
polygamy cases involving immigrants, the moral objection to polygamy 
was often an excuse for racism, but racism was not the sole reason for the 
objection to polygamy. 
ii. Rejecting “Fraudulent” Marriages in Immigration 
The federal government has refused to acknowledge marriages entered 
into solely for the purpose of gaining access to the United States.228  On the 
other hand, in a variety of contexts, some states have refused to annul 
“sham marriages,” on the theory that to ignore the marriage vows that 
individuals enter would do violence to the essence of what it means to be 
“married.”229 
Congress’ power to prosecute marriages undertaken solely to gain 
                                                          
58 (May 6, 1882) (limiting the number of Chinese citizens coming into the country). 
The Act stated that the “the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the 
good order of certain localities.”  The order authorized the suspension of Chinese 
immigration for ten years.  See also Ertman, supra note 137, at 306; Ming-sung Kuo, 
The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building: Two Strains of Chinese Immigration Cases 
Revisited, 67 ALB. L. REV. 27, 28 (2003); Smearman, supra note 223, at 391-95. 
 226. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *56. 
 227. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 
100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1184, 1186a (1994)); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-906, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.  
Marriage fraud has been prosecuted, inter alia, under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (prohibiting 
marriage fraud) and 18 U.S.C. §1546(a) (outlawing fraud and misuse of visas and other 
permanent documents).  An “individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the 
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws” faces a penalty of five years 
imprisonment and/or a $250,000 fine.  8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006). 
 229. Hanson v. Hanson, 191 N.E. 673, 674 (Mass. 1934); see also Schibi v. Schibi, 
69 A.2d 831, 834 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only to give 
a name to a prospective child); De Vries v. De Vries, 195 Ill. App. 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1915) (denying annulment where parties entered into marriage to prevent nullification 
of husband’s employment contract); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998, 998 (Sup. 
Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (holding 
similarly to Schibi); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942) 
(denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there 
was an understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v. 
Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159, 164 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1942); Campbell v. Moore, 1 S.E.2d 
784, 790 (S.C. 1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the 
purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL 
1129721, at * 2 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married 
husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband 
knew that was the purpose of the marriage).  See generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage 
Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2012) (discussing when misrepresentations between 
parties would lead to annulment). 
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immigration benefits was recognized in Lutwak v. United States.  Congress 
had passed the War Brides Act in 1945 in order to allow service members 
who had married alien brides to bring their spouses to the U.S. with 
them.230  Several persons were prosecuted for entering into marriages solely 
to obtain, or helping others to obtain, the benefit of immigration.  At the 
time of the decision there was no specific federal statute barring marriage 
fraud.  All plaintiffs had satisfied the technical requirements of the state 
laws for marriage.  Still, the federal government balked at providing 
immigration benefits based upon these marriages.  The Supreme Court 
agreed, stating that to hold otherwise would undercut the statutory purposes 
behind the War Brides Act: 
Congress intended to make it possible for veterans who had married 
aliens to have their families join them in this country without the long 
delay involved in qualifying under the proper immigration quota. 
Congress did not intend to provide aliens with an easy means of 
circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in which neither of 
the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship[.]231 
The Lutwak Court asserted that in making its determination, Congress 
could rely upon a “common understanding” of the term “marriage.”232  For 
the Court, under federal law, this meant “the two parties have undertaken to 
establish a life together and assume certain duties and obligations.”233 
The Supreme Court rejected the view that it or Congress was infringing 
upon state authority.  The Court expressly acknowledged “the general 
American rule of conflict of laws that a marriage valid where celebrated is 
valid everywhere unless it is incestuous, polygamous, or otherwise declared 
void by statute.”234  However, it declared that denying immigration benefits 
did not in fact involve the validity of a marriage, but rather involved 
vindication of the laws of the United States. 
We do not believe that the validity of the marriages is material.  No one 
is being prosecuted for an offense against the marital relation.  We 
consider the marriage ceremonies only as a part of the conspiracy to 
defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United 
States.  In the circumstances of this case, the ceremonies were only a 
step in the fraudulent scheme and actions taken by the parties to the 
conspiracy.235 
                                                          
 230. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.  Under current regulations, parties may prove a valid marriage under federal 
law by providing proof of integrated finances, shared domicile, intimacy and publicly 
holding oneself out to others as married.  See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5) (2009). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 611; see also United States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 
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The Lutwak case is consistent with the conflict of laws notion that a 
forum has greater flexibility when the question is affording the “incidents” 
of a marriage.  However, the practical effect of Congress’ decision not to 
recognize a marriage in immigration is to completely bar the marriage from 
recognition within the United States.  The Court did not cite plenary power 
as the basis for its rejection of the marriage.  Instead, it relied upon the need 
to vindicate the policies of a federal statute. 
It is worth noting, however, that these cases likely pose very few 
problems by way of federalism concerns.  While states might refuse to 
annul such marriages based on local policy,236 they are not likely unhappy 
when the federal government determines that those who did not take the 
vows of marriage seriously should not be allowed into the country as 
“married” persons. 
C. Deviating From the Incidents of Local Marriage Policy, Though Still 
Recognizing the Marriage as Valid Overall 
In the overwhelming number of cases, Congress’ deviation from local 
marriage law is not complete.  That is, Congress recognizes the marriage, 
but overlooks some incidents of state law with respect to the marriage.  I 
would argue that these examples are but differences in degree from broader 
deviations, tailored to meet the perceived federal interest at stake. 
1. The Oregon Donation Law’s Provision for Separate Property Rights for 
Married Women in Oregon Territory 
A historical example of this narrower approach is found in Oregon 
Donation law.237  Congress and the states regularly used a system of free or 
very cheap land grants to encourage white settlers to move beyond the 
original colonies and ultimately from sea to shining sea.  It was common to 
limit those who could take such grants to white males.238  Typically, the 
                                                          
1985); Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1966); Chin Bick Wah v. United 
States, 245 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1957).  But see United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1 (7th 
Cir. 1975); United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).  Cf. United States v. 
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972).  Nor does it matter that the subversion of federal 
purposes was unintentional in DOMA cases.  Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) 
For income tax purposes, the government would not recognize the couple’s contract to 
recharacterize community property as joint property even though it was not done many 
years prior because the husband was ill and in the event of death, the couple wanted 
property to pass outside of probate. 
 236. See discussion supra p. 751; supra note 229. 
 237. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (Oregon land); see infra 
note 344. 
 238. Regardless of parentage, those considered black were expressly excluded from 
the Oregon land grants discussed herein, as were American Indians unless they had 
white fathers.  Oregon passed its own married women’s property act in 1866.  See 
Oregon History: Minorities, OR. BLUE BOOK, 
http://bluebook.state.or.us/cultural/history/history18.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  
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grants also provided that if the applicant were married, he would receive an 
extra portion to support his family.  The “Oregon Donation Law” was 
unique because it provided that a wife would receive that extra portion as 
her own separate legal share, subject, of course, to her husband's control.239  
The reason for deviating from the common law seems obvious.  Congress 
wanted to attract female mates for the men who would settle there (or 
encourage existing wives to take the trip), thus encouraging procreation and 
populating the land with white settlers.240 
In Maynard v. Hill,241 the Supreme Court confronted the question of 
whether a husband could apply as a married man for a double portion, 
obtain a divorce from the local legislature in his wife's absence, remarry, 
and then perfect title through a new bride, thus depriving the first wife of 
her share under the statute.  David Maynard did just that.  Promising his 
wife he would later send for their family, he left Ohio for California but 
ended up in Oregon where he met a new love and high-powered friends.  
He used his influence to obtain a decree of divorce from the territorial 
legislature and then married his new girlfriend.  His wife was not entitled to 
be served with notice because, under the common law, a wife's domicile 
was wherever her husband's was, but Lydia Maynard found out somehow 
and sued.  The Court followed Oregon Law to a point, accepting that David 
Maynard was “divorced” for purposes of federal law.  But that's where the 
deference ended.  Although he was also "married" under local law, the 
Court declined to consider him “married” within the meaning of the federal 
statute. For purposes of federal law, the Maynard was treated as a single, 
divorced man.  By the time of the Court's decision, Maynard and his first 
wife had died.  His new wife secured his portion; his children by his first 
wife, then adults, got nothing.  The short shrift given to Maynard's first 
wife and her descendants establishes that the goal of the Oregon Donation 
statute's spousal provisions was increasing the population of Oregon 
through white families, not recognizing women’s rights or protecting all 
children.242 
                                                          
See also note 344. 
 239. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496. 
 240. Id. 
   241. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 242. See Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29, 33 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4,776) (“The 
evident policy of the law was to give to husband and wife an equal quantity of 
land . . . .  The settlement of a married man is intended for the benefit of his wife as 
well as himself—to enable her to obtain her equal share of the bounty of the grantor.”).  
For an article considering the logic of this provision, see Steven H. Hobbs, Love on the 
Oregon Trail: What the Story of Maynard v. Hill Teaches Us About Marriage and 
Democratic Self-Governance, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 117 (2003) (providing more of 
the backstory for Maynard v. Hill and surmising that population growth was the intent 
of the statute). 
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2. Adoption of a Unique Marital Property Characterization for Fair 
Income Tax Treatment of Community Property and Separate Property 
States 
Another example of deviation as to incidents appears in Congress’ 
efforts to settle differences in income tax treatment between citizens in 
community property states compared with those in separate property 
states.243  Before 1947, taxpayer couples in community property states with 
only one spouse working outside of the home had a financial advantage 
over married couples in separate property states.  Couples in the 
community property states were able to split the income between the 
paycheck and stay-at-home spouses in filing their taxes.  Consequently, 
under a progressive tax system, the community property state couple ended 
up in a lower tax bracket than a similarly situated couple in a separate 
property state.  The latter was forced to attribute all income to only the 
spouse who received a paycheck.  This result occurred because federal law 
followed state law on the definition of marital property.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in Poe v. Seaborn that community property couples could seize 
their advantage in the absence of contrary federal law.244 
This issue was more complex than merely “good” community property 
states that respected women versus “bad” separate property states that 
didn’t.  Despite celebrating the “fairness” and wisdom of their system to 
women,245 most community property states had divested the wife of a key 
aspect of ownership by placing control of the community property with the 
husband.  And while claiming that the community property system was a 
sham to avoid taxes, men in separate property states were using the Married 
Women’s Property Acts to shift property to their spouses, thus claiming 
lower taxes on the theory that the property or income earned from that 
property was not and never was theirs.246  Whatever rule Congress came up 
                                                          
 243. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (grant of petition for writ of 
certiorari) (In creating the marital deduction, Congress assumed a couple made up of a 
man and a woman.); Brief On The Merits Of Amici Curiae United States Senators 
Orrin G. Hatch, et al, at 14-15. 
 244. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930). 
 245. See Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. 
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 37 (1934) (statement of Sen. Henry 
F. Ashurst) (praising his state of Arizona’s system as “chivalry” and “gentlemanly”). 
 246. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110 (dismissing the idea 
that control undercut community property rule); Community Property Income: 
Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd 
Cong. 61, 64 (1934) (statement of Helen Carloss, Department of Justice); Community 
Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 73rd Cong., 184-92 (1934) (statement of Sen. Tom Connally); see 
also Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 38-40 (1934) (statement of Benjamin H. 
Bartholow, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Bartholow 
Statement] (noting that in some states, a husband could alienate property without the 
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with, states were adjusting their laws to try to ensure that their citizens 
received at least as much advantage as citizens in other states.247 
Around 1934, Rep. Allen Treadway of Massachusetts, a separate 
property state, proposed a bill to attribute the income to the spouse who 
controlled it under state law.  The 1934 congressional hearings on the 
subject turned into a debate about the federal government’s power to affect 
marriage laws.248  The Chief of Staff to the Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue Taxation noted that among lawyers everywhere there was a “great 
deal of controversy” over the question of whether the federal government 
could ignore state definitions and tax community property income.249 
The concern that federal officials expressed was the need for uniform 
treatment among similarly situated groups.  General Counsel for the IRS, 
E. Barrett Prettyman, wrote a letter underscoring the role that marriage 
laws played in this outcome.  Looking to who controlled the property was 
fair, he said, because the local laws “make it possible for the taxpayer to 
surrender title to another and to keep dominion for himself, or if not 
technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.”250  Of course, 
Prettyman’s view depended upon a rejection of the “marital partnership” 
theory of the community property system.  Treasury’s Bartholow stated, 
“[a]s time went on, it was felt that the right of husband and wife in these 
community-property states to divide, the income which, in the usual case, 
is earned by the husband as the breadwinner, ran counter to the principle of 
imposing graduated rates on large incomes.”251 
Eventually, Congress decided that it was impractical to force what was 
in effect a common law rule upon community property states, but it did not 
adopt a partnership theory of marriage nor did it continue to allow each 
state to go its own way.  Instead, to accomplish the goal of uniform 
treatment, Congress adopted language that allowed any couple the option 
of income splitting, essentially affording to all the choice of treating 
property as community property for income taxation purposes.252  This new 
                                                          
wife’s consent although he had to use the income for her benefit). 
 247. See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahan, To Save State Residents: States’ 
Use of Community Property for Federal Tax Reduction, 1939-1947, 27 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 585 (2009). 
 248. See generally Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. (1934). 
 249. Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of 
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 10-11 (1934) (statement of Lovell H. 
Parker, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation). 
 250. Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of 
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 24 (1934) (letter from E. Barrett 
Prettyman, General Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue). 
 251. Bartholow Statement, supra note 246, at 31. 
 252. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 111-14 (1948). 
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rule deviated from the past practice of looking to state law. 
There are numerous other examples of partial deviation involving marital 
property rules.  In 1979, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court 
held that benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 were not 
subject to community property rules.253  In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Court 
determined that Congress had preempted state community property rules to 
define retirement rights under ERISA.254 
D. The Unique Case of American Indian Tribal Marriages 
The final case of federal intervention into local marriage laws that this 
article considers is the federal handling of American Indian tribal 
marriages. The relationship between the Indians and the federal 
government was and is far different than the relationship between the 
federal government and its states or territories.  First, Indians were not 
parties to the Constitutional compact; instead they were objects of it for the 
Constitution gave Congress plenary power over matters concerning Indian 
tribes.255  Second, in earlier history, tribal members were not deemed 
American citizens.256  Third, Indian sovereignty, though asserted, was not 
consistently respected.  As early as 1830 the Supreme Court rejected the 
Indians’ claims that they should be treated like “foreign nations” vis a vis 
the states. 257  Instead, the Court said they were “in a state of pupilage,” and 
“their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”258  And, while Congress’ oversight of U.S. territories often 
involved fitting these territories to become states, Congress’ early 
intentions were far less clear with respect to how the American Indian 
peoples' would fit into the populace.  Congress eventually allowed 
individual citizenship but only after the Indians had been forced to cede a 
                                                          
 253. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979). 
 254. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151-52 (2001); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 
520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997) (stating that preemption of state law is required to avoid 
diversion of retirement benefits). 
 255. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (the “Commerce 
Clause”). 
 256. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, Pub. L. No. 175 codified as amended as 8 
USC § 1401(b) (1982) (authorizing Indians to become citizens).  Some Indians became 
citizens pursuant to other laws.  For example, the Act of 1890, which applied Arkansas 
to Indian Territory, allowed tribal members to apply to become American citizens but 
retain their Indian citizenship.  See Act of May 9, 1890, (Oklahoma Organic Act), ch. 
182, §§ 1, 29, 26 Stat. 81, 93 (1890). 
 257. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,17-18  (1831).  Indians could not 
sue in federal court under diversity statute because they were neither citizens of the 
United States nor foreign states despite their claims of the latter. 
 258. Id. For a thorough discussion of federal treatment of their status see Judith 
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1989). 
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great deal of their lands and culture.259 
Still, despite the fact that the Indians were not treated as full sovereigns, 
courts did see the Indians as distinct political communities entitled to local 
governance under traditional conflict of law rules.260  Congress generally 
treated tribal marriage as a local issue, unless a federal interest compelled a 
contrary result.261 
States also sometimes had occasion to interpret tribal marriage issues.  
They too applied conflict of law principles to their decisions.262  Polygamy 
was one notable exception.263  However, sometimes even in polygamous 
                                                          
 259. The government made numerous attempts to force assimilation of the Indian 
tribes into American western culture.  These efforts, which were primarily a response 
to desires of white settlers for more lands then occupied by Indians, tended to have 
disastrous consequences.  See e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706-09 (1987) 
(discussing disastrous federal policies intended to force American Indians to adopt 
farming and private land ownership approaches of whites in order to speed assimilation 
and to free land for white use).  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
officials also encouraged Indians to send their children away from reservations and to 
educate them in government sponsored boarding schools that stressed white and 
Eurocentric culture.  See The Broken Crucible of Assimilation: Forest Grove Indian 
School and the Origins of Off-Reservation Boarding-School Education in the West, 101 
OREGON HIST. QUARTERLY, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), pp. 466-507.  It is clear, 
however, that early on Indians valued their sovereignty and did not want either 
citizenship or assimilation.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18. 
 260. Worscester v. Georgia, 31 U.S 515 (1832) (entitling Indians to local 
governance authority as in Law of Nations); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.  
 261. A 1909 Governmental report explained federal approaches tried to summarize 
federal approaches to Indian marriage law between 1867-1906. It describes the 
approach as treating Indian statutes like the marriage statutes of states, if that custom 
could be proved by congressional standards and was not in conflict with federal law or 
policy.  If local custom could not be proved to satisfaction, then the court followed the 
common law.  Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Special 
Report, Marriage and Divorce 1867-1906, Summary Laws, Foreign Statistics (1909). 
 262. E.g., Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 1845 (1845) (showing that customary 
marriage contracted among tribe in own territory should have been considered valid 
under Alabama law); Weatherford v. Weatherford, 20 Ala. 548 (1852) (declining to 
recognize marriage where no proof conducted according to custom); Compo v. Jackson 
Iron Co., 50 Mich. 578 (1883) (stating at the time in question in lawsuit, Indian tribes 
were sovereigns and absent US law to the contrary, “they have as complete power to 
determine their own domestic relations as any other organized community would 
have”); Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 807 (1912) (recognizing a long tradition of states 
abiding by Indian marriage laws both between the Indians and in cases of 
intermarriage); McBean v. McBean, 37 Ore. 195 (1900) (declaring that a marriage 
valid in the place contracted is valid everywhere).  There was also the view that the 
matter was a federal, not state matter; e.g., Boyer v. Diveley, 58 Mo. 510 (1875) 
(noting that an Indian marriage and inheritance subject to federal not state jurisdiction). 
 263. Regarding public policy see Boyer v. Diveley, 58 Mo. 510 (1875) (referencing 
marriages as between “opposite sex” although that issue not specifically raised).  
Despite the rule of local deference, “when an alleged marriage does not contain the 
essential elements of a marriage as known to our laws, it ought not to be enforced as it 
is “no marriage.”  Wall, 8 Ala. at 48 (excepting incestuous or polygamous marriages 
despite the rule of comity); Tower v. Towie, 368 P.2d 488 (Okla. 1961) (recognizing 
marriage according to Cherokee custom, and noting strong policy in favor of 
presuming legitimacy from the cohabitation); Henson v. Johnson, 246 P. 868 (Okla. 
1926) (recognizing Arkansas law applicable by Act of Congress and that the same 
would look to Indian law but refusing to recognize polygamous marriage as contrary to 
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marriages, courts would find a way to accept the marriage if the context 
involved the inheritance of or legitimacy of an Indian child.264 
The federal treatment of Indian marriage (and even the Indians' own 
treatment of intermarriage with whites) also became intricately tied up with 
white settlers’ quest for land and Indian attempts to preserve their unique 
culture.  Marriage to an Indian woman often conferred tribal membership 
and property rights upon a white husband.265  To prevent the hemorrhaging 
of land and culture and to discourage temporary marriages to Indian 
women merely for the sake of obtaining land, the Indians themselves began 
to seek limits on marriages between white men and Indian women.  Some 
of these restrictions came in the form of limitations on tribal rights flowing 
from female marriage to one outside of the tribe.266  In 1897, the federal 
government reversed this trend by declaring that Indian women who 
married “white” men would have the same rights to property as any other 
member of the tribe.267  They did not consistently offer the same rights to 
Indian women who married black men.268 
In 1890, as part of the Oklahoma Organic Act, an act to establish a 
temporary American government for what was to become the state of 
Oklahoma, Congress specifically declared that all marriages then existing 
pursuant to Indian custom were valid.269  It recognized as legitimate the 
                                                          
federal law and denying attendant inheritance rights); see also, James v. Adams, 155 P. 
1121, 1122 (Okla 1915); Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931, 934 (Okla. 1911). 
 264. Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1890) (focusing on Indians separate and 
capable of managing own domestic relations and children are not illegitimate); Ortley 
v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982 (Neb. 1907) (declaring that children of polygamous marriage 
treated as legitimate);  Kobogum v. The Jackson Iron Company, 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 
1889) (noting that absent federal law, Indian laws control their domestic relations). 
 265. Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 23 Stat. 392 and June 7, 1897, reprinted in 1 INDIAN 
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 38 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1902) (referencing tribal and 
land rights gained through marriage). 
 266. See Compiled Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Article XV, §70 in 1 JOHN L. 
ADAIR, COMPILED LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 246, 276 (1881) (noting the 
importance of tribal cohesion and requiring a white man desiring to marry a Cherokee 
bride to pay a fee, show evidence that he was not previously married, and be supported 
by a group of other Cherokees); see also Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 23 Stat. 392 and June 7, 
1897, reprinted in 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 38 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 
1902) (discussing a white man who married an American Indian woman outside of 
“five civilized tribes” and who did not gain property rights of tribal members or rights 
to her land; an American Indian woman who properly married a white man gained U.S. 
citizenship and also the status of a married woman, but reserved her title in tribal 
property). 
 267. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 90l; see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK ON 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4 (1942) (discussing the Act and effects upon children of mixed 
marriages with whites or blacks). 
 268. COHEN at 4 (noting mixed precedents on effect of Indian woman marrying 
black man). 
 269. Act of May 9, 1890, (Oklahoma Organic Act), ch. 182, §§ 1, 29, 26 Stat. 81, 93 
(1890); see also Sperry Oil & Gas v. Chisolm, 264 U.S. 488 (1924) (discussing the 
Oklahoma Organic Act which made Oklahoma territory); Bartlett v. Okla. Oil Co., 218 
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children of prior marriages, however constituted, thus securing inheritance 
and other rights for them under U.S. law.  But at the same time, Congress, 
for the future, adopted the state substantive law of Arkansas as the law for 
“Indian Territory, insofar as those laws did not conflict with Congressional 
intent.”   The Act exempted that portion of land actually occupied by the 
“Five Civilized Tribes” and certain others of the Indians.270  The Indians 
retained power to punish Indians for violations of Indian laws.  The laws 
also required that U.S. citizens desiring to marry an Indian woman had to 
attend to the customary preliminaries of such marriages as prescribed by 
the relevant tribe.271  The Act purported not to change Indian rights; 
however, some argued that it did alter existing treaties but that the tribes 
had little power to prevent it.272  In the Curtis Act of 1898, Congress 
determined that state law should govern Indians with respect to all matters, 
including marriage.273  But sometimes, courts held these statutes to not 
apply when the cases only involved Indians.274 
In a modern era, the United States has given greater respect to the 
Indians’ right to determine their own domestic relations.275  That deference 
                                                          
F. 380  (1914). 
 270. Oklahoma Organic Act, supra, note 269.  “Five Civilized Tribes” was the name 
whites used for Indians who joined in early treaties with Americans.  See Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 282 (2001) (Souter, J. Concurring)  (noting the Treaty with the 
Cherokees, (1835), U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478. Treaty with the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws, Art. 7, 11 Stat. 612 (1855), and Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles, 
Art. 15, 11 Stat. 703 (1856)). Under these treaties the Indians often ceded land and 
local governance rights for peace; see, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 9, 1835, 
U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478. 
 271. Act of May 2, 1890, § 38, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81, 98; see, e.g, Johnson v. Slate, 60 
Ark. 308 (1895).  Prior to 1890, Indian law applied.  For a general discussion of 
treatment of Indian marriage laws see DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORT, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906, 
SUMMARY LAWS, FOREIGN STATISTICS, 215-17 (1909) [hereinafter COMMERCE 
MARRIAGE REPORT] (discussing application of Arkansas law to Indian territory); 1-4 
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, §4.01 (Inherent Indian Sovereignty). 
 272. 21 CONG. REC. 3712, 3715 (1889) (statement by Mr. Butler) (arguing 
Oklahoma Organic bill breaches treaty, referencing mild letter from Cherokee 
delegation that asked for only two changes though it also noted surprise that offer is not 
worse and saying that the Indians are in the position of “powerless and helpless” people 
and “are simply constrained from force of circumstances to accept this as a choice of 
evils”). 
 273. Act of June 28, 1898; see also Marlin v. Lawallen, 276 U.S. 58 (1928). 
 274. See COMMERCE MARRIAGE REPORT, supra note 271, at 215-17 (discussing 
federal control of Indian Territory, acknowledgement of customs and application of 
state law); see also Barnett v. Prarie Oil & Gas, 19 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1927) recognizing 
applicability of Oklahoma law but applying “exclusive and mandatory” local ordinance 
of Creek Indians as well to determine inheritance). 
 275. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain 
their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations 
among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”); Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (“Although no longer possessed of the 
full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations and laws restricting rights of children born 
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is now being tested for shortly before it issued the Windsor opinion, the 
Supreme Court issued a narrow interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act.276 
While Congress had plenary power over the Indians, when Congress 
deviated the reason was not the plenary power itself.  The reason was a 
determination that respecting Indian local rule conflicted with a perceived 
federal interest.  Very often that federal interest was the desire for land and 
expansion.  Deference to local custom with respect to Indian customary 
marriages was also made easier by the fact that there was no fear that 
recognition of Indian local customs would lead to alteration of state or 
federal marriage customs. 
As with the history of other minority groups that have faced broad scale 
racial or cultural discrimination, an analysis of marriage that focuses solely 
on the narrow lens of “marriage rights,” sells American Indian history far 
short, dismissing racial and cultural discrimination as unrelated to 
marriage.  Actions that weakened the community as a whole—such as 
forcibly removing Indians from lands they occupied and or requiring that 
they adhere to majority cultural norms including marriage norms—likely 
posed as much or even more difficulties for the security of Indian 
marriages, families, and communities, than rules determining whether or 
not a particular marriage was valid or not.277  Such actions magnify the 
impact of unfair marriage rules and restrict the ability of a targeted 
minority community to resist, modify or adjust to them.  It also must not be 
forgotten that those we call in retrospect the “Indians” were in fact many 
tribes with distinctive domestic relations traditions and cultures. 
IV. SUMMARIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO 
                                                          
to female tribal member when the mothers marry outside the tribe are valid.”); US v. 
Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that marriage is consistent with 
Navajo customs and therefore marital privilege shields a wife from testifying in a child 
abuse case against the husband even though exception might apply in non-Indian case).  
But see Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Evolving Indigenous Law: Navajo Marriage-
Cultural Traditions and Modern Challenges, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 292 
(2000) (criticizing the government approaches to cultural norms in particular 
polygamy). 
 276. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 12-399 (U.S. June 25, 2013) (holding that the 
Act did not apply to bar a white couple’s adoption of a part Cherokee child when the 
Cherokee father had declined to support the child, had not exercised parental rights 
before adoption, and had never had custody of the child).  In this case, the baby’s 
mother requested that the father waive his parental rights to avoid child support but did 
not inform the father of plans to put the child up for adoption to any willing couple.   
Only the child’s father is a member of the Cherokee Nation.   
 277. See, e.g., The Indian Removal Act of 1830, 4 Stat 411 (1830) (authorizing 
removal of Indians from lands in the Southeastern United States into Western US 
territories).  See generally John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Values In Transition: The Chiricahua 
Apache From 1886-1914, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 39, 46-82 (2010) (discussing the 
Removal Act and other actions that drove Indians off of lands). 
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MARRIAGE 
A. Deference to Local Rule as the General Approach 
The federal government has historically looked to local laws to 
determine the validity of a marriage (not merely to state laws).  It has done 
so even when acting pursuant to its enumerated Constitutional powers and 
even when its power was plenary.  Of course, deference in the case of 
states does involve unique questions of federalism, but federalism is not the 
sole reason for deference.  It should be noted that deference also might 
have resulted from a kind of "practical federalism," that is a concession that 
given the circumstances and despite federal authority, it is simply easier to 
follow state law.  That law is already well developed; those who it would 
affect are familiar with it; adopting state law may encourage the states to 
buy what the federal government is peddling that week; and often there is 
simply no conflict with federal interests even if deference results in 
variation in application of local laws among the several states.  The same 
practicalities can restrict federal action even when there is a need for it.  
Such was the case, I would argue, in the early termination of the 
Freedman's Bureau work and the failed promises of Reconstruction. 
When acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, the federal government 
has deviated from local deference when deference would conflict with an 
important federal policy.  In some cases, it has rejected the validity of the 
marriage completely for all purposes, such as Utah polygamy laws and 
immigration law barring entry of immigrant "spouses" engaged in 
fraudulent marriages.  These two instances involved assertions of plenary 
power, although the matter of power over the local actions of territories 
was then debated. 
Congress has also accepted marriages completely for all purposes, 
contrary to state law.  The ex-slave marriages conducted under the 
oversight of the Freedmen’s Bureau and U.S. military are examples.278  
That case involved War Powers and, at the appropriate times, the authority 
of amendments to the Constitution with respect to the ex-slaves. 
When federal interests so dictated, Congress has also granted a narrow 
set of incidental rights to marriages even when the state deemed those 
marriages invalid.  The recognition of “slave custom” marriages solely for 
pension purposes when rebel states would not recognize them is such a 
case.  In that situation, the federal interest was recruiting for the U.S. 
military in the context of the Civil War.279 
                                                          
 278. See discussion supra pp. 751-53. 
 279. This construction does not negate the possibility that some Congressmen voted 
for the policy because they wanted to end slavery. 
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Finally, Congress has also adopted different incidents for marriage than 
state or local law would normally suggest, while still recognizing the 
marriages’ validity.  Such was the case with Oregon Donation law and the 
settlement of conflict over the income taxation of marital property.280 
It appears that Congress has deviated only to the extent necessary to 
vindicate the perceived federal interest.  History thus advises caution in 
federal determinations relating to marriage and family.  It also suggests that 
the central question that Courts should consider in reviewing federal 
deviations from state law is whether a legitimate federal purpose is served 
by the deviation, a question that presumes an appropriate federal power. 
B. Three Historical Justifications for Deviation 
I would argue that we can classify the justifications for deviation that 
emerge from history into three categories.  In some cases, more than one 
has applied to a given case. 
1. Fulfilling a Constitutional Duty 
Deviation has occurred when the federal government claimed that 
following local law would conflict with a perceived constitutional duty.  
Here we can place both instances of recognizing slave marriages, to the 
extent that they vindicated a “duty” to save the union or were an execution 
of the promises of the Civil War amendments.281  We can also place here 
the attack on polygamy in Utah, but only to the extent that it was triggered 
by Supremacy Clause concerns or Congress’ constitutional obligations to 
prepare the territories for statehood.  A third example is the rejection of 
state marital property rules for income taxation, to the extent that Congress 
felt the deviation fulfilled a constitutional duty to treat the states uniformly 
as part of its charge to protect the general welfare.  It is doubtful that 
DOMA is needed to fulfill a constitutional duty. 
2. Preserving a Purpose or Scheme in Existing Statutes, Rules, or Treaties 
The second justification of deviation is that following local law would 
undercut an existing statutory purpose or scheme, federal rule, or treaty.  
Here we can place the decision to reject “fraudulent marriages” for 
immigration purposes in vindication of the immigration statute.282  Here 
one can place the deviation from local marital property rules in taxation, on 
the theory that following local law would undercut the predetermined 
progressive taxation scheme or run counter to the implicit statutory 
                                                          
 280. See supra p. 753 (Oregon); supra p. 754 (taxes). 
 281. See discussion supra pp. 721-37. 
 282. See discussion supra pp. 750-51. 
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assumption in then-existing income tax laws that only those who received a 
paycheck earned the marital income.283  Here, too, belongs the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of David Maynard's second marriage in Maynard v. Hill, 
on the ground that Congress did not intend a husband to apply for land 
while married to one wife, divorce and marry a second wife, and still claim, 
as a "married" man, a double portion of territorial land.284  Those who 
argue that DOMA supports procreation are essentially arguing that DOMA 
was intended to preserve a purpose or scheme in existing statutes, rules, or 
treaties.  As I will explain later, there is some merit to the argument that 
procreation is linked to federal statutes affecting marriage, although the 
broadest DOMA went beyond that which is required to preserve that link. 
3. Preserving a Federal Policy That is Neither Already Rooted in an 
Existing Statute, Rule, or Treaty Nor Constitutionally Compelled 
The third justification for deviation is that following local law would 
jeopardize a federal policy that stands apart from any specific statute, rule, 
or treaty and is not constitutionally compelled, but is argued to be 
authorized and appropriate.285  This justification contains the potential for 
the most mischief because the policies, by definition, have not been vetted 
by public processes, as have Constitutional provisions or statutes.  Specific 
historical examples in this category include the attacks on polygamy, but 
only to the extent that they were based upon an antipathy toward 
Mormonism or polygamy.  We can place here rejection of state community 
property characterizations, if based upon conclusions that separate property 
regimes are better for society or even that women, by gender, should not be 
afforded equal ownership in marital property.  In DOMA cases, Plaintiffs 
would claim that the federal policy is anti-homosexual animus.  Defendants 
would argue that DOMA was designed to preserve the institution of 
traditional marriage.  Claims that question the appropriateness of same-sex 
parenting also belong here. 
C. The Role of the “Majority of States,” Uniformity and of the Common 
Law 
 In times of interstate conflict that affected desired federal outcomes, the 
federal government has tended to follow the approach of the majority of 
states and/or the common law.  At the start of the union, slaveholding states 
                                                          
 283. See discussion supra pp. 754-57. 
 284. See discussion supra pp. 753-54. 
 285. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“[U]nless restricted by 
some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil 
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social 
life under its dominion.”). 
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were in the majority, but by the time that the federal government 
recognized slave marriages during the Civil War,286 slaveholding states 
were in the minority.287  Courts have approved of the approach and have 
taken it themselves.288  Thus, while the Supreme Court made history in 
Loving v. Virginia by striking down such laws criminalizing the act of 
interracial marriage, by the time it did so, as the Court specifically noted, 
“only” sixteen of the fifty states continued to have such bans.289  At press 
time, thirteen states and the District of Columbia license same-sex 
marriages.290   
                                                          
 286. See discussion supra p. 721-33. 
 287. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 230 (1860) (lamenting change in 
union and noting slave states were seceding to “check” the “evil of overgrowth of the 
free states.”).  It is well known that until the decade prior to the Civil War, Congress 
had taken pains through a number of compromises to keep the number of slave and free 
states exactly equal as a measure to preserve the union. In 1852, slaveholding states 
argued that the “general government” had abdicated its role as the “common agent.”  
Confederate States of America – Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce 
and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
 288. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (with reference to claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that the fact that all fifty States and the District of Columbia 
have recognized some form of psychotherapist privilege is relevant to the 
appropriateness of federal embrace of that privilege); id. (policy decisions of the states 
bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend 
the coverage of an existing one); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 644 (1953) 
(noting that Congress was entitled to rely upon the “common” definition of marriage in 
rejecting fraudulent marriages intended to procure immigration benefits); Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (deciding whether to recognize a legislative divorce for 
federal purposes, by looking at the common law and the approaches of several common 
law states); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65 (affirming Congressional rejection of 
polygamy and noting that English common law and the laws of the several states found 
polygamy “odious”).  But see Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1, 30-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the notion of looking to the majority of states when the psychotherapist-
privilege had no common law origins).    In early DOMA cases, when it was defending 
the statute rather than attacking it, the Justice Department made the argument that 
DOMA followed the majority of states and was a fair and was a constitutionally 
defensible approach until a national consensus developed.  See Gill v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389-90 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).  
See also, supra p. 105, note 8 (Justice Department abandonment of defense of DOMA.) 
 289. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (noting by contrast that in 
1955, a majority of states had such restrictions); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 753 
(Va. 1955) (noting [m]ore than half of the States of the Union have miscegenation 
statutes” and that “[w]ith only one exception they have been upheld in an unbroken line 
of decisions in every State in which it has been charged that they violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
 290. At press time, the licensing jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington state, and the District of Columbia.  See D.C. 
CODE § 46-401 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A §§ 650-A, 650-B (2013), available at 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-Ach23.pdf; MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. L. § 2-201 (West Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 
2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 415 (Conn. 2008); Varnum 
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).  The California story is complex and may not be over.  
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This approach of looking to the majority and to the common law seems 
consistent with the founders’ vision of federal power.  Alexander Hamilton 
suggested a federal government was needed in times of conflict among the 
states, to be an “umpire or common judge to interpose between the 
contending parties.”291  Madison defended constitutional emphasis on 
federal sovereignty by noting that states act as “partisans of their respective 
States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest . . . .”292  This 
constitutional obligation to “umpire” for the whole seems to be found in the 
obligation of Congress to “provide for the general welfare” and the 
“common defense” of the United States,293 and in specific obligations to 
create uniform laws.294  It seems inherent in the obligation to “regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states.”295  It is indicated in the very 
nature of a national or “general” government in a federalist system.  
  At the same time, the powers reserved to the states in the Tenth 
Amendment are local powers; it clearly is not the case that a given state's 
                                                          
California recognized them for a time but then amended its Constitution by voter’s 
referendum to define marriage as between one man and one woman with respect to 
future couples.  A California state court upheld the referendum as valid under the 
state’s constitution.  See Srauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (2009) (rejecting the 
challenge solely under California constitution).  Plaintiffs then filed in federal court 
challenging the referendum change under the federal constitution.  In the district court, 
California’s governor and Attorney General at first defended the Constitutional change, 
but later they reversed course and argued against it.  Others intervened to defend the 
referendum change.  The district court hel the change unconstitutional.  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and the case was 
argued on March 26, 2013, the same day Windsor was heard.  On June 26, 2013, the 
same day that Windsor was decided, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction 
to address the California question given that key authorities with responsibility to 
defend the state’s Constution had refused to do so.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, slip op. No. 
12-144 (June 26, 2013).  See also 19-A § 650-A B (2013) available at 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-Ach23.pdf; 19-A MAINE 
REV. STAT., DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 19-A §650-A & B (2013); available at 
mainelegislature.orghttp://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-
Ach23.pdf; MD. D FAM. L. § 2-201 (2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:1-a (2010); D.C. § 46-401 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 8 (2009).  See also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Varnum 
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407, 415 (Conn. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 
2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).  At 
press time, Delaware, Rhode Island and Minnesota had recently approved of same-sex 
marriages.  Katharine Seelye, Rhode Island Joins States That Allow Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at 15; Delaware, Continuing a Trend, Becomes Eleventh 
State to Allow Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2013, at 14; Minnesota Clears 
Way for Same-sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at 12. 
 291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 292. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). 
 293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. pmbl. 
 294. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”). 
 295. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. 
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authority to decide what marriage is within its boundaries must be subject 
to a majority vote of the other states.  By its breadth, the “first” of the three 
DOMAs places tension on these two types of powers over marriage, the 
power of the federal government to decide policies incidentally affecting 
marriage for the good of the country and the power of the states (and the 
people of a given state) to determine what marriage means at the local 
level.  
V. DOMA’S PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
UNDERLYING STATUTES 
Despite the fact that same-sex marriage plaintiffs, including Windsor, 
challenged DOMA on an “as applied” basis, courts have not considered the 
underlying statutes at issue in each DOMA case.296  The notion that the 
underlying statutes might be relevant to DOMA's analysis was first 
referenced at oral argument in Windsor—after this writer circulated an 
earlier draft of this article to counsel for the parties and certain amici.297  
There are in fact three DOMAs.  One DOMA bundles all marriage statutes 
                                                          
 296. E.g., Edith Schlaine Windsor, Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief, ¶1 
(“Declare DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Edith 
Schlain Windsor.”); ¶85, p. 21 (supporting that DOMA “as applied by the IRS” 
requires disparity of treatment of plaintiff and singles out her valid marriage); Gill 
Complaint, ¶10, p. 5 (“It seeks a determination that DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, as applied to 
plaintiffs, violates the United States Constitution.”); Golinsky v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975-76, 980, 1002-03 (discussing “as applied to plaintiff” 
circumstances and involving spousal health coverage). 
 297. The discussion is in the following colloquy: 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But what gives the Federal Government the right to be 
concerned at all at what the definition of marriage is?  
MR. CLEMENT: Well, at least two—two responses to that, Justice Sotomayor.  First is 
that one interest that supports the Federal Government’s definition of this term is 
whatever Federal interest justifies the underlying statute in which it appears.  So, in 
every one of these statutes that affected, by assumption, there’s some Article I Section 
8 authority. 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So they can create a class they don’t like—here, 
homosexuals—or a class that they consider is suspect in the marriage category, and 
they can create that class and decide benefits on that basis when they themselves have 
no interest in the actual institution of marriage as married.  The states control that. 
MR. CLEMENT:—the Federal Government has sort of two sets of authorities that give 
it sort of a legitimate interest to wade into this debate.  Now, one is whatever authority 
gives rise to the underlying statute. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 67-69, Windsor v. United States (No. 12-307) (U.S. 
filed March 27, 2012) available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307.  See also supra note 10.  In Massachusetts v. HHS, the state of Massachusetts 
has made a general Spending Clause argument that DOMA is not germane to the 
spending programs to which it applied.  Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 56-59, Mass, 682 F.3d at 1 (explaining that 
DOMA is not germane to spending and Congress has made no attempt to investigate 
application to each federal statute). 
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together making them impervious to same-sex couples.  Another DOMA 
collapses into the underlying statutes that it defines and thus must be 
judged in the context of each statute. And a third DOMA is merely an 
exercise of Congress' undisputed right to issue definitions for its own 
statutes and, I would argue, affirm the status quo.  Under this DOMA, that 
status quo is the constitutional concern.  I address the validity of these three 
DOMAs in Part VII.  In this Part, I look more closely at the second 
incarnation of DOMA—the one that collapses into its underlying statutes—
to explain how the underlying statutes provide DOMA's authority if any 
and state its purposes, if any.  In particular, I show that some, though not all 
of these underlying statutes do indeed provide evidence that procreation 
support is a key part of federal marriage policy. 
A. DOMA’s Underlying Statutes as Evidence of Authority  
One interpretation of DOMA is that it draws its authority, if any, from 
every statute to which it applies.  One must then ask whether or not DOMA 
was within the authority supporting the original legislation and its purpose. 
That question brings us back to the question of the purposes of DOMA's 
underlying statutes.  Assuming those purposes to be valid, as we must, 
DOMA must be tied to those purposes.298  
B. DOMA’s Underlying Statutes as Evidence of Marital Procreation 
Support Through Economic Policy 
The argument that DOMA supports procreation has been variously 
stated: that the federal government has an interest in children being raised 
by their biological parents, that it wants to discourage out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies, that the government has an interest in ensuring that children 
are raised by their biological parents etc.299  Plaintiffs and supporting amici 
in same-sex marriage cases have challenged the notion that procreation has 
any relationship to federal statutes relating to marriage.300  As noted, the 
                                                          
   298. It may also be necessary to go further, however.  For example, as to statutes 
passed pursuant under an enumerated power plus the necessary and proper clause, a 
challenge might be that DOMA was not a necessary and proper part of the statute.  
Compare Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 Sup. Ct. 2566, 2591-2601 (2012) 
(while noting the permissive nature of necessary and proper clause in rejecting the 
argument that individual mandate is an integral part of a comprehensive scheme of 
economic legislation that is the Affordable Care Act, but concluding individual 
mandate can be defended as a tax).  That inquiry brings us back to ascertaining 
DOMA’s purpose and the purposes of federal statutes affecting marriage. 
   299. BLAG Windsor Merits Brief at 43-49. 
 300. See Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Welfare Law Professors 
Addressing the Merits in Support of Respondents, 4-7 (asserting procreation not an 
essential part of marriage); id. at 8-11 (maintaining that the right to marry and the right 
to procreate are distinct); id. at 11- 16 (arguing that marriage serves other purposes, the 
majority of which are not related to procreation, and the majority of which foster a 
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Obama Administration has abandoned the argument that DOMA advances 
a federal interest in encouraging responsible procreation.301  Courts have 
also rejected the theory sometimes reducing the argument to a claim that 
same-sex couples are not acceptable parents.302  The Second Circuit 
conceded that procreation support could, properly framed, be an acceptable 
reason for the government’s support of traditional marriage but concluded 
that the parties had not shown that DOMA advances it.303 
In this section, I want to couch the procreation argument a bit differently. 
I will argue that the statutes evidence an understanding that the 
heterosexual couple is unique because of the biological imbalance between 
them and because of a history of gender discrimination through marriage.  
Challenges to DOMA have largely been treated as facial challenges.   No 
one has put before the courts evidence that procreation is a theme present in 
                                                          
relationship between the couple); id. 16-25 (contending government does not favor 
biological over other parenthood); id. at 25-29 (stating that the government favors all 
families). 
 301. See supra pp. 709-10, notes 8 & 9 (abandoning the of defense of DOMA); see 
also Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that 
the government, for this litigation, has disavowed the House Report’s stated 
justifications for DOMA including (1) encouraging responsible procreation and child-
bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage, 
(3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources); see 
also The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H. 3396 Before the House of Rep. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1996 WL 256695 (May 15, 1996) (offering justifications). 
 302. See Mass., 682 F.3d at 15 (noting controversy over whether same-sex couples 
would make best parents, stating “DOMA cannot preclude same-sex couples in 
Massachusetts from adopting children or prevent a woman partner from giving birth to 
a child to be raised by both partners” and minimizing broader potential procreation 
concerns); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183, 185 (2d. Cir. 2012) (noting 
that defenders of DOMA virtually conceded that the responsible procreation argument 
“may not withstand intermediate scrutiny” but urge that “same-sex couples have a 
diminished ability to discharge family roles in procreation and the raising of children” 
and dismissing the notion that argument is broader). 
Although all sides’ arguments underwent evolution, the BLAG defendants provided the 
following justifications: (1) that DOMA was a placeholder and that Congress Acted 
Cautiously in Facing the Unknown Consequences of a Novel redefinition of a 
foundational social institution; (2) that Congress was protecting the public fisc and 
preserving the balances struck by earlier Congresses; (3) that Congress was seeking to 
maintain uniformity in eligibility for federal marital benefits; (4) that DOMA furthers 
the government’s interest in encouraging responsible procreation; (5) that Congress 
rationally desired to preserve the social link between marriage and children; (6) that 
Congress rationally desired to encourage childrearing by parents of both sexes.  See 
Brief For Intervenor-Appellant The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United 
States House of Representatives at 39-58, Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 102204/102207/10-2214).  In Windsor, BLAG 
added that Congress can rationally retain the definition of marriage for the same 
reasons the states can.  See Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the United States of Representatives at 25-49, Windsor v. United 
States, 133 U.S. at 786, available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/windsor-
v-united-states/windsor-blag-brief-1-22-13.pdf.  
 303. E.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188 (noting the “promotion of procreation can be an 
important governmental objective”). 
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the design of DOMA’s underlying statutes.  I contend that if one looks at 
the underlying statutes, for which DOMA supplies the definition, one does 
indeed see persistent themes regarding procreation.  On the other hand, 
these themes are not prevalent in all of the statutes that DOMA affects.  To 
illustrate the procreation point, I discuss a few examples here:  ERISA, 
Social Security spousal provisions, marital income taxation, and the marital 
deduction at issue in Windsor.  These examples show that both procreation 
and historical gender discrimination play significant roles in our federal 
statutes relating to marriage. 
1. ERISA 
Initially, ERISA had no spousal provisions and considered only a model 
of employment uninterrupted by births and childcare.  It took ten years of 
lobbying for supporters of women to have the statute amended through the 
Retirement Equity Act (“REA”).  The REA added provisions that 
considered women’s work, pregnancy and caretaking patterns, and the need 
for spousal protections.304  The legislative history of those provisions is full 
of discussions of (1) the effect of procreation and caretaking on women’s 
ability to qualify for retirement benefits; (2) the imbalance between men 
and women (in heterosexual relationships) that allow a husband to continue 
working and obtain promotions, throughout his wife’s pregnancy and 
childcare while the wife must defer some part of the same; and (3) a 
husband’s resulting ability to control retirement assets, to the wife’s 
detriment.  That legislative history offers little doubt that the procreation 
concerns (and in particular, the procreative imbalance existing in the 
heterosexual couple) played a significant role in the design of the REA.305 
The concern was not unwed pregnancies but rather, if marriage was to be a 
primary means of procreation, the unique imbalance in the heterosexual 
                                                          
 304. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 26 U.S.C. § 402, 98 Stat. 
1448. 
 305. Retirement Equity Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 19 Before the Subcomm. on 
Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 6 (1983); S. REP. 
NO. 98-575 (1984).  See 129 CONG. REC. 28,458-59 (1983) (statement of Sen. Robert 
Dole) (observing that while men can do childcare, women bear a disproportionate 
burden; a woman devoting time to childcare may find herself unable to access 
husband’s retirement plan); 129 CONG. REC. 17,039 (1983) (statement of Sen. Peter 
Domenici) (noticing that childbirth and childcare hinder women’s retirement access, 
creating inequities); 129 CONG. REC. 30,369-70 (1983) (statement of Rep. Marge 
Roukema) (“The jobs of childrearing and homemaking are now recognized as being of 
equal importance to those jobs which require a woman to leave the home.” However 
women are disproportionately at risk of old age poverty.); 129 CONG. REC. 34,359 
(1983) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); see also 129 CONG. REC. 28,465 (1983) 
(statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan) (stating that existing pension, tax, and 
retirement laws do not accommodate the special needs of women and homemakers); 
129 CONG. REC. 28,467-68 (1983) (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee) (“Women often 
have shorter job tenure than men, and they are more likely to leave their jobs to raise 
children or take on other traditional family responsibilities.”). 
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couple had to finally be addressed in a modern time. 
While ERISA gave women more protections, scholars have criticized the 
ERISA structure as promoting sexism because the statute gave spouses 
only a beneficiary right and rejected the notion of equal partnership with 
respect to the earnings, even when state law did.  As a result, before 
retirement or death arrives, the wage earner (disproportionately the 
husband) has the right to control retirement assets completely.306 
ERISA's provisions signal how carefully Congress has to be if it wishes 
to maintain a procreation-through-marriage policy.  ERISA is not merely a 
benefit; it also poses a significant burden upon the higher wage-earning 
spouse, one that some couples have sought to avoid through waivers and 
prenuptial agreements.  Congress has to be careful that it does not create a 
regime that allows easier and cheaper cherry-picking of benefits such that 
an overall scheme designed to offset the costs of child bearers and child 
rearers ends up in fact placing them lower on the economic totem pole and 
even risks a loss of protections because persons who have no need for it are 
positioned to lobby against it. 
2. Social Security 
As with ERISA, spousal benefits were not a part of the original 
legislation we now know as Social Security.  They were added in 1939 
along with benefits for spouses, spouses with minor children, dependent 
single children, and dependent single parents of a wage earner.307  The 
reasons for these amendments were set forth in a memorandum from the 
Director of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance to Regional 
Directors and Field Office Personnel: 
Against what are we trying to make our society secure? We are trying to 
make it secure against at least two tangible, concrete things; namely, 
1. A large proportion of the members of that society becoming dependent 
on society for its support—without resources of its own; 
2. Loss of the purchasing power of this same large proportion of the 
                                                          
 306. E.g., Paula A. Monopoli, Marriage, Property and [In]Equality: Remedying 
ERISA’s Disparate Impact on Spousal Wealth, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 61, 63 (2009), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2009/11/4/monopoli.html (describing ways that ERISA 
discriminates against women as childbearers, childrearers, and caretakers).  Some gay 
marriage advocates have argued that denial of same-sex marriage is, or is tied to, 
gender discrimination but they have largely focused only on how heterosexual marriage 
generally promotes male hegemony and on gender stereotyping.  E.g., Andrew 
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 249 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality 
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 231; see also Nancy 
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage 
Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1535, 1549 (1993). 
 307. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 37, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1634-36 
(stating spousal, widow, and children’s benefits). 
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American people.308 
Who were the people who would not have resources of their own about 
which the Director spoke?  They were understood to be overwhelmingly 
women and children.  Under the original law, a man could accrue Social 
Security benefits, then draw them and use them for his family.  But if he 
died prematurely, his wife and children, and dependent parents were left 
with nothing.  At the same time, in 1939, married women were discouraged 
from working outside the home, pregnant women even more so.  When 
women worked outside the home, as many did, they were not entitled to the 
same pay as men.309  This discrimination hurt not only women, but also 
men and families that needed two earners for economic stability.  The Act 
reflects both the fact that women were in fact the nation's child bearers and 
child rearers and the national government's stamp on discrimination to 
ensure that women's careers remained disproportionately centered around 
children compared to men and their economic futures remained tied to 
marriage.  
Although the statute is now interpreted to apply to both male and female 
spouses, the basic design of Social Security is still the same that was 
adopted in 1939.  Biology also has not changed.  The spousal benefits 
design still assumes that one person in a marriage will not have worked 
enough in a paying job to have earned Social Security in his or her own 
right and thus must rely upon a spousal work record.  A spouse must be 
married to her eligible spouse for ten years before she becomes eligible for 
spousal benefits.  A widow receiving Social Security benefits upon her 
deceased husband’s record (or vice versa) loses those benefits if she 
remarries before age 60.310  In Bowen v. Owens, the Supreme Court, 
applying a rational basis test, held that such refusals to grant benefits to 
divorced spouses when they remarry do not constitute gender 
discrimination.311  Indeed it stated that, “Congress was using marital status 
as a general guide to dependency on the wage earner.”  And it drew the 
same conclusion with respect to the discontinuance of benefits upon 
                                                          
 308. John J. Corson, Bureau of Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance, Director’s 
Bulletin No. 35, Reasons for the 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act, 
available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html (reflecting 
that Corson’s views “are a significant expression of the viewpoint of the Social Security 
Board on the ‘39 law and his remarks should be understood as reflecting the views of 
the top administrative officials of his day”). 
 309. Not until 1965 was the right of a married couple to use birth control assured.  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485-86 (1965) (finding that preventing 
married couples from accessing birth control violates Fourteenth Amendment).  
Griswold, a director of a Planned Parenthood clinic, was criminally prosecuted for 
providing birth control advice as an accessory. 
 310. 42 U.S.C. §402(e)(1)(A); id. (g). 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(H), 
(c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(H) (2006). 
 311. Bowen v. Owens, 106 S. Ct. 1881 (1986). 
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remarriage stating that the remarriage rule was based on the assumption 
that remarriage altered the status of dependency on the wage earner.312  
Also applying a rational basis test, the Court has held that it does not 
violate Equal Protection or Due Process for Social Security to deny an 
unmarried mother separate mother's or parental benefits based on the work 
record of her minor child’s undisputed deceased father.313  In so holding, it 
stated that the relevant provision was “intended to permit women to elect 
not to work and to devote themselves to care of children.”314 
If her work record is insufficient in her own right, a spouse does not 
draw exactly what her husband draws.  Nor does she receive what she 
would have made had she not taken the economic hit of childbearing or, for 
older women still living today, suffered extensive gender discrimination.  
Her benefits are limited to not more than half of what her husband draws 
based on his record.  If she is a widow with minor children, she receives the 
independent parental benefit but only so long as she has children who 
under the age of sixteen.  The remarriage provision and the child age 
limitation for widow’s benefits both reflect a pattern found in the early 
Civil War military pension provisions discussed in Part III(A)(1).315  Race 
also played a role historically in this benefit because if her husband 
suffered job discrimination, a wife received less or nothing. 
It is true that, except for older women, Social Security cannot today be 
justified as a remedy for the effects of past broad-scale discrimination that 
threatened to put women on the streets when their husbands died and 
threatened to deny a heterosexually headed family of modest means a 
decent quality of life.  But it can still be explained as tied to procreation by 
its other leg: that Congress wishes to make it possible for one parent 
(today, male or female) to stay at home and that childbearing and childcare 
may affect the ability of the female in the heterosexual family to earn 
sufficiently in her own right.  The first of these theories argues strongly in 
favor of giving same-sex couples with children the right to receive spousal 
benefits, assuming parenthood is established.  The second is not generally 
applicable to same-sex couples, although those with children could 
potentially face a similar situation by mutual choice.  They too could suffer 
disproportionate childcare responsibilities within the couple as so called 
gendered childcare models reflect the reality of caretaking economics in 
                                                          
 312. Id. (emphasis added). 
 313. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979). 
 314. Id. at 288 (“The animating concern was the economic dislocation that occurs 
when the wage earner dies and the surviving parent is left with the choice to stay home 
and care for the children or to go to work, a hardship often exacerbated by years 
outside the labor force. ‘Mother’s insurance benefits’ were intended to make the choice 
to stay home easier.”). 
 315. See discussion supra p. 732. 
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our American system. 
3. Marital Income Taxation 
A federal interest in supporting procreation also plays a role in the 
income taxation of marriages.  Much has been made of the fact that some 
married couples, if they file jointly, can receive a lower tax rate than 
singles.  But this so-called “marriage bonus” comes only to those spouses 
whose incomes are disproportionate.  Why would Congress structure 
benefits so?  Such a structure makes sense if one assumes that childbearing 
and childrearing will interrupt one of the partner’s work patterns.316  It also 
makes sense in a context of gender discrimination that inhibits women's 
economic opportunities. 
4. The Estate/Gift Tax Marital Deduction in Windsor 
The argument that procreation support lies at the heart of the marital 
deduction is a harder sell.  Our modern deduction arises directly out of the 
debate between separate property and community property states discussed 
earlier.317  Separate property states attribute all earnings to the spouse who 
receives the paycheck.  Under the theory, the nonpaid spouse is entitled to 
"support" from the paid one, and during marriage does not own any part of 
the income the paid spouse brings home.  By contrast, community property 
states consider the couple to be partners and attribute half of the marital 
property ownership to each, no matter which received a paycheck.  
Consequently, in community property states, only half of the marital 
property passes upon the death of one spouse and thus, only half is subject 
to estate taxation at that death.  The other spouse controls the other half.  
But in separate property states, when the spouses have disproportionate 
income, the higher paid spouse owns the higher share of marital property.  
That person is usually the husband, who is also likely to die first.318   
Because of the drastically progressive nature of estate and gift taxation, 
married men in separate property states tended to pay more taxes at death, 
while those in community property states had, in effect, the benefit of 
                                                          
 316. Couples with middle to lower incomes are least likely to benefit from the 
“bonus” because they are more likely to need two spouses working outside the home. 
Disproportionately, these couples are black, another fact demonstrating the link 
between racial prejudice which suppressed the ability of black males to support their 
families in such a patriarchial system and marital benefits.  Dorothy Brown, Racial 
Equality In The Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy Got To Do With It?, 21 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1999). 
 317. E.g., Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on S. 395, S. 404, S. 574, and 
S. 858 Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 
97th Cong., pt. 1, at 11 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept.]; see 
discussion supra p. 754-57. 
 318. 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept., supra note 317, at 11. 
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income splitting that placed them in lower tax brackets.  This held true 
even though many community property states that split ownership of 
marital property still gave the husband the right to control all marital 
property.  While some men in separate property states gave property to 
their wives, they risked that she might not give it back when desired, might 
not concede control, or even worse that after death another man might 
ultimately become its owner or controller.  
Congress tried to remedy this perceived unfairness but it never adopted 
the community property system of taxation.  For example, in 1942, 
Congress tried to attribute all of community property to the husband at his 
death, unless it could be proven the wife earned it.  This posed a “tracing” 
problem.319  Moreover, men in separate property states adopted the practice 
of giving the wife only a life estate and then passing the remainder to 
children or others.  Because a life estate expired at death, there was no 
transfer tax on property passing upon the wife’s demise.  On the other 
hand, in community property states a husband could not control the entire 
estate in this way at death because he technically only owned half of it, 
even if he was the only wage earner.320 
To address these concerns, at the same time that Congress allowed 
married couples to elect to file jointly, Congress created the marital 
deduction at issue in Windsor.321  In 1981, it removed all limits.322  Now 
spouses can leave an unlimited amount to each other free of estate and gift 
taxes.  But in the instance of a couple of biologically imbalanced 
procreators, the law offers many opportunities for the man, who, again, is 
likely to die first, to exercise power over the entire marital assets.323 
 One could theorize that the purpose for not taxing property passing at 
death between spouses is that the man will likely die first and the woman 
will need support for herself and, more importantly from Congress’ 
viewpoint, their children.  Indeed, when Congress made the marital 
deduction unlimited in 1981, the rules required one to give an outright gift 
to a spouse in order to qualify for the marital deduction.  The surviving 
spouse had the right to use the property as she wished.  But that theory of 
leaving the spouse a nest egg for children was shot to pieces when 
                                                          
 319. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 111 (1948). 
 320. Id. at 27-28. 
 321. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, at 609 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (increasing 
marital deduction amount for lower income couples). 
 322. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)-(b), 95 
Stat. 172, 301; see also 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept., supra note 317, at 11. 
 323. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, at 510-11 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the “widow’s 
election” whereby one spouse can force the other to place her assets in a joint trust by 
denying her access to his half of the community property at his death). 
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Congress decided to amend the terminable gift restriction and adopt 
Qualified Terminable Interest Property (“QTIP”) treatment.  Under QTIP 
treatment, a husband can give a wife a life estate only and still have the 
estate qualify for the marital deduction.324  Thus, a husband could control 
property from the grave, passing it after his wife’s death to children or 
others.  While theoretically the QTIP approach is gender neutral, in context 
it is far from it.  As mentioned above, the use of spousal life estate gifts for 
tax avoidance and retention of control dated back to before 1948.   
The justification for allowing the QTIP approach was expressly stated to 
be children.  It was argued that without the QTIP, a man had to choose 
between leaving property directly to his wife to get the deduction or 
leaving it to his children but lose it.325  It was pointed out the arrangement 
helps persons who may be in second marriages and want to ensure that 
children from a prior marriage or relationship receive a legacy but still 
want to leave support for a present spouse.326  But others argued that an 
overwhelmingly male Congress had offered men a legal way to strip their 
wives of control over devises under the guise of doing what is best for the 
children.  Indeed, some have criticized the QTIP arrangements as sexist and 
a return to “dower.”327  
For better or worse, in fashioning the estate tax marital deduction and 
related provisions, Congress was aware of the unique imbalance existing in 
a great many heterosexual married couples.  That imbalance was imposed 
both by biology but also by a history of government supported employment 
discrimination and gender stereotyping in work and family life.  The 
marital deduction does not seem to be rooted in any modern sense in the 
federal government’s interest in supporting “procreation.”  First, it kicks in 
only at death, but when the large majority of parents die, their children are 
already grown up.  Indeed, in the case of the QTIP, the property only 
passes after the surviving spouse’s death, further ensuring that the children 
                                                          
 324. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (2006).  See Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on 
S. 23, S. 395, S. 404, S. 557, S. 574, S. 858, and S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Estate 
and Gift Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., pt. 2, at 179 (1981) 
[hereinafter 1981 Sen. QTIP Rpt.].  For a discussion of the evolution of the QTIP see 
Irene A. Vlissides, Estate of Clack v. Commissioner: An End to the Conflict Over 
Contingent QTIP Elections?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163 (1997) (discussing history 
and subsequent efforts of taxpayers to diminish even further the control holders of the 
life estate would have in QTIP Trust property). 
 325. 1981 Sen. QTIP Rpt., supra note 324, at 179. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited 
Marital Deduction, 76 N.C.L. REV. 1729 (1988); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital 
Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 301, 305-06 (1995); Mary Moers Wenig, “Taxing Marriage,” 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 561, 572-74 (1997) (arguing that the law of dower was reborn via 
QTIP). 
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will be well into adulthood.  Second, it cannot be said to offset childrearing 
costs because the person who would allegedly have paid the costs is 
already dead when the benefit is awarded.  Third, the QTIP provisions do 
not restrict the passage of the property only to children.  Fourth, the by-
product of the arrangement is not procreation support but rather that a wife 
and mother who has assumed a traditional family role at the government's 
urging is then denied any control over marital assets (and thus of the 
valuable opportunity to favor those beneficiaries who she prefers), save by 
her husband's consent.  All of this under the guise of saving taxes.  Thus, 
the deduction cannot be said to be designed to offset the effects of the 
unique history of gender discrimination against women.  And fifth, it 
benefits only a small amount of people, those with estates of greater than 
the amount of the federal exemption, roughly five million dollars.328  
Finally, there is little evidence that well-off men benefitting from it would 
not marry or financially support the children they create or the mothers 
they impregnate without such a deduction. 
C. Summarizing Federal Procreation Support Through Federal Marriage 
Policy 
It is possible then to see in federal policies and benefits related to 
marriage, a pattern of federal support for procreation.  That these benefits 
or burdens are not afforded to parents who do not marry indicates a 
preference for procreation within marriage, the so-called "responsible 
procreation" position.  Congress does not ignore unmarried parents but 
provides benefits to children born to them in a different way.  Marriage 
statutes go beyond merely giving awards (and indeed even the benefits 
have been grossly overstated).  They also regulate the relationship between 
uniquely biologically imbalanced heterosexual couple.  It is rarely 
recognized that the combination of biology and family economic needs 
may drive what some refer to as gendered caretaking patterns.  Families 
may be deciding that it makes no sense to have both parents lose valuable 
opportunities for advancement and promotion, which could help the entire 
family.  Moreover, if one has already taken time off, purely financially 
speaking, that one is likely to be the best candidate to take even more time 
off, except in rare cases in which the woman actually out earns the man.  
Many couples may simply be making choices that answer to their own 
economic realities. 
Using marriage for supporting procreation, even within the context of 
discrimination, dates back to the common law.  It makes sense that, in an 
earlier time, government required a married man to have fathered a child in 
                                                          
   328. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010). 
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order to receive courtesy (the right to a life estate in his deceased wife's 
property).  If he didn’t have a child to support and who could inherit her 
assets, then he did not need that financial resource which presumably could 
be returned to the man who provided it, her father.329 
It is not through bouts of forgetfulness that the U.S. government has not 
imposed a national system of paid maternity leave and has resisted the 
broad social welfare systems found in European nations.  Witness the cries 
of "socialism" when the Affordable Health Care Act, a step toward a 
national health care program, was being debated.330  By contrast, the 
countries that led the way in adopting a legally recognized status for 
committed same-sex couples are also characterized by extensive social 
welfare systems that do not rely heavily upon “marriage” for supporting 
procreation but do rely on very high taxation.  I would contend that the 
unvarnished truth is that governmental support of marriage has long been 
used—and still is used—as a regime for the private (rather than public) 
financing of childbearing and childrearing, so that one man’s dependents 
do not end up being paid for by other men. That the regime has not been 
totally successful given the number of failed marriages and unmarried 
procreators does not make it unconstitutional with respect to same-sex 
couples. 
At home, it is noteworthy that the first U.S. state to adopt same-sex 
marriage for gays and lesbians, Massachusetts, also thereafter became the 
first in the nation to require health insurance for all of its citizens.  In 
rejecting bans on same-sex marriage, Massachusetts' high court opined that 
supporting procreation was not the purpose of marriage in that state.331  
That choice reflects a local perspective that is different from perspectives in 
other parts of the country.  Yet, the irony is that despite the embrace of 
"marriage equality" for same-sex couples, Massachusetts continues to 
maintain a separate property regime for marriage, it does not have a system 
of paid maternity leave for pregnant employees, and does not offset the 
costs of pregnancy not covered by insurance, except in the form of social 
services for the very poor.  All this leads one to conclude that it must intend 
                                                          
 329. Under state law, “Curtesy” gave a man a life estate in all of his wife’s property, 
real or personal, but only if he had a child.  Grimball V. Patton, 70 Ala. 626 (Sup. Ct. 
Ala 1881) (finding that the husband was not a tenant in curtesy because he had no 
children, thus could not claim any part of wife’s estate covered by trust established by 
her father’s will). 
 330. See, e.g., Affordable Care Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2006); Michael 
McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism: Reps. Louie Gohmert, Steve 
King Attack, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (March 27, 2012, 7:54 PM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmert-steve-
king_n_1383973.html.  See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 Sup. Ct. at 2566 
(upholding provisions of Affordable Care Act against Constitutional challenge).   
   331. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) 
(rejecting notion that in Massachusetts, marriage is for supporting procreation). 
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that husbands support their wives during the inefficiency of pregnancy, and 
that unmarried women eat the costs or go on public assistance, since child 
support is not compensation for a mother's lost earning and earning 
power.332  The point is not that Massachusetts must now become Europe, 
but rather that governmental support of marriage is often an attempt 
(however successful or ill conceived) to ensure that procreation burdens 
remain on identifiable, private shoulders.  It is a way government seeks to 
hold people accountable for their own.  That this is not a good model for 
community in some people's eyes does not make the model 
unconstitutional.  And same-sex couples are not the only group that has 
been excluded by the design of marriage.  Working parents who need two 
incomes also find that the design of many of marriages' benefits filtered 
through the tax system are available only to those who can afford to have 
one partner in the couple stay at home, as in the case of spousal income tax 
treatment discussed in Part III(C)(2). 
In 2003, the General Accountability Office (“GAO”) identified “some 
1100 laws in the United States Code in which marital status is a factor.333  
What GAO did not consider was the extent to which procreation in 
marriage—though encouraged and supported by the government through 
these benefits—contributes to the baseline costs of the parties receiving 
those benefits or whether Congress was trying to offset that cost.  Nor was 
GAO asked to consider how other benefits available to those who are not 
married measure against those given to the married.  Consider, for 
example, that no one compensates a birth mother (or her partner if she is 
part of a couple) for her forbearance from economic opportunities in 
pursuit of having a healthy baby.  Stillbirths and miscarriages carry a huge 
cost as well, despite the tragic end.  Those who bring home a bundle of joy 
from a hospital often also bring home a hefty portion of their bill that is not 
covered by insurance.  On the other hand, if one adopts there is a $13,000 
                                                          
 332. See Website of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 
available at http://www.mass.gov/mcad/maternity1.html (last visited May 16, 2013) 
(guaranteeing eight weeks of maternity leave to women for adoption or birth, but not 
requiring paid leave; suggesting Massachusetts law may require men to receive 
identical leave regardless of birth status of parents); see also Global NAPs, Inc. v. 
Awiszus, 930 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 2010) (interpreting Massachusetts pregnancy leave 
statute to find that a woman not covered by federal leave act who took leave more than 
eight weeks could be terminated). 
 333. In 1997 the General Accountability Office identified “all those laws in the 
United States Code in which marital status is a factor, even though some of these laws 
may not directly create benefits, rights, or privileges.”  U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, 
Defense of Marriage Act, GAO/OGC-97-16 at 1-2 (1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf.  The number of instances was 1049.  
Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman S. 
Judiciary Comm., Jan. 31, 1997.  In a followup memorandum it updated that number to 
1138 as of 2003.  Letter from Danya K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Hon. Bill Frist, 
Maj. Leader, U.S. Senate, Jan. 23, 2004. 
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federal tax credit to offset the expenses of procuring the child (a credit 
available to same-sex couples who adopt).334 There may be good reasons to 
distinguish between heterosexual couples and adoptive couples in funding 
the costs of procuring a child, but the point remains that GAO was asked to 
consider marriage's benefits in a vacuum.   Congress does not have that 
privilege.  It must consider the benefits of the married and unmarried, of 
those with children and those without, of the single and the coupled and 
cohabitating with no children, and of single parents.  Its failure has not 
been that it has failed to establish marriage equality for gays and lesbian 
couples, but rather that it has largely failed to consider the rights of same-
sex couples in marriage and family policy at all. 
VI. USING CONFLICT OF LAWS THEORY TO RECONCILE A PROCREATION-
BASED MARITAL BENEFITS REGIME AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
I have argued that procreation support is a key factor in the federal 
government's support of marriage.  The broad scale attack on procreation 
that has been launched in the same-sex marriage cases seems to assume 
that procreation and same-sex marriage cannot exist in the same system.  In 
this section, I argue that courts should use conflicts of laws doctrines to 
reconcile Congress' authorized choice to use procreation as a key 
component of marriage policy and the legal rights of same-sex couples. 
From the start, it should be noted that this is not a proposal that seeks to 
accomplish "marriage equality," that is, all married persons receive exactly 
the same rights.  It is better described as a proposal for "marriage for all."  
That is, everyone should have the right to be married, but Congress has the 
right to decide that marriages should receive different taxpayer funded 
economic support based on rational criteria.  This writer agrees with those 
who opine that the only reason that the state should be involved in marriage 
policy is to support procreation and its effects on earning power for the 
couple.  If children could be plucked from trees and came with buds 
attached to their bellybuttons that bloomed into twenty-five-year "your 
baby only" support trust funds, no woman or married couple would have to 
experience the economic inefficiency of pregnancy, and heterosexual 
couples could have sex without worrying about birth control and accidental 
pregnancies. Government would then have no need to be involved in 
marriage support because only people who want and are ready for children 
would have them, and parents would have more than enough money to 
raise them.  People don't need government to form family relationships.  
But children are part of the nation's economic juggling act and procreation 
(bearing and raising) is both inefficient and expensive.  Marriage is one 
                                                          
 334. 26 U.S.C. § 23. 
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major way that the government ensures that the larger portion of 
procreation's costs—birthing and raising—are borne by identifiable private 
parties.  While the government provides some initial carrots to sweeten the 
pot, the truth is that, from the public's point of view, marriage without a 
national plan for maternity care is a relatively cheap way to finance the 
necessary work of procreation as a capitalist system moves forward.  And 
the government uses heterosexuality as a marker because that marker 
identifies all of the people it wishes to reach and pregnancy, even today, 
remains unpredictable.  It's an unromantic system for sure. 
The American model has funneled access to legal recognition of family 
largely through marriage.  Our repeated historical error has been that access 
to those family rights often has been made to depend upon who was being 
married, what kind of children they might produce or indeed whether they 
would produce at all.  Blacks procreated the wrong type of children; 
women were too inefficient at procreation; the poor and the ummarried 
procreated at the wrong time (when they were not rich or when they were 
not married); and same-sex couples did not procreate at all.  Thus, no 
legally recognized family rights for you!  All the while government 
continued to attach benefits for those who were entitled by law to the legal 
recognition that is marriage.  Thus, same-sex marriage advocates are right 
that because marriage centered on procreation and the right kind, marriage 
became the key to access to many incidents that bore very little relationship 
to procreation. 
Conflict of law rules help to resolve the dilemma over when a 
procreation standard can be legitimate public policy and when it must bow 
to the rights of individuals to form families as they choose.335  As discussed 
in Part II, under state conflict of law rules, the law of the place where the 
marriage was celebrated governed the validity of a marriage.  On the other 
hand, the incidents that flowed from that marriage were often governed by 
the state where the couple lived.  The logic makes sense.  The incidents, 
especially if they are economic in nature, are far more likely to affect the 
home jurisdiction’s policy interests and coffers.  If the marriage fails, it is 
the forum state that must deal with the financial failures that may follow as 
well.  Similarly, considering federal conflict of law rules, it makes sense 
that while recognizing marriages, Congress has, as discussed in Part 
III(C)(2), declined to apply state community property rules to some federal 
benefits.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable 
restrictions may be imposed as to the incidents of marriage.336 
                                                          
   335. While my focus is marriage, with adaptations, the proposal I offer here could 
apply to state recognitions of marriages and also to government's treatment of non-
marital family benefits. 
 336. While declaring unconstitutional a restriction on marriage by persons who are 
behind in child support payments, the court stated “[W]e do not mean to suggest that 
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I suggest then that we categorize the federal rights related to state 
sanctioned marriage along conflict of laws lines into two categories:  the 
validity of the marriage on the one hand, the incidents on the other. 337  
Marriage confers the legal right to call an unrelated other one's most 
intimate family.  The marital bundle includes the right to be treated like 
spouses by government both in private relations and in public ones, and for 
a whole host of reasons including social, medical, and legal.  I will call this 
bundle of rights that marriage confers simply “family” rights.  I suggest 
that we place the other benefits that government attaches to marriage in the 
category of "incidents" or branch rights.  These branch rights are not core 
to the family relationship—indeed, some are quite new—and they largely 
comprise economic benefits from the public purse.  Congress could take 
these rights away from all couples without altering the traditional notions 
that a person is "married" to another. 
A. “Family” Rights 
Through the incidents that it attaches to marriage and family life, the 
federal government can burden or facilitate family life.  Think of granting 
one couple a government-subsidized right to bring one’s spouse on an 
overseas trip while denying another, granting one the right to live in a 
government-subsidized home but not another, granting one a right to be 
buried next to each other in a government-funded cemetery but not another, 
granting one federal marital privilege but not another.  Such denials burden 
the right to be a family, elevating one party's access to family rights granted 
by government over another party's rights.  
                                                          
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for 
marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.  To the contrary, reasonable 
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”  Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 
(1978). 
 337. Other scholars have proposed using incidents theory in the context of interstate 
recognition of same-sex marriages.  These theories generally propose that a marriage 
would be deemed valid but only with respect to certain incidents.  The downside of 
such an approach of course is that the validity status of a marriage constantly changes, 
tested as each incident arises. I propose to conceptually separate the notions of validity 
and incidents, as a conflicts of law policy has traditionally done.   E.g., Barbara J. Cox, 
Using an Incidents of Marriage Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of 
Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WID. L.J. 
699, 718-58 (2003-2004); Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage And Choice-Of-Law: If 
We Marry In Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 1033 (1995).  Yet another approach would provide all couples the economic 
benefits of marriage but allow differences with respect to rights that could be replicated 
by contract.  See ERIN O’HARA & LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 164-65 (2009).  
Domestic partnership statutes also reflect a different “incidents” approach.  While those 
statutes do not use the term "marriage" for committed same-sex relationships, they 
provide a legal status to such relationships and some or all of the incidents traditionally 
associated with marriage. 
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1.  State Law Should Control Who is “Married” for Purposes of Federal 
Incidents that Affect a Couple's Right To Be a Family. 
 State law should govern the question of whether a marriage is valid and 
who is marital family.  The approach is consistent with longstanding 
federal conflicts of law policy.  Some would argue it is constitutionally 
mandated.  Whatever its source, as I have shown, deviation from state or 
local custom is an extraordinary path for Congress to take.   
Courts must determine when Congress' asserted reasons for deviating 
from local law are valid and when they are not.  In the context of same-sex 
marriages, the holdings of Lawrence v. Texas and Windsor confirm that the 
mere fact that a couple is of the same-sex should not alone constitute 
sufficient public policy to reject marital family status at the federal level 
when states recognize it.338  Moreover, though unnoticed by other legal 
scholars and litigants, the several states now expressly recognize at a 
minimum the right of intimate same-sex couples to contract with respect to 
family life:  to enter into cohabitation agreements, to designate each other 
as personal agents for making health care decisions over otherwise legal 
next of kin and the like.  That move is huge.  In an earlier era, a resounding 
majority would have considered such relationships an abomination, so 
immoral that the state considered any agreements to secure them void.339  
Add those states to the thirteen that have adopted same-sex marriage and 
the seven or so that have adopted domestic partnerships or civil unions, and 
one finds a firm majority of states that have embraced some form of legally 
cognizable way to allow individuals to choose relationships and families 
that they wish.  This writer believes it likely that many other states would 
                                                          
 338. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In Lawrence the court struck down a 
Texas state sodomy statute criminalizing intimate relations between consenting adults 
as unconstitutional. The sexual relationship that was at the heart of the felony charge in 
Lawrence—and rejected as a basis for criminal sanctions—is also at the heart of 
historical objections to marriage. 
 339. The states expressly stating that such contracts are valid are Georgia, Florida, 
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.  See, e.g., 
Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (upholding the contract); Posik v. Layton, 
695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the contract); Swails v. Haberer, 
No. 02-7095, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17727 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (upholding the contract 
applying state law); Boyle v. King, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty, No. GD07-021569, Dec. 
LEXIS 313 (2010) (agreeing the contract would be enforceable but finding none and 
applying other state law instead of divorce code to lesbian couple for property 
separation on breakup of relationship); Cherkis v. Curzi, No. 1989-CE-6173 (Pa. Ct. 
C.P. Aug. 30, 1991) (upholding the contract); Anderson v. Anderson, No. 43CO1-9105-
CP-269 (Kosciusko Cir. Cr., Indiana, 1992) (upholding the contract); Seward v. 
Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding that mere cohabitation would 
not give rise to any benefits, but a written agreement might do so); N.C. CONST. ART. 
XIV, §6 (banning same-sex marriage while upholding the contract); SC CONST. ART. 
XVII, §15 (banning same-sex marriage while upholding the contract); Ross v. 
Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App. 2006) (banning same-sex marriage while 
upholding the contract). 
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also recognize same-sex cohabitation agreements and other documents 
solidifying the relationship between same-sex couples.  Cohabitation 
agreements are not marriage, but the moral objections to the underlying 
relationship in both cases are the same. 
Consequently, there is no reason in the cases of same-sex marriage for 
the federal government not to follow state or local law with respect to who 
is in a marital family.  These marital family relationships exist independent 
of procreation.  From state designations, the government can then decide 
how to allocate the benefits it chooses to attach to those relationships.  
2. For Equal Protection Purposes, Courts Should Apply Intermediate 
Scrutiny to Denials of Federal Benefits that Affect Family Rights.  
In the case of same-sex couples, courts should review refusals to provide 
benefits that affect family rights under intermediate scrutiny.  The reason is 
that, as to these types of rights, same-sex couples constitute a quasi-suspect 
class.  They satisfy the traditional concerns that compel heightened 
scrutiny: (1) they have historically endured persecution and discrimination 
in pursuing their family rights both within and outside of marriage; (2) 
homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; 
(3) with respect to these rights, the class remains a politically weakened 
minority; and (4) when they exercise the right to form families they 
become visible and identifiable.340 
B.“Branch” Rights 
1. Federal Law Should Control Who Receives the Federal Branch Rights 
That Flow From State-Designated Marriages.  
Branch rights are the benefits and burdens that government attaches to 
marriage in order to effect specific governmental public policy objectives. 
Most of them will be economic.  Because of their significant impact upon 
the federal purse and the state’s lack of power with respect to federal 
expenditures, who receives branch rights in the federal context should be 
governed by federal law. 
2. For Equal Protection Purposes, Courts Should Apply Rational Basis 
                                                          
 340. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting 
Supreme Court has applied these factors in determining whether heightened scrutiny is 
needed and citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); id. at 440-41; id. at 442 n.10, 472 n.24. 
By contrast, under Loving v. Virginia, heterosexual blacks are “suspect” with respect to 
both family rights and incidents.  Indeed, as a heterosexual couple, the Lovings met the 
presumed ability to procreation requirement and were still denied access to marriage, 
precisely because of their presumed ability to procreate. 
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Scrutiny to Federal Denials of Branch Rights.  
Generally, the denial of branch rights to same-sex married couples 
should be subject to a rational basis level of scrutiny in an Equal Protection 
challenge.  The key inquiry will be whether or not the statute was intended 
to advance a legitimate interest in supporting natural procreation through 
marriage or address the unique imbalance in the married heterosexual 
couple with respect to it.  I submit that rational bases other than these will 
be few or nonexistant. 
The rational basis test makes sense for branch rights.  These rights have 
never been considered at the core of the right to be married and conflict of 
laws policy has never dictated that one sovereign should follow another 
sovereign’s policies on them.  Second, gay and lesbian Americans as a 
group are not a suspect or a quasi-suspect class with respect to the branch 
rights that are attached to marriage.  Instead, regarding these rights, they 
are like many others who are excluded from marriage's economic benefits 
by Congressional priorities.  Third, such a standard allows the government 
the needed flexibility to make the policy choices it has a right to make in 
spending federal tax dollars.  Fourth many of these incidents involve 
economic legislation as to which the courts have long extended deference 
to Congress’ decisions.341  Fifth, branch rights by definition do not involve 
state power over the family or other significant federalism issues.  Sixth, a 
rational basis standard recognizes that in making funding decisions 
Congress considers far more interests than merely those of same-sex 
couples versus opposite sex couples. 
An example using the Oregon Donation law discussed in Part III(C)(1) 
will explain why suspect or quasi-suspect status for same-sex couples 
should not apply to branch rights and why a rational basis standard makes 
sense.  The Oregon law allowed only white men, Indians who had white 
fathers and white women married to white men to take a share of Oregon 
land.342  Despite the fact that the law was linked to procreation and 
marriage, it did not economically disadvantage gay white men; indeed, 
white males of all orientations were economically favored under law.  They 
could get the essentially free land grant and, unlike women, had the power 
to apply for it in their own right.  The “incidents” of marriage in that day 
which Justice Story identified as discussed in Part II(A)(3)—the disability 
of the wife, the rights of the husband—were of no aid to gay men because 
those disabilities hobbled one of the parties economically without the 
offsetting responsibility or benefit of procreation.343  Two (white) men 
                                                          
 341. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
 342. See discussion supra at p. 753, notes 237-38. 
 343. Thus, Justice Story noted the incidents of marriage were the disabilities of a 
wife and the rights of husband.  See discussion supra p. 719.  As the Oregon statute 
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could work and travel far more widely than other groups.  Each member of 
a gay white male couple could take a lot of land with each partner 
controlling his share.  They could live together and farm it together.  If 
“economic benefits” is the concern as has been emphasized in media, why 
trade the economic situation of two white males for the economic rights of 
a white heterosexual married man holding all power within his home but 
aided by a legally hobbled wife and facing repeated accidental and 
expensive pregnancies?  Indeed, this sole option for marital arrangements 
in earlier centuries—coupled with the fact that gay men could only have 
and legally claim biological children through marriage and intimacy with 
women—was likely a key reason we have so little evidence that gay men 
tried legally to marry other gay men in that era.   Even if there were no 
barriers on same-sex relationships, legal marriage would have made no 
economic sense for gay men in prior centuries because it was riddled with 
sexism that economically crippled one of the partners.  But marriage law 
did significantly disadvantage gay men in terms of family rights.  They 
could not publicly proclaim themselves as in love, or “married” or as an 
intimate family.  Consequently, they could not secure their connection into 
old age and beyond.  Even publicly pursuing the relationship outside of 
marriage could, in some communities, bring serious criminal penalty. 
Women in contrast had no right to land, unless they were married to a 
white man or, after 1853, unless they were once married to one and 
widowed.344  This requirement—to marry a white man—denied lesbian 
women family rights.  If they married white men (which only white women 
could do) they got the economic benefit and likely children, but they lost 
out on the family benefit that they very much desired.  Black women in 
most jurisdictions, regardless of orientation, could either not marry at all 
(due to slavery) or, if free, could often not legally marry white men. 
Two groups had no chance of getting Oregon land under any 
circumstances.  One was women of any orientation who never married, 
straight or lesbian.  The second was blacks.  Male, female, straight, or gay, 
married or unmarried—all blacks, not merely slaves—were disqualified 
from getting Oregon land by statute on the basis of race.345  Poor people's 
                                                          
demonstrates, marriage based economic benefits at the federal level essentially 
followed this model.  Indeed, arguably one goal of such a structure was to place the 
married man on par with the single one and thus encourage marriage in a regime that 
crippled the wife from making significant economic contributions. 
 344. In 1853, Congress allowed widows to claim through husbands who had applied 
for the land, but died.  Donation Land Claim Act of 1853, 10 Stat. 158, §8. 
 345. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, §4, 9 Stat. at 496 (1850) (defining 
racial and gender restrictions).  At that time, blacks were, by far, the largest group of 
those classified as non-whites.  Given how many Spaniards and Mexicans occupied 
these areas, many Latinos were considered “white” and, thereby, would have qualified 
for land.  Those considered non-white would not have qualified.  This writer has found 
no evidence yet of other groups being denied land or applying for it probably because 
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right to the land depended largely upon their race and their gender, not 
upon their class or economic status.   
Some land grant statutes did later allow white women to apply for less 
desirable land,346 and the end of slavery helped ease racial restrictions and 
improve black access.  But the Oregon design (which, remember, was 
novel for its time in allowing married women to have even a share of land) 
demonstrates why the strictest standard of scrutiny should not be applied to 
the denial of branch benefits relating to marriage of same-sex couples.  The 
example demonstrates the need to have standards of review that reflect and 
remedy the discriminatory history in question.  The outcome I suggest is 
also consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Loving.  To discuss 
Loving as merely about the right to marry is, to mix a metaphor, to 
whitewash the case and then to neuter it.  Loving was a case about the 
freedom to marry and form a family as one chooses, but it was also a case 
about race discrimination and about race procreational discrimination.347  
Any approach that ignores this history reduces the “marriage-equality” 
battle to a simple uncomfortable question:  Which white men have the most 
economic rights?  Is it those who prefer the company of women?  Or is it 
those who prefer the company of men?348  
                                                          
their numbers in the U.S. were quite small in 1850.  On gays and lesbians, I do not 
deny the possibility that they suffered discrimination uniquely as gays and as well as 
whatever else they were (e.g., race, gender etc.).  The notion is called intersectionality.  
See, e.g, Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991) (introducing 
notion of intersectionality); Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure 
of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83 (1994) (applying the 
intersectionality theory to gay and lesbian experiences).  Indeed, intersectionality  
advances my argument that one needs to be careful in assuming that all experiences fit 
into the same box. 
   346. The Advantage of Having an Administration that is Posted on Whisky—
Married Women May Now Buy Land, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 19, 1887, at 5.  The 
Secretary of Interior decided that women, including married women, may purchase 
timber and stone lands in states of Mississippi, Louisiana, California, Oregon, Nevada, 
and Washington Territory, provided that land is not suitable for agriculture. 
   347. The Virginia Supreme Court in Loving relied primarily upon its earlier holding 
in Naim v. Naim.  That case held that the policy behind the anti-miscegenation statute 
was to prevent interracial procreation and the creation of a “mongrel breed of citizens.”  
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), overruled by Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.  See 
also Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (stating that Naim is controlling and 
there is no need to reconsider it), rev’d by Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (referring to state’s 
desire not to create a “mongrel breed of citizens” to and to preserve white supremacy). 
Loving was but one brick in a large complex of race discrimination and indeed, but 
considered out of context, the right to marry white people was among the least of black 
people's historical racial hurdles.  The case did not, of course, open marriages' doors for 
either black or interracial same-sex couples. 
 348. Lesbian scholars have criticized the battle for “marriage” arguing that a 
marriage-based regime for social support will not protect all families or meet the needs 
of all gay and lesbian couples.  See Paula L. Ettlebrick, Domestic Partnership, Civil 
Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 905 (2001) (noting 
same-sex parenting always requires three people and arguing for recognition of broader 
relationships other than marriage and questioning attempt to mainstream gay and 
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 One could argue that same-sex couples who are parents under state law 
should have the benefit of intermediate scrutiny when procreation is the 
claimed reason for the benefit.  Under this view the denials of ERISA, 
Social Security benefits and income tax benefits mentioned in Part V(B) 
should be subject to the intermediate review standard for married same-sex 
couples who are parents under state law.  The issue requires more attention 
than this article can provide.  However, brief treatment can outline some of 
the issues.  Arguments in favor are that the federal government has 
traditionally incorporated state law on parenting definitions, the federal 
government does benefit when two parties rather than one commit to 
supporting a child as parents.  Moreover the economics of a family unit 
might still dictate that one parent will need to disproportionately tend to the 
child's needs for the entire unit to move forward most efficiently, rather 
than each taking the economic hit of parenting equally.  Some same-sex 
parents do have natural births although always involving third parties. 
Notably, benefits allegedly targeted for procreation go to opposite sex 
parents who adopt and use reproductive technologies toward parenthood as 
well as those who never have procreated and cannot procreate.  And 
finally, gays and lesbians have faced opposition as parenting couples, not 
merely as individuals, even when they have taken the traditional path of 
being adoptive parents.  
On the other hand, there are also arguments against intermediate scrutiny 
as the standard of review for marriage-related branch benefits relating to 
parenting.  Traditionally, married parents under law commit to supporting 
not only the child but also each other.  It might be argued that the presence 
of the biological tie and the biological imbalance that normally exists in the 
heterosexual couple—and even past gender discrimination within 
heterosexual marriage—are key assumptions in statutes that provide or 
impose marital obligations or benefits tied to parenting through marriage 
(as opposed to providing the benefits outside of marriage).  Moreover, 
when the issue is procreation-related benefits based on a Congressional 
assumption that having biological children within a marriage is preferred, 
with respect to branch benefits same-sex couples do not stand much 
differently than committed unmarried couples or single parents.  On the 
                                                          
lesbian families); Paula L. Ettlebrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. 
Rosenbaum eds., 1997); NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND STRAIGHT AND GAY MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (arguing gay and lesbian couples are 
no more disadvantaged by a marital regime for benefits than other non-married 
groups). 
Other authors have similarly criticized using marriage and "intimacy" as a basis for 
affording family benefits.  See e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTURED MOTHER: THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (asking why 
marriage or intimacy should be the gateway to providing benefits). 
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question of over-inclusion, some heterosexuals who use surrogates or other 
reproductive technologies also have children or might have them 
biologically. Notably, we are speaking here of the standard of scrutiny, not 
of the ultimate decision on whether or not same-sex couples should be 
treated exactly like opposite sex ones. I conclude that the rational basis 
standard should be considered sufficient – for now.   
Moreover, as I have discussed in Part V, even modern statutes appear to 
be designed to cover the negative economic effects of a pregnancy as to 
which both parties played a central biological role.  When the biological 
imbalance assumed by the statutes is not present, the parties have greater 
bargaining power vis á vis each other with respect to procreation.  With 
lesbians, if birth is their choice, either can have the child.  With gay men, 
because neither forgoes economic activity to give birth, they have greater 
economic freedom to choose who among them will be the primary 
caretaker. Moreover, as discussed in Part V(B)(2), rational basis scrutiny 
has been applied to denials of benefits to unmarried heterosexual biological 
parents under state law who without question are biologically unbalanced 
vis á vis each other, may even be cohabitating, and who may be committed 
to parenting.  In those cases, the man does not legally commit to financially 
supporting the mother though one pregnancy or several that he may well 
have consented to.  Courts generally enforce a father's commitment to 
supporting the child, not the mother.  Surely, using heterosexuality as a 
marker is over-inclusive.  The over inclusion however, could be said to be a 
function of a legal assumption as to the unpredictability of procreation, a 
legal indulgence of the fertile octogenarian fiction, the impracticality of 
testing for procreation given privacy interests, and possibly a recognition of 
the long term financial impact of procreation.  It is not a conclusion that 
how one procreates or whether one procreates does not matter.  
It can reasonably be argued, especially given the newness of the issue, 
that the federal government has a right to weigh in on how the federal tax 
dollars it confers affect the third party rights that are regularly at issue in 
reproductive technology cases for both same-sex couples and for 
heterosexual ones, the trends in reproductive technologies themselves, 
and as on how federal funding will affect the rights of the children or 
potential children at issue.  Finally, one could argue that parenting 
discrimination is a matter not specific to same-sex couples or to marriage, 
and responses should, therefore, be handled outside of it. 
It is true that sexism has long been and continues to be perpetrated 
through marriage policy.  However, there is zero evidence that including 
same-sex couples who did not suffer that history of marriage as a vehicle 
for gender discrimination as same-sex couples will alleviate gender 
discrimination within and through marriage.  Indeed, one could argue that 
policies that make the gender discrimination imbalance less invisible also 
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make it easier to accomplish discrimination.   
The author does not dispute that same-sex couples have been 
discriminated against in parenting or that they can make wonderful parents. 
But other couples excluded from procreation-related benefits (the 
unmarried, in particular) and their children have also faced unique 
historical discrimination with respect to asserting their parental rights.  A 
rational basis standard for dispensing of benefits through marriage would 
give Congress more freedom to consider the rights of all couples excluded 
from marriage’s non-familial benefits.  Moreover the standard would not 
preclude a challenge that Congress should have provided certain 
procreation-based benefits outside of marriage.  So long as the United 
States continues to use marriage as a primary means of supporting natural 
procreation, I believe that Congress is entitled to use heterosexual 
procreation as a lane marker for for procreation-related benefits, subject to 
a rational basis test..  Indeed, the founders likely did not have in mind many 
of the reproductive technologies that can result in parenthood under some 
state laws. 
C. The Plenary Power Exception 
If the Constitution places exclusive or plenary power in the federal 
government to make the relevant decision, even if the restriction directly 
affects family rights, the test must, of course, be rational basis.  Courts are 
clear that in such cases a finger should be placed on the scale in favor of 
federal decision-making even when suspect classes are otherwise 
involved.349  Three obvious instances of plenary power come to mind: 
immigration, the U.S. military, and Congress’ power over American Indian 
Affairs. 
D. The Difficulty of Line Drawing 
Surely some cases of line drawing to identify whether the denied right 
affects a marital family right or is a merely a branch right may be harder 
than in others.  Every federal marital benefit in some way affects the 
family.  In close cases, courts should employ a balancing test to decide the 
primary operation of the right.  A court could also decide that some rights 
should be treated as affecting family rights for some purposes but not 
others, or that government may not block all benefits, but it may offer a 
different level of economic benefit based upon constitutionally defensible 
                                                          
 349. E.g., U.S. v. Mirza, 454 Fed. Appx. 249 (5th Cir. 2011), 132 S. Ct. 1725 (2012) 
(discussing immigration); United States v. Llamas-Gonzalez, 414 F. Appx. 936 (9th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3047 (2011) (discussing immigration); Delaware 
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 470 U.S. 73 (1977) (discussing Indian affairs); 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (discussing Indian affairs). 
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public priorities. 
Another case of line drawing difficulty may arise in determining whether 
or not a statute advances procreation—and how.  This determination will 
often be the tipping point on rational basis review.  It may lead to exclusion 
of same-sex couples that do not have children or the inclusion of those who 
do.  The question of who is a parent will also likely be one that will invite 
controversy, especially in the case of reproductive technologies in which 
third party rights are involved.  Congress and the Courts will have to sort 
out when a statute is merely advancing male hegemony and/or sexual 
orientation discrimination and when it advances procreation or another 
legitimate state interest.  
E. Is the Federal Government Required to Use The Word “Marriage?” 
This analysis does not require that the government use the term 
marriage.  The federal government obviously has the right to define the 
terms to be used in its own statutes.  DOMA actually does not prevent the 
government from using a neutral term for all intimate relationships simply 
for the purpose of designating who gets federal benefits.  Take for example, 
a term like “federally recognized intimate partnerships.”350  However, if 
Congress used a single term, if it wished to preserve a procreation-based 
regime, it would still have to create subclasses.  That could be done on a 
basis other than sexual orientation, but I cannot see that the division with 
respect to branch rights is compelled.  Moreover, it is a fact that marriage is 
uniquely a state-created notion.  Employing that name at the federal level 
may help states that embrace same-sex marriage, but it could also 
negatively affect the rights of those states that have declined to do so, 
including those that use alternative names for the relationships. 
In fact, not being wed to the term "marriage" for same-sex couples will 
also allow government to expand some benefits that are currently marriage 
related to those couples in jurisdictions that do not recognize marriage.  
The general principle of following state law in making federal policy on 
family matters, could justify the federal government recognizing marriage 
substitutes that some states have adopted in lieu of same-sex marriage such 
                                                          
 350. At oral argument in Windsor, Justice Alito raised a similar question adding to 
his hypothetical that the government defines the word to include same-sex couples. 
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me get to the question I asked Mr. Clement. It just 
gets rid of the word “marriage,” takes it out of the U.S. Code completely. 
Substitutes something else, and defines it as same-sex—to include same-sex 
couples. Surely it could do that. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 99, Windsor v. United States (No. 12-307) (U.S. filed 
Mar. 27, 2012) available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307.   
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as civil unions and domestic partnerships.  Domestic partnerships run the 
gamut in the degree of rights they allow, but they generally allow at least 
some rights that mirror family rights, even if they deny branch incidents.  
The federal government might even be able to base family-related benefits 
upon contracts creating ties that states have agreed to recognize in lieu of 
marriage if such contracts are designed to create the types of legal 
relationships that are consistent with the federal statutory purposes 
establishing the benefit. 
VII. APPLYING THE STANDARDS TO THE THREE DOMAS 
 How does this scheme relate to the three DOMAs?  One DOMA bundles 
all marriage rights together, making them impervious to same-sex couples.  
This is the DOMA that has dominated attention in same-sex marriage 
litigation.  The argument supporting this DOMA, if any, is that DOMA is 
an integral part of a comprehensive legislative scheme supporting 
procreation by heterosexual couples.  The problem is that, as I have shown, 
not all federal statutes vindicate the procreation goal, and this DOMA also 
burdens rights traditionally reserved to the states while denying same-sex 
couples fundamental rights affecting the family.  Because it bundles family 
rights with other rights, this DOMA should be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny and should fall under Equal Protection, as it did in Windsor. 
The second DOMA is a statute that collapses into each underlying statute 
that it defines.  The argument supporting this DOMA is that it is authorized 
by and it is integral to each of those underlying statutes.  More likely, this 
DOMA would survive in some cases, but fail in others.  Whether or not the 
second DOMA stands—the one that collapses into the underlying 
statutes—depends upon which federal policy is at issue.  
Then there is the third DOMA.  This DOMA is definitional.  This 
DOMA does not tell Congress how to allocate marital benefits.  It simply 
limits how Congress can use the term "marriage.”  As applied to all 
statutes this DOMA, should also fail because the definition cannot be 
sustained in all cases, especially without an alternative regime.  However, 
this DOMA may be valid in some circumstances where Congress intended 
to uniquely addresses historical gender discrimination through marriage or 
the procreational situation of the heterosexual couple.  
VIII. APPLYING THE STANDARDS TO THE WINDSOR CASE 
How does the Windsor case come out under this proposal?  The plaintiff 
sought a refund of federal estate taxes paid because she was denied the 
estate tax marital deduction after the death of her spouse.  The Windsor 
case is complicated by several facts.  First, she was married in Canada and 
at the time of her spouse's death, her domicile of New York did not 
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recognize same-sex marriages either directly or under its conflict of law 
rules.  Second, opinions indicate that neither litigants nor the federal courts 
focused upon whether she had already applied for a refund of state estate 
taxes or whether New York had already determined that it would 
retroactively apply its own same-sex marriage laws and grant the tax 
refund.  The Second Circuit simply assumed that New York law would 
control whether or not she was "married" and predicted New York would 
conclude that she was based on New York precedent recognizing foreign 
same-sex marriages for inheritance purposes.  It may not be that easy.351   
                                                          
 351. Below, BLAG challenged Windsor's Article III standing and lost, but seemed 
to concede that state law controlled the question of whether her marriage was valid at 
the relevant time.  See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d. 394, 398 (2012), 
aff'd 699 F.3d. 169, 176, 177-78, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); Brief in 
Opposition at 18-19, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 786 (opposing the petition 
to writ of certiorari before judgment and discussing state law as controlling).  The 
Second Circuit looked to New York law to determine whether or not New York would 
retroactively consider them married at the time of the spouse's death, and it decided that 
New York would.  Windsor  v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176, 177-78 (2012).  It did 
not mention whether or not Windsor had filed an original claim or refund with respect 
to her New York state estate taxes as “married” under New York law.  Neither the 
district court nor the Second Circuit considered that federal law might well determine 
retroactivity e.g., the time as to which a requirement to be satisfied under state law is to 
be met for purposes of federal law, even if state law would govern whether a same-sex 
marriage is cognizable.   
Windsor's complaint stated that New York "recognizes [the couple's] marriage" and 
that it "provided them with the same status, responsibilities and protections, as other 
married people.”  Windsor Complt. at ¶4, p. 2.  In her brief to the Supreme Court, 
Windsor stated that the IRS denied her claim because both spouses were women and 
the deduction did not apply due to DOMA.  Brief on the Jurisdictional Questions for 
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, at 5, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 786.  The brief also 
asserted that New York denied her the state marital deduction because that "[a]t the 
time, New York State for purposes of imposing its own estate, calculated the value of a 
decedent's estate by reference to the estate's federal tax liablility" and that "[t]hus the 
IRS's decision meant" that Windsor owed New York state estate taxes.  Id. at 5, n.2.  It 
said that Windsor has filed a "protective" claim in New York.  It did not indicate that a 
copy of the claim was a part of the Appendix filed with the Supreme Court or part of 
the record below and this author does not have access to all of those records.   
While many states do choose look to federal law with reference to their own estate 
taxes, at the time, New York also still had the right to calculate her liability with 
reference to whether New York considered her married or not. New York was not 
required to follow federal law on that marriage determination.  Thus it is important to 
know whether New York denied the request to treat her as married when she filed her 
return, or whether Windsor only asserted it at a later point.  The question of 
retroactivity for state estate tax purposes is a New York question.  If state law governs 
retroactivity, as the parties suggested to the Second Circuit and as it then opined, then 
New York’s decision governs in both cases.  Moreover, a state determination should 
arguably be a prerequisite to a federal determination.  Otherwise, a state could later say 
“no retroactivity for purposes of state law” and then the very basis for a filer's win on 
the merits would be ripped from under her—but the filer might already have been paid 
the federal refund.  A federal court has the means to certify the question to the state's 
highest court or to require that a taxpayer ask the state tax authorities to rule.  To 
predict state law in that circumstance in such a political context, affects the ability of a 
state to determine to the contrary later as it has a right to do.  If federal law governs 
retroactivity then the question is whether even if DOMA is unconstitutional, that ruling 
should be retroactively applied in the tax context to a marriage that even a state itself 
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Nevertheless, assuming one can validly reach the merits, claims 
likeWindsor's Equal Protection claim should likely be reviewed under a 
rational basis test.  I concede some good arguments that taxation of 
inheritances presents a "hybrid" case and should have the favor of a 
heightened standard.  Descent and distribution are traditionally state areas 
of interest.  While the actual passing of property is not hindered, the tax 
reduces the amount of property that can pass at death and the government 
taxes some property that is normally within the power of the state to 
control.  Thus, a higher tax on inheritances between same-sex spouses 
straddles the line between denying family rights and denying economic 
rights. Moreover the tie to procreation appears distant, at least as the 
deduction is presently designed.  On the other hand, the federal government 
has always had broad power to determine taxation.  It needs that flexibility; 
and, despite claims of some that the rational basis standard is too watered 
down to be meaningful, absent a procreational interest, a rational basis test 
should be sufficient to determine a case like Windsor's in her favor with 
respect to both state and federal property. 
As I have argued, in Part V(B)(4), there is no demonstrable link between 
the modern marital deduction and procreation and, I would argue, no 
rational basis for denying the claim.  Awarding the deduction is also 
otherwise not contrary to federal public policy.  Indeed, while the impact of 
the deduction for Windsor is quite large, the impact on the federal purse 
will be relatively small because so few married couples of any orientation 
                                                          
did not recognize at the relevant time.  The timing of Windsor's claim with New York 
state—how she filed at first and when she filed for a refund—may also matter to 
standing.  
The impact of a decision on retroactivity relates to more couples than those like 
Windsor who went ahead and married despite law.  It is reasonable to ask why 
retroactivity should not also be applied to those couples who wanted desperately to 
marry but concluded the act of legal marriage would be legally fruitless or who could 
not afford to travel to abroad or to another state to be married, or who entered into civil 
unions or domestic partnerships, some prior to their state later adopting marriage in 
fact.  What of those who still cannot marry under state law?  How far back should 
retroactivity go?  Both state and federal governments must also consider whether the 
retroactivity principle is limited to estate taxes (and if so, why?) or whether it applies 
more broadly to other areas of taxation. 
Another approach to the question, considering conflict of laws theory and the 
Constitution, is to consider whether the U.S. is required to retroactively recognize a 
Canadian same-sex marriage—which is the place that recognized the marriage as a 
valid marriage ceremony at the relevant time.  If the answer is that the federal 
government should have recognized the Canadian marriage as qualifying at the time of 
death (e.g., the application of DOMA should be seen as violating Equal Protection at 
the time), the retroactivity problem disappears because the marriage was current at time 
of the spouse's death.  But this case has the wrinkle that the state of domicile would not 
have recognized the marriage at the time, federal tax laws do normally look to the state 
of domicile for defining marriage in the tax context, and so the argument exists that the 
federal government should recognize it for the purpose of branch rights only if the 
several states would or if the state of domicile would have at the relevant time—unless, 
of course, following state law would be deemed to be violating the federal Constitution.  
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have estates large enough to qualify for it.  Finally, while the deduction 
does not restrain the ability of the couple to be a family, it touches upon 
inheritances within families, thereby burdening the state's attempt to have 
Windsor treated just like other families within the state.  Consequently, on 
the merits, if the home state would grant a marital deduction refund based 
on retroactive recognition of a marriage, Windsor and those like her should 
get the federal refund. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The battle over same-sex marriage is, broadly viewed, not merely a 
battle over marriage but a battle over families:  Who can form them?  
Whose will be most financially and socially successful?  Whose receives 
the most publicly funded benefits?  But it is also a theoretical battle over 
what burdens we in the United States believe should be publicly supported 
and which ones we think should be privately borne.  At the center of that 
latter battle is procreation.  Many different groups are competing for 
financial benefits out of the public purse.  Same-sex couples comprise only 
one such group.  Beyond the treatment of same-sex couples one can 
criticize our current procreation centered approach for biases against the 
middle and lower classes, biases against women, and biases against 
minority groups.  Not all of these biases are illegal under current law. 
As I have argued, support of procreation has long been a part of federal 
marriage policy.  It remains so today.  If a procreation policy is to survive, 
Congress must be able to reserve lanes of legal space for the funding of 
differently situated families within that regime.  Heterosexual married 
couples are marked generally by the risk of accidental pregnancies, a 
history of gender discrimination through marriage, and an imbalance in 
procreational position between them.  The more that parties who do not 
share the same interests or concerns are added to the procreation lane, the 
more rapidly legal precedent will erase or dramatically transform any 
protection or benefits intended to deal with that unique situation.  While 
current federal marriage policy continues to discriminate against 
procreating women, abandoning a procreation based marriage regime will 
not resolve those problems.  Indeed, it may make the situation worse. 
So long as the United States continues to use marriage as a primary 
means of supporting natural procreation, I believe that Congress is entitled 
to use heterosexuality as a lane marker for procreation-related benefits, 
subject to a rational basis test.   Congress has a right to design a scheme 
that does not make heterosexual marriage less favored by those it wishes to 
encourage to undertake because the financial benefits measured against the 
financial costs of procreation within marriage are not compelling in a larger 
market.  Congress is also entitled to address gender inequality in 
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heterosexual marriage uniquely given the long history of the same and its 
distinction from sexual orientation discrimination.  It is constitutionally 
defensible, if not wise, for Congress to create zones of interest in family 
policy in order to give voice to the different interest groups, remedy the ills 
of concern, and in order to give voice the very procreation-related concerns 
that are, this writer believes, the only legitimate reason for state or federal 
governments to be involved in financing marriage.  Overinclusiveness of 
heterosexual couples who do not procreate or have not shown they can is 
not desirable, but may be unavoidable.  The issue here is not who will 
receive financial benefits (which may be dispersed within or without 
marriage), but rather who will receive those benefits through financial 
policies that are tied to marriage. The arrangement disadvantages the 
children of same-sex couples, but no more so than the children of 
unmarried heterosexual couples, the latter of whom definitely procreate 
naturally but do not receive for their children benefits related to marital 
procreation. 
 It is not correct to suggest, as some have, that adding new couples to an 
economic benefit does not diminish the rights of those already enjoying the 
benefit.352  Economic benefits operate in a larger marketplace, and a benefit 
given to one group repositions the actors in that marketplace vis-à-vis 
others.  Indeed, that repositioning in the economic marketplace is the very 
point of the benefit. 
The history of marriage in the United States has been both a history of 
using marriage to support procreation and using marriage to promote 
discrimination. Both strands are present in DOMA and the Court wisely 
struck its broadest variation down. But as discussion of what Congress can 
do now moves forward, the courts should strive hard to respect Congress' 
right to set the priorities for public funding that "the people" favor, while 
still requiring Congress to adhere to the principles of federalism and Equal 
Protection in the Constitution. Congress' failure is not that it has not given 
exactly the same benefits to same-sex couples and opposite sex couples but 
rather, that in marital and family funding policy, it has not considered the 
rights of same-sex couples at all.  The courts should require it to do so, but 
also give Congress the leeway to consider not just the narrow theater of 
litigation where those with time and resources contend, but also the entire 
landscape of families and individuals, all of whom should be considered as 
Congress makes family funding decisions. 
 
                                                          
 352. See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 3 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (suggesting that DOMA does not increase benefits for heterosexual couples 
nor do its defenders show how denying same-sex couples benefits would encourage 
heterosexual ones to marry). 
